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Abstract
This thesis provides a detailed analysis of the so-called ‘house money’ or windfall
endowment effect and its main determinants.
Chapter 1 provides a detailed survey on the literature related to the house
money effect. This effect according to Thaler and Johnson (1990) - refers to the
situation where prior gains mitigate the influence of loss aversion and facilitate
risk-seeking. The concept borrows its name from the expression employed in the
gambling parlance of “playing with the house money”, which is used when people
gamble while ahead. As the literature has used a variety of concepts and ideas to
describe the house money effect, this chapter presents and discusses them within
the environment and the related literature that they have emerged. This is done
in order to highlight the predominant answers to the main research questions
raised in the various strands of the literature, namely: (i) whether people treat
money differently depending on its origin; and (ii) the implications of the house
money effect for the experimental methodology in economics.
The literature is organised and presented according to the context in which
the above two research questions have been examined. By presenting results in
each particular context, we pin down the contextual differences that might be
responsible for the presence (or absence) of the house money effect, and lay the
initial ground work to answer a third research question: What drives the house
money effect? In this regard, after we demonstrate the context-dependency of the
house money effect we present the two main interpretations that it has received,
namely that the house money effect is a result of different mental accounting over
windfall gains (‘windfall effect’) or a result of fairness or deservingness concerns
(‘Lockean desert effect’).
Chapter 2 re-examines the house money effect and explores its main driving
forces. For that, we employ a novel experimental design utilising a within-subject
approach, coupled with the use of three different contexts of economic decisions (a
trust game, a set of lotteries and a public good game). Both the within-subject
experimental design and the three contexts of economic decisions allow us to
better test the two main interpretations of the house money effect.
Our experimental data confirm the presence of the house money effect both
in the decision to trust (but not in the decision of trustworthiness) in the trust
game and in the decision to contribute in the public account of the public good
game. However, our findings do not support the hypothesis that changes in
risk behaviour of participants are due to different sources of money, suggesting
that risk attitudes are robust and independent of the origin of money along the
experiment. Therefore, our findings seem to favour interpretations of the house
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money effect as a result of ‘just desert’ or fairness preferences rather than the
result of different mental accounting over windfall gains.
Chapter 3 combines two branches of experimental literature, namely the house
money effect and the literature on individual differences in social preferences.
Both the house money effect and individual differences have been used extensively
to explain cooperation in social dilemmas (and its decline over time). Here, we
test the implications of house money on reciprocal behaviour, that is, whether
participants in economic experiments are less likely to reciprocate when earned
money rather than windfall money is at stake. Using the innovative experimental
design of Fischbacher et al. (2001) with strategy method, we classify participants
according to their behaviour in a linear public good game, and by adding the
within-subject element in our experimental design we test the robustness of this
classification across the different origin of endowments. Our results indicate that
the types’ classification is robust across the origin of money. Contrary to Harrison
(2007), we find that participants’ decision to free ride or not (contribute or not) is
independent of the origin of money, but given that the decision to contribute has
been made, contribution levels may vary -actually be lower- when money is earned
rather than windfall endowed. We also elicit beliefs about others’ contributions
and test how these beliefs affected by the ‘house money’ and in turn how they
affect the decision to contribute. This discussion relates to what the literature
has characterised so far as “anticipatory reciprocity”.
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Chapter 1
A Survey on the House Money
Effect
1.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a detailed survey on the literature related to the house
money effect. The house money effect borrows its name from the expression used
in the gambling parlance of “playing with the house money”, which is used when
people gamble while ahead. An example might make things clearer: imagine that
you have just turned 21 and you are finally allowed to visit a casino with friends.
You have saved £100 to gamble on your special night. As you enter the casino
you see a slot machine and, feeling lucky, you give it a go. Chance seems to smile
and you win £100. The question now is: Are you going to spend the £100 you
won on the slot machine by a lucky hand the same way you are going to spend
the £100 you have been saving the last two months?
The house money effect refers to the situation where “after a gain, subsequent
losses -smaller than the original gain- can be integrated with the prior gain, mit-
igating the influence of loss aversion and facilitating risk-seeking” (Thaler and
Johnson, 1990, p. 657). So if the house money effect holds, the answer to the
previous question is obvious: you will be keener to spend the £100 you have won
rather than the £100 you brought from home.
The question that then arises is the following: Do people treat money differ-
ently depending on its origin, meaning how the money (or the asset, in general)
ended up in their hands? This research question has long triggered the interest
of economists. Friedman (1957), in his seminal work on the permanent income
hypothesis, discusses how people treat ‘windfall (unexpected) money’ differently
than their regular income. Since Friedman (1957) many have looked into this
question, as well as a host of related issues. Different approaches, sometimes
from differing perspectives, have produced a variety of terms and concepts de-
scribing what we have earlier defined as the house money effect. In the rest of
this chapter, we will present and discuss these concepts and ideas related to the
house money effect, as well as the environment and the related literature within
which they have emerged.
There is a second question, though, which is also of prime interest. Assum-
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ing that people do treat the money differently depending on its source, what are
the implications of this house money effect for the experimental methodology in
economics? How can the house money effect influence decisions of participants
in economic experiments where the common practice is to endow participants
with an initial amount of money? What are the consequences for the external
validity of economic experiments and how should the discipline take these consid-
erations into account in order to advance the methodology used? Quoting Levitt
and List (2007, p.170):“By anticipating the types of biases common to the lab,
experiments can be designed to minimize such biases. Further, knowing the sign
and plausible magnitude of any biases induced by the lab, one can extract useful
information from a study, even if the results cannot be seamlessly extrapolated
outside the lab. In this sense, even in cases where lab results are believed to have
little generalizability, some number from a laboratory estimate is better than no
number, provided that a theoretical model is used to make appropriate inference.”
Apart from tackling the two questions discussed above, this chapter also or-
ganises the related literature in such a way as to answer a third question: What
drives the house money effect? This is actually the central question in Chapter 2
of this thesis, but here in Chapter 1 we trace the development of these important
issues and draw out the tensions in prior research. It is hoped that this approach
will prepare the reader and open the path for demonstrating how our subsequent
research questions, findings and results fit into previous scholarly works.
The main contribution in this chapter is that the literature is organised and
presented according to the context that the above mentioned research questions
have been examined in. The obvious question arising at this point is why we
should use this organisation criterion. Although the evidence on the existence
of the house money effect is mixed, there is a general consensus that this effect
is context-dependent1 , implying that different frameworks of examination might
imply different results. By presenting results in each particular context, we will
pin down the contextual differences that might be responsible for the presence
or absence of the house money effect. In that way, we will facilitate our analysis
and discussion in Chapter 2 where we explore what drives the house money
effect. Facilitating our analysis in Chapter 2 further, we will also discuss here
the literature behind the two commonly used interpretations of the house money
effect, namely a different mental accounting over windfall gains (‘windfall effect‘)
or a result of fairness or deservingness concerns (‘Lockean desert effect‘).
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: We first define the house
money effect and discuss its contextual dependency by presenting the related
literature according to the context the house money effect has been examined in.
We divide that literature between those scholarly works that examine the house
money effect in the context of individual decisions, and those that do the same
but within the environment of a game, where social preference may emerge. We
then take a step back to briefly present the theoretical background that has been
used to interpret the house money effect in the literature presented here.
1See for example Thaler and Johnson (1990), Cherry et al. (2005), Kroll et al. (2007) etc.
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1.2 The House Money Effect (HME)
The idea that people treat small amounts of ‘windfall’ or unexpected money dif-
ferently than their regular income is quite old, dating back to Friedman (1957)
and his work on permanent income hypothesis, where he presented evidence of the
‘windfall effect’. According to this hypothesis, assuming that people have pref-
erences for smoothing consumption over their lifetime, their marginal propensity
to consume a temporary (one-time) windfall increase in income will be smaller
than if this increase in income was permanent2
The house money effect though was first formally discussed and defined by
Thaler and Johnson (1990). In their paper, they examine how prior gains and
losses affect risk-taking behaviour. Their work is a continuation of previous re-
search3 that clearly established the idea that real decision makers do not only
consider marginal costs -as economic theory suggests- but are often influenced by
historical or sunk costs. Starting by recognising that prior outcomes (gains or
losses) affect most decision makers, they explore how this takes place and they
find evidence that prior gains and losses can influence choices in systematic ways.
An example of these systematic ways is their finding that under some circum-
stances 4 a prior gain can increase subjects’ willingness to accept gambles. They
named this finding the house money effect. The intuition behind this - which also
gave the name - is captured in the gambling parlance of “playing with the house
money” which expresses the feeling of gambling while ahead.
1.3 The Context-Dependence of the HME
As we have underlined in the introduction earlier the context dependence of the
house money effect has a general consensus in the literature. Cherry et al. (2005)
conclude that “[. . . ]although our earnings protocol replicated the Cherry et al.
(2002)’s design, the results differ, suggesting that the influence of asset origin
could be context dependent. Relative to anonymous dictators, subjects acting in
the public goods game faced a more complex task that demanded greater cognitive
effort and involved simultaneous decisions by other contributors.” Kroll et al.
(2007) find that the origin of wealth seems to matter in asymmetric situations
(such as our best-shot public good game with heterogeneous-wealth groups) and
also conclude that the impact of endowment origin in the lab appears context-
dependent and they suggest that future research should draw more attention on
understanding how these contextual cues affect how people weight the different
elements of preference. Throughout this thesis we use the term ‘context’ along
the line of Cherry et al. (2005) and when we talk about ‘different contexts’ we
refer to different decision tasks.
Here in this Section 1, we make a preliminary distinction between the studies
that they examine the house money effect in the context of individual decisions
2There is an extensive early literature testing the permanent income hypothesis that yielded
mixed only results (see Bodkin (1959); Bird and Bodkin (1965); Lee (1975); Keeler et al. (1985)).
3See Arkes and Blumer (1985), Thaler (1980).
4Those ‘circumstances‘ will be described later in this chapter.
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and those which focus on games, where social preference may appear because of
the interaction with other counterparts. That is, we fist consider studies that
examine the house money effect in the contexts such as decisions over lotteries or
investment decisions, while in the second part, we present relevant results for the
house money effect in situations where people facing decisions in the context of
a dictator, ultimatum, trust and public good game or in a market environment.
As we explain in more detail at the section regarding the interpretation of
the house money effect, the idea behind this division in the literature is that
contextual differences might favour the mental accounting interpretation in some
cases and the ‘Lockean desert’ interpretation in some others.
1.3.1 The HME in Individual Decisions
We start here by presenting the house money effect in the context of individual
decisions. In these studies presented here, participants in the relative experiments
face an individual decision either in a form of deciding upon a set of lotteries or
making an investment decision. We first continue from before our discussion on
the original work of Thaler and Johnson (1990) and then we demonstrate results
from earlier or subsequent work on the topic. This branch of the literature usually
interprets the house money effect as treating ‘windfall gains’ within a different
mental account than that they evaluate regular income.
1.3.1.1 Lotteries
Thaler and Johnson (1990) extended the previous work of work of Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) on prospect theory by focusing on prior gains and losses
and how these affect risky choices. Citing Kahneman and Tversky (1979, p.286)
“. . . a person who has not made peace with his losses is likely to accept gambles
that would be unacceptable to him otherwise“, Thaler and Johnson (1990) discuss
the conditions under which prior outcomes might influence the reference point.
Within the prospect theory framework, and specifically with regards to the editing
phase, they suggest alternative editing rules and design surveys and experiments
to test which of these best explains the phenomena in discussion.
Considering these five editing rules, namely Prospect Theory with Memory,
Prospect Theory with No Memory, Concreteness, Hedonic Editing and Quasi-
Hedonic Editing, as well as the findings from four experiments that they run, the
authors conclude that the Quasi-Hedonic rule seems to do best relative to the oth-
ers. Quasi-Hedonic Editing rule resulted as a modification of theHedonic Editing5
rule to make it closer to the Concreteness editing rule in response of experimental
data that refuted Hedonic Editing. Quasi-Hedonic Editing assumes that when
subjects are presented choices in the one-stage format they do not actively segre-
gate the sure gain and that when faced with a two-stage gamble involving a prior
loss, subjects will not integrate subsequent losses with the initial loss. However,
after prior gains, subsequent losses will be integrated with/cancelled against the
prior gain. They run an experiment with actual choices for real money, which
5See section on mental accounting for description of Hedonic Editing rule.
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Table 1.1: Results from Experiment Using Real Money
largely replicated the results that they had previously obtained in experiments
with hypothetical questions. Results on the question with prior gains in both
kinds of experiments showed evidence that is consistent with the house money
effect.
Since we discuss the importance of context for the house money effect, Thaler
and Johnson (1990) themselves underlined the importance of framing6 . They
find consistent results across their experiments indicating that the house money
effect is more evident when the situation is presented to participants in a two-
stage rather than in a one-stage format7, suggesting that the presence of house
money effect is context-dependent. The tables below show how questions were
presented to participants and the percentage of those who chose the risk-seeking
option. Kahneman and Tversky (1981) had already underlined the dependence
of preferences on the formulation of decision problems and recognised that their
theory was developed for one-shot gambles.
At around the same time, Battalio et al. (1990) conducted an experiment
with four series of questions, where asking participants to make a choice between
gambles. In the two series gambles involved gains and in other two they in-
volved losses. Participants were first asked a set of hypothetical questions and
later on they were invited to answer a second set of questions that involved real
payments. Although there were systematic and significant quantitative differ-
ences over real and hypothetical sets of questions, the qualitative conclusions
did not differ. Among the behavioural issues observed, they noted risk-loving
behaviour over a number of prospects with all-positive payoffs, in cases where
prospect theory would have predicted risk aversion. Therefore, as they claim,
“this calls into question prospect theory’s arguments regarding the extent to which
the gains’ function is concave and/or the probability weightening function exhibits
subcertainty”.
In the same vein, Cardenas et al. (2014) examines the house money effect
following the Binswanger (1980)’s and Attanasio et al. (2012) ’s Ordered Lottery
Selection design which consists of two sets of lotteries, one involving losses and
6Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1981) have discussed the importance of framing in earlier
work.
7This distinction between two-stage and one-stage framing of the question posed to partici-
pants will draw our attention again later on in Chapter 2.
14
Table 1.2: Results from Experiment Using Hypothetical Questions
gains and another only involving gains. Their innovation lies in giving the cash8
to the treatment group three weeks in advance so that the respective participants
feel as close to playing with their own money as possible. With their preferred
specification they find a CRRA9 coefficient of 0.34 with a standard deviation of
0.09, and they observe that if participants in the treatment group spent 35% of
their endowment their CRRA coefficient is higher than that of the control group
by approximately 0.3 standard deviations. They interpret this as a small and
indirect house money effect operating through the amount of the cash in advance
that was actually spent.
1.3.1.2 Investment Decisions
Keasey and Moon (1996) extend the work of Thaler and Johnson (1990) on prior
gains and losses by examining how these affect choices in a business context.
Rather than making choices over lotteries participants were asked to make capital
expenditure decisions. Their results found additional support for the house money
effect as participants shifted behaviour towards risk seeking in situations involving
prior gains.
Weber and Zuchel (2005) examine contradictory evidence from the empirical
literature on how prior outcomes affect decision makers’ risk attitudes. They
examine both the house money effect and the escalation of commitment effect
(that is, prior losses rather than prior gains inducing more risk-taking behaviour).
Their experimental design involved both a portfolio decision and a two-stage
betting game and helped them show that framing does matter. They actually
found that decisions in the portfolio decision context are consistent with escalation
of commitment whereas in the two-stage betting game setting decisions seem to
follow predictions consistent with the house money effect.
8The cash was enough to cover the potential losses.
9CRRA refers to constant relative risk aversion.
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The studies that have been discussed so far support the existence of the house
money effect in the context of individual decisions involving risk. In all these ex-
periments the objective was to examine how prior gains affect decisions under risk
and evidence suggests that participants involved in those experiments exhibited
more risk-taking behaviour after having experienced gains.
1.3.2 The HME in Games
There is also another branch of literature that focuses more on what we discuss
in the introduction as the relevance of the house money effect to experimental
economics, namely the changes in behaviour both in the lab and the field when
‘earned’ rather than ‘windfall endowments’ are used. Some of these studies within
this branch of literature refer to the house money effect but some others rather
talk about ‘endowment (or asset) heterogeneity’. This additional terminology is
discussed here in this section, where we present research on the house money
effect that has been done within the environment of bargaining games, charitable
giving and social dilemmas. These studies focus on decisions that either do not
involve risk at all (e.g. dictator game, charitable giving) or the risk involved is
related to strategic uncertainty (e.g. trust game)10. The interesting bit of this
branch of literature is that usually interprets the house money effect as a result
of Lockean desert effects or fairness concerns.
1.3.2.1 Dictator (& Ultimatum) Games
Cherry et al. (2002) are among the first to “argue that just as rewards must
be salient (Hwan Baik et al. (1999)), the assets in a bargain must be legitimate
to produce rational behaviour”, and although claiming that this proposition had
not been explicitly examined previously in bargaining behaviour, they specifi-
cally and clearly make the connection between their research on bargaining over
earned wealth and the pre-existing and closely related work within economics and
psychology on found-money effect and mental accounting11.
Cherry et al. (2002) consider a dictator game where dictators bargain over
their earned wealth rather than unearned windfall endowments. They show that
dictators bargaining over their earned wealth were more self-interested than what
was shown in previous studies. Moreover, dictators were eventually hardnosed;
that is, they became even more selfish when complete anonymity was induced;
more precisely, the other-regarding behaviour was essentially eliminated. They
conclude that controlling for asset origin is no less important than controlling
reciprocity in explaining other-regarding behaviour in simple (one-shot) bargain-
ing games and that when assets are legitimised with effort and strategic concerns
are controlled with isolation -meaning complete anonymity- other-regarding be-
haviour was the exception. This shows that the motivation behind the non-selfish
10Strategic uncertainty refers to situations where imperfect information over the likelihood of
another person’s decisions is involved, as opposed to state uncertainty which is associated with
perfect information over the likelihood of outcomes that often do not involve another person
(Houser et al. (2010, p.73)). See also discussion in Chapter 2 for more on that.
11See (Cherry et al., 2002, p.1218 footnote 1)
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behaviour were strategic considerations rather than fairness and/or altruism.
Cherry et al. (2002) extend the work of Hoffman et al. (1996) who focus on how
social distance affects other-regarding behaviour in dictator games and they show
that as anonymity or social isolation are relaxed the offer distributions decrease
as predicted. Hoffman et al. (1994) in an earlier work conducted dictator and
ultimatum double blind experiments as well and they observed that if the right
to be the first mover is “earned” (rather than the wealth) by scoring high in a
general knowledge quiz, then first movers exhibit a more self-regarding behaviour
opening the path for further research on the topic. Interestingly, the lower offers
in the ultimatum games were not accompanied by higher rejection rates.
Cherry (2001) himself had earlier commented on mental accounting as a key
determinant of other-regarding behaviour observed in bargaining experiments.
He showed that dictators bargaining over earned money exhibited self-interest
behaviour in 76% of bargains as opposed to 26% of bargains over allocated money
and underlined that the earnings protocol may be an important option for future
laboratory research as it can contribute to increase the external validity of such
experiments by providing a closer correspondence between the laboratory and the
actual (over personal assets) individuals’ decisions.
A few years later, Oxoby and Spraggon (2008) continued the above-discussed
work on legitimising wealth in dictator games. They started with the conjecture
that legitimising assets creates property rights which participants observe, re-
gardless of who accumulates those rights. They tested this conjecture by running
a series of dictator games - a baseline treatment where there were only wind-
fall endowments; a dictator earnings treatment replicating Cherry et al. (2002);
and a receiver earnings treatment12 where receiver had earned the wealth and
the matched dictator was called to decide on its allocation. They found that
property rights, generated by legitimising assets with effort, play a crucial role
in the revealed preferences of participants, as dictators who earned wealth made
zero offers consistent with game theoretic predictions, while dictators facing re-
ceivers who earned the wealth allocate significantly more. They basically observe
a dichotomous effect of earned endowments in the dictator game: an individ-
ual’s own entitlements to assets seem to dominate the fairness concerns char-
acterised in outcome based models of other-regarding preferences (Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000); Fehr and Schmidt (1999)), and others’ entitlements to assets
seem to intensify each individual’s observed positive reciprocity characterised in
intention-based models of fairness (Rabin (1993); Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(2004))13.
Cherry and Shogren (2008) confirm the results of both Oxoby and Spraggon
(2008) and Cherry et al. (2002) but their main contribution is that they try to
disentangle the two factors that might be driving the observed earned endowment
effect, that is, the changes in relative deservingness and the legitimising of the
endowment with effort. Their results provide evidence that the deservingness of
12This treatment - according to Oxoby and Spraggon (2008) - mirrors the Berg et al. (1995)
trust game as the receiver’s exertion of effort indicates trust in the dictator not making a zero
offer. More on trust games are discussed, though, in the next section.
13For a more detailed discussion on other-regarding preferences see also following section on
interpretations of the house money effect and Chapter 3.
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the recipient does matter regardless of the origin of the endowment and in those
cases dictators made a greater offer to the respective recipient, but they also
find that dictators that earned endowments, although showing some degree of
sympathy to recipients who had not been afforded the same opportunity, offered
significantly less than those with allocated endowments.
Bradley (1998) and Eckel and Grossman (1996) discuss the concept of de-
servingness. Bradley (1998) shows that in dictator games allocators (dictators)
reward skilful recipients but punish unskilful ones only modestly though since
they appear to consider effort as an appropriate measure of deservingness. The
author also presents evidence on ultimatum games where offerers seem to adapt to
the strategic environment, but yet when faced with skilful recipients they seem to
be motivated by fairness concerns rather than by strategic considerations. Eckel
and Grossman (1996) find a significant increase in offers when the recipient was
generally acknowledged to be ‘deserving’. Their experiment consists of two treat-
ments - in one of them the recipient is an anonymous student subject while in
the other an established charity. In their discussion they argue in favour of the
moral motivation theory of Hoffman et al. (1994) and they suggest its modifi-
cation to include altruism. They also underline the importance of abstraction
in the conduction of experimental procedures when theory is tested, but at the
same time they recognise that since social and psychological factors are relevant
in determining economic decisions, this abstraction might need to be abandoned
to some extent in the investigation of particular topics such as other regarding
behaviour.
On the same direction Rutstrom and Williams (2000) conduct an experimen-
tal study on distributive preferences. They examine whether individuals have
non self-interested preferences over income distributions, and if so how these
preferences depend on their perception of worthiness of compensation as indi-
cated either by the amount of effort exerted or by productivity level achieved.
They employ a modification of the standard dictator game. Subjects first par-
ticipated in an assigned (individual) task that determined their initial income
entitlement and were then brought together into groups of 12, where they were
asked to choose their preferred final distribution of income within the group.
A random dictator rule was applied to give equal chance to everyone involved
to dictate the outcome and to eliminate any strategic considerations14 . Their
results strikingly favour the model of self-interest in individual decision-making
since 99% of subjects choose the income distribution that maximised their own
payoff. As an additional robustness check of their results they implement a ran-
dom entitlement mechanism. They observe a statistically significant increase
in the non-self-interested behaviour that is though not entirely consistent with
earnings-based distributive preferences and in absolute magnitude is small.
In the literature the dictator game is often presented and examined within
the environment of charitable giving15. Reinstein and Riener (2009) attempt to
decompose the house money effect into two components: the tangibility and the
14The choice of the quasi-dictator game by Rutstrom and Williams (2000) was intentionally
made to abstract from and control for strategic considerations in order to examine individual
preferences directly.
15See also earlier discussion on work of Eckel and Grossman (1996).
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desert effect. The former refers to the situation where people treat the money they
are promised differently than cash that they actually hold and the latter to the
situation where people may treat money that they earn differently than random
windfall gains. In line with Eckel and Grossman (1996), they conduct their
experiment in the context of charitable giving and the treatments vary according
to the extent to which money is perceived as earned and secondly according to
the tangibility of payment16. Their results support both the tangibility and the
desert effect with the magnitude of the former appearing to be at least as strong
as the latter.
Carlsson et al. (2009) take the discussion on the role of windfall endowments
beyond the confines of the laboratory to the field experiment setting, in attempt
to examine the limitations of lab experiments’ external validity. Following Eckel
and Grossman (1996), they use a dictator game where the recipient is a charity
organisation. The charitable giving context allows them to keep all other factors
such as stakes, subjects’ pool, choice sets and time horizon constant whilst only
varying the asset origin (windfall or earned endowments) and the environment
(lab or field). Their results confirm previous research on asset origin in dictator
games as they find a significant and substantial difference in donations when
using windfall rather than earned endowments both in the lab and in the field.
However, they also find a sizeable and significant difference in choices made in
the lab and in the field and in particular with regards to windfall endowments17.
Mittone and Ploner (2006) continue the work of Cherry et al. (2002) by slightly
modifying their experimental design. They focus on the symmetry in effort factor
as they argue that not controlling for the impact of symmetry in effort might
lead to a biased assessment of the relevance of anonymity and asset legitimacy
in decision making. For this reason, they ask both the dictator and the recipient
to participate in a real effort task as part of the treatment condition. In order to
provide adequate incentives to exert effort, participants only received information
about their type (either being a dictator or a recipient after they exerted effort
in the task) after completing a quiz of 17 GMAT-type questions in the first stage
of the game. Their evidence suggests that symmetry in effort induces higher
offers than when only the dictator is involved in the real effort task. This result
strengthens their argument that although asset legitimacy may play an important
role in bargaining behaviour, its impact might be overestimated in some cases
where the experimental design does not account for another implicit relevant
issue, namely the “social reference point” that the dictators may assume as a
benchmark for evaluating the degree of fairness in their decisions.
Surveys on dictator games and their modifications (e.g. charitable giving)
seem to reach a consensus on the existence of what they call “found money
effect” with dictator offers to be significant lower in all the related experiments
when endowments (or the right to be a dictator) were earned rather than windfall
endowed (randomly assigned) and it is very obvious from the discussion above
16That is, subjects were given the cash before they decided how much to donate; or they
were allocated an endowment on screen and made their donation on a computer screen.They
only received the cash at the end of the experiment.
17More precisely, lab experiments are upward biased but the difference is much smaller when
the endowment is earned.
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that the research has focused on issues of fairness and deservingness, on property
rights and entitlements to explain this effect.
1.3.2.2 Trust Games
In contrast to the long literature on asset origin and property rights in dictator
games, little has been done regarding trust games. To our knowledge, Fahr and
Irlenbusch (2000) are the first to consider earned property rights in the context
of a trust game. The main goal of their research is to examine whether behaviour
of both the trustor and the trustee alters in the trust game when property rights
are explicitly introduced by asking trustors and/or trustees to participate in a
real effort task. They also test whether this behaviour is predicted better by
the mindreading concept (Smith (1998)) or by the equity principle . They run
three treatments: trustor who exerts effort matched with a trustee who does
not; trustor who does not exert any effort matched with a trustee who does;
and finally where both trustor and trustee exert effort and are matched together.
They set out five hypotheses to be tested:(i) the stronger the property rights
of the trustors, the higher the returns; (ii) the stronger the property rights of
the trustors, the higher the investments; (iii) the stronger the property rights of
the trustees, the higher the investments; (iv) the higher the property rights of
the trustors, the higher their payoffs; (v) the stronger the property rights of the
trustees, the higher their payoffs. Their results confirm the last two hypotheses
implied by the equity principle and underline the robustness of similar results in
previous experimental work. They also observe that trustees return significantly
more money the stronger the property rights of the trustors, but they fail to
reject the null hypothesis in favour of the hypothesis implied by mindreading that
trustors with stronger property rights invest more in anticipation of the trustees’
expected behaviour. Instead they observe that trustors unilaterally implement a
fair outcome by investing more in the cases where trustees have stronger property
rights.
Cox and Hall (2010) continue the work of Cox et al. (2009) on cooperation in
private and common property trust games. They assign stronger property right
entitlements by requiring participants to meet a performance target in the real
effort task in order to earn their endowment. They find new evidence that un-
der stronger property entitlements common property and private property trust
games are not isomorphic. More precisely they observe that cooperation is lower
in common property compared to private property trust games. This new evi-
dence supports predictions of revealed altruism theory18.
Apart from the literature on trust games there is also some closely related
literature that examines the ‘mirror’ image game of trust game, that is, the
power-to-take game, also known as the taking game. In a two-player taking game
the First Mover (FM) decides whether or not to take an amount of money from
the Second Mover’s (SM) endowment. If the FM decides not to take, the game
ends and both players keep their endowments. If the FM takes money from the
SM, the SM can retaliate in return.
18See Cox et al. (2008)
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Bosman et al. (2005), extending previous work on emotional hazard in a
power-to-take experiment (Bosman and Winden (2002)), examine if agents be-
have differently if their own earnings are at stake (‘effort’), or if a budget is
allocated to them by the experimenter (‘no-effort’). Measuring emotions and fo-
cusing on their behavioural significance, they find that: (i) responders destroy
more on aggregate, and more regularly, with no-effort; (ii) responders frequently
choose an intermediate amount of destruction with no-effort, in contrast with
the all-or-nothing finding for effort; (iii) takers’ behaviour does not depend on
effort; (iv) responders expect substantially lower take rates with no-effort; (v)
both actual and expected take rates have a significant effect on the probability
of destruction, both in case of effort and no-effort; (vi) and finally they underline
that emotional factors explain these results.
In a much more recent study Danková and Servátka (2013) examine the house
money effect and its impact on negative reciprocity. They explore the implications
of windfall endowments on observed reciprocal behaviour, focussing specifically
on negative reciprocity. They implement three treatments where in the first
treatment SM’s endowment is entirely ‘house money’; in the second and third
it consists of both ‘house’ and earned money. In one case the FM can take
from the ‘house money’ part of the endowment and the SM can retaliate using
his/her earned money part. In the other case, the FM can take the earned part
and the SM can retaliate using ‘house money’. They conjecture two reasons
why the origin of endowment might matter for negative reciprocity: first, using
earned money as opposed to house money might increase the costs of negative
reciprocity due to this money being in a different mental account and thus lead
to less retaliation, and secondly decreasing an endowment consisting of earned
money might be considered a stronger violation of property rights and lead to
more retaliation. Their results suggest that participants retaliate more in both
cases, supporting the latter conjecture.
Closely related to this literature is an extensive literature on retaliation and
punishment, mainly suggesting that an increase in the perceived cost of recipro-
cation/retaliation may diminish its frequency and/or extent. Although of some
relevance to our discussion, due to spatial considerations we shall omit further de-
tails. Readers interested in this field may consult the following key papers within
the literature: Ostrom et al. (1992), Fehr and Gchter (2000), Anderson and Put-
terman (2006), Carpenter (2007), Nikiforakis and Normann (2008), Nikiforakis
(2008), Herrmann et al. (2008), Nikiforakis and Engelmann (2011).
Experimental evidence on both trust and take games, despite the many dif-
ferent incentives involved in their more complicated set up, also support the
existence of the house money effect and the discussion on these studies again
refers to entitlements and property rights. Danková and Servátka (2013) actually
in their conclusion claim that despite the auxiliary evidence on their results that
participants seem to distinguish between earned and ‘house’ money, this might
not necessarily mean that they were using different mental accounts for each type
of money.
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1.3.2.3 Public Good Games
At the same time that the literature on asset origins in dictator games was
emerging, Clark (2002) conducted research on -what he calls- an objection to
experimental methodology that has received surprising little empirical attention:
“. . . the disparate evidence that people treat small amounts of windfall unexpected
money differently than they do their regular income.” Building on the literature
of permanent income hypothesis and on that of mental accounting he underlines
the relevance of “house money effects” for experimental economics’ methodolo-
gies not only in individual decisions but also in group decisions. He argues that
house money effects are relevant in public goods settings in two ways. Firstly,
in such group experiments subjects with windfall endowments may be more will-
ing to spend them on non-pecuniary goods like altruism, fairness, revenge, etc.,
and secondly, subjects may choose unusually risky strategies. Although in the
context of linear public good games risk preference seems irrelevant because of
the existence of a dominant strategy, work by Kreps et al. (1982) and Andreoni
(1988) suggests that subjects may strategically make positive contributions in
early rounds of public good games in case of incomplete information regarding
the types of other subjects, who might hold reciprocal norms and are uncertain
about others’ types as well.
Following Isaac et al. (1984) and Andreoni (1995), Clark (2002) employs an
experimental design consisting of two treatments of a Voluntary Contribution
Mechanism19 (VCM). The VCM is repeated in each treatment for 10 times but the
composition of groups of 5 changes across rounds. In one of the treatments, half of
the subjects participated in the traditional way where their initial endowments for
decisions were windfalls given by the experimenters (house money), while in the
other treatment subjects had to bring their own money. Final wealth distribution
was maintained identical across the two treatments by an additional payment ex
post at the end of the experiment that had not been announced in advanced20.
Findings suggest a familiar VCM pattern where contributions start from below
50% and gradually decline over the rounds. Although mean contributions in the
first round are slightly higher with house money rather than with own money,
these differences in contributions are not statistically significant.
Harrison (2007) commented on Clark (2002)’s work, criticizing the statistical
methods used in analysing the data and describing them as inappropriate. More
precisely, with regards to both the first analysis with the session-specific means
and the second analysis, which focuses on the first round contributions only, Har-
rison (2007) claims that problems derive from inappropriate metrics of evaluation
which disregard information rather than the actual use of nonparametric tests.
Harrison (2007) takes a closer look at the raw data, separates the subjects into
pure free riders and those making positive contributions in both cases over each
round. This reveals that the house money had a major effect on the fraction
of free riders but no clear effect on the levels of positive contributions. For a
19The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism is another name of the well-known linear public
good game.
20Subjects had only been promised ex ante an identical distribution of earnings but were not
explicitly aware of the additional payment.
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more systematic examination, Harrison (2007) conducts a panel analysis of data
by employing a population-averaged estimation method known as Generalised
Estimating Equations. This method confirms what had already been shown by
indicating a significant effect of the house money treatment on the propensity to
completely free ride, but no effect on the level of contributions once the decision
to contribute has been made. The house money effect is estimated to reduce the
probability of positive contribution by 8.2 percentage points.
Cherry et al. (2002) had already set the agenda for further research with
regards to asset origin affecting to some degree the anomalistic behaviour in ex-
perimental settings by suggesting in their conclusion that, “windfall wealth [. . . ]
might explain the lack of free-riding in the provision of public goods in the lab-
oratory ”(p.1220).In later work of their own, Cherry et al. (2005) examine the
impact of endowment origin and heterogeneity on public good contributions in
the lab. Their results reject the hypothesis that positive contributions in linear
public goods games are due to asset origin as subjects’ contributions were ap-
proximately equivalent regardless of whether their wealth was windfall or earned.
They do however find a significant difference between contributions within groups
of heterogeneous wealth and contributions within groups of homogeneous wealth,
with the former being lower than the latter; this finding is independent of the ori-
gin of assets21. They find evidence of -what they call- an ‘anticipated reciprocity
effect’ not present in the dictator games; according to which subjects with high
endowments contribute less in heterogeneous groups. Their experimental design
suggests two treatments: one with windfall wealth and one with earned wealth.
In both treatments subjects are grouped into collectives of four and play a linear
public good game only once. The earned wealth is induced at an earlier stage
prior to the public good game in the sessions with earned wealth following the
protocol of Cherry et al. (2002) and subjects are matched into either group where
all members hold the same amount of initial wealth or each member holds each
endowment level (10− 40, heterogeneous case). Discussing their results and how
they differ from Cherry et al. (2002)’s in the context of dictator games, Cherry
et al. (2005) argue that public good games are more complex tasks for partici-
pants in experiments and that they require greater cognitive effort, concluding
that the influence of asset origin could be context-dependent. These claims form
both the motivation for and the core of Chapter 2 of this thesis.
Kroll et al. (2007) continue the earlier work of Cherry et al. (2005) on the im-
pact of asset origin and heterogeneity. Arguing that the ‘anticipatory reciprocity’
effect might overshadow the endowment origin effect, they suggest examining the
origin and heterogeneity effects in the context of a best-shot public good game22
. In such games the behavioural motives of anticipatory reciprocity should be
eliminated as only the highest contribution sets the level of provision of the pub-
lic good, whereas the lower contributions are for nought since they only serve to
decrease the payoffs of the contributors. Their experimental design is identical
to the one in Cherry et al. (2005) with the only exception being that the linear
21This result, although still apparent, weakens when contributions as percentage of endow-
ments were considered.
22This game was first introduced by Hirshleifer (1983).
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public good game is now replaced by the best-shot public good game. Their re-
sults indicate that in agreement with Cherry et al. (2005) endowment origin does
not have an effect on (either relative or absolute) contributions in the symmetric
setting of homogeneous endowments. In the heterogeneous endowments treat-
ments, although overall mean contribution levels show no statistically significant
difference between earned and windfall endowments, a closer look reveals what
aggregation hides: it appears that groups receiving windfall endowments behave
as predicted by the focal-point Nash equilibrium, that is, the member with the
highest endowment contributes almost everything while the other three members
contribute little to nothing. On the other hand, in groups where endowments are
earned subjects with the highest endowments seem to contribute less while the
other group members seem to contribute more. Further comparisons with sym-
metric cases lead the authors to conclude that “. . . any endowment-origin effect
depends on asymmetric issues such as heterogeneous endowments and best-shot
production technologies(p. 425). Interpreting their results, Kroll et al. (2007)
comment on the trade-off that exists in a best shot game between preferences for
fairness and preferences for efficiency, in addition to preferences for self-interest;
and observe in their findings that with windfall endowments, there is no specific
information about what is more ‘fair’ among Nash equilibria and for that efficiency
concerns seem to prevail while with earned endowments, fairness consideration
rise and the efficient outcome might not be considered fair. They also in the same
vein with our work underline how context can affect competing preferences.
Oxoby and Spraggon (2009) consider a two-person public good game with het-
erogeneity in the source of participants’ endowments. More precisely, they match
participants into pairs in three ways: (i) both with earned endowments; (ii) both
with endowed endowments by the experimenters; and (iii) one with earned and
one with endowed. The public good game is the typical one shot linear public
good game but participants have to make an unconditional and a conditional on
what the other group member will do- contribution. Following Fischbacher et al.
(2001) and Keser and Winden (2000)23 , they make the conditional contribution
incentive compatible by making it relevant for one of the participants in each
pair after both participants have made both types of decisions24. They find an
‘inverse found money effect’ in which participants who earn their endowments
and are matched with someone who does not earn their endowments are more
unconditionally and conditionally cooperative. They attribute this result to ‘an-
ticipatory reciprocity’ as introduced and discussed by Cherry et al. (2005) and
Kroll et al. (2007). According to ‘anticipatory reciprocity’, subjects who earn
their endowment seem to expect those who receive windfall endowments to con-
tribute more and as a result they contribute more themselves. Similarly, subjects
with windfall endowments expect those with earned endowments to contribute
less and thus, they do so themselves.
In a more recent paper, Muehlbacher and Kirchler (2009) motivated by the
inconclusive evidence of the effect of earned (by effort) endowments in public
23We also follow the experimental design of Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Keser and Winden
(2000). See more on that in Chapters 2 and 3.
24For more on the strategy method see Experimental design section in Chapter 2.
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good games, conduct an additional experiment where, in contrast to the major-
ity of previous studies, the participants are not informed about the asymmetry
of the origin of the endowments within their groups. The idea behind this exper-
imental design is to test the “pure” effect of effort on cooperation. Their results
indicate that participants who earn their endowments by exerting a high level
of effort contribute less to the public good than those participants who receive
their endowments more easily in the low effort condition of the first stage of the
experiment.
Although at first sight evidence regarding the house money effect in public
good games seems mixed and sometimes contradicting, reading the related litera-
ture closer reveals that results are in accordance with those we have seen so far in
bargaining games. The house money effect is context-dependent and more evident
in asymmetric situations. At this point it is interesting to make two comments:
first, earlier games (both dictator and trust games) that we have discussed involve
asymmetry in decisions of the counterparts as well and second, as opposed to dic-
tator games where the house money effect intensifies self-interest preferences (in
accordance with game-theoretical predictions), in the case of public good games,
the house money effect seems to favour fairness preferences, suggesting behaviour
that diverge from predictions of Nash equilibrium.
1.3.2.4 Markets (& Auctions)
In the last part of this section, we present studies that examined the house money
effect in the context of markets or some of them more specifically in the context
of an auction. We chose to present this literature under the general category of
games that we have set up as strategic considerations are involved, but as (both
the findings that we will further discuss in Chapter 2 and) the competitive nature
of these settings -which seems to rule out social preferences- brings them close to
that literature on house money effect in individual decisions.
Following the theoretical work of Barberis et al. (2001), Ackert et al. (2006)
attempt an experimental investigation of the house money effect in a multi-period
(dynamic) financial market setting. Barberis et al. (2001) show that investors
who derive utility from consumption and changes in financial wealth and are loss
averse, are less risk averse after an increase in stock prices because gains cushion
subsequent losses whereas after a fall in stock prices, investors become more risk
averse as they are concerned about further losses.
Ackert et al. (2006) conduct nine experimental sessions, each consisting of a
series of markets where eight participants in each market compete via a sealed-
bid Vickrey auction to acquire an asset of one-period life that pays a dividend
of $40 or nothing with equal probability. Participants are endowed either with
low endowments ($60) or high ($75). Their experimental hypotheses are that
the market price is higher when traders’ endowments are larger, and that the
average price is increasing in the wealth of the market. Their empirical results
indicate that the house money effect persists across trading periods. They find a
significant difference between the low and the high endowments groups and show
that market prices are higher when traders have more found money.
As with the prices, bids also appear higher in the high endowment sessions and
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this result is also persistent across trading sessions. As they ask the participants-
traders to predict the average price in each market, they present also the predicted
price in the low endowment sessions; the results show the predicted price to
be lower than the high endowment sessions in all trading periods. This result
indicates that traders expect lower bids when endowments are lower. They also
report that although they were able to document a significant house money effect
in their setting, they are not able to show that subsequent changes in wealth had
an effect on market pricing. They actually find that changes in average wealth
lasts for more than one period in the low endowment sessions but they have no
significant effect in the high endowment sessions. Results are similar when they
consider the traders’ bids.
In an attempt to explain this inconsequentiality of the wealth changes, they
cite Knetsch et al. (2001) who argue that traders in repeated trials may adjust
their bids toward a margin following a kind of peer pressure and lack of confidence
in their own valuation. Ackert et al. (2006) claim that the house money effect in
their context might have been concealed by these effects.
In order to eliminate these peer pressure effects, Chakravarty and Ma (2009)
consider a BBecker et al. (1964) bidding mechanism instead. They run four
distinct trading sessions with 28 subjects. Each subject participates in one session
consisting of six treatments. The treatments vary in terms of initial endowments
($60, $75 and $120) and the number of bidding periods (3 and then 6). Their
experimental design results in poor evidence of the house money effect as they
only find the existence of a short-term house money effect that is related only to
the initial endowments. They also report that changes in wealth had no effect
on risk-taking behaviour and for that they argue that expected utility theory
seems to survive in the laboratory and people’s risk-taking behaviour is driven
by rational inference rather than irrational exuberance.
Returning to the discussion on the equity principle, according to which a
person’s earnings should be in proportion to his/her inputs, Cason et al. (2011)
examine whether real-effort investments made by sellers that determine buyers’
values or sellers’ costs can affect prices in a competitive experimental market.
Starting from the experimental result ( Smith (2012)) that subjects in the labo-
ratory appear to trade at prices remarkably close to those theory predicts for the
competitive case, they differentiate their design by introducing real effort made by
sellers rather than exogenous costs and values, thus ensuring that equity concerns
are now relevant to the determination of prices in the competitive experimental
market examined.
The experiment consists of three treatments: the baseline (replicating earlier
research); the costs treatment, where sellers’ production depends on their relative
performance in a tournament and on a random productivity shock; and the values
treatment, where sellers’ effort can increase the values of buyers, generating po-
tential efficiency gains. These investments in effort do not affect the competitive
equilibrium resulting from own-payoff maximisation, but prices are expected to
be higher in the costs and values treatments than in the baseline if equity con-
siderations are present. Previous experimental research ( Franciosi et al. (1995))
has shown that fairness concerns have an effect on market prices but ‘fairness’ in
those studies refers to preferences for equality not equity. Although they include
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certain features25 in their design that increase the likelihood that real effort will
affect market outcome, they find no significant difference between the three treat-
ments. They argue that their results suggest that competition seems to eliminate
any equity concerns that traders might have.
Rosenboim and Shavit (2012), using a “prepaid mechanism” to overcome eth-
ical problems and selection biases for participants using their “own” money, run
three different experiments. In the first one, participants are asked to make
choices between lotteries that involve positive and negative outcomes. In the sec-
ond one, they participate in a second price auction and in the third one they face
a decision problem similar to the one a first mover faces in a trust game. In all
cases they observe that participants who use prepaid money exert greater effort to
reduce any possible losses than those participants who receive their endowments
on the spot. They do observe though that when losses are not involved or were
not possible, prepayment had no effect and results were similar to those with the
on-the-spot mechanism.
All the above studies suggest that house money effect is not (strongly) evident
in the contexts of markets. These findings help us to take our discussion on the
interpretation of the house money effect a step further in the next section and
also motivate our work in Chapter 2.
1.4 The Interpretations of the HME
In this section, we present a short summary of the literature behind the two most
prevailing interpretations of the house money effect. Some scholars consider the
house money effect to be a result of mental accounting. Particularly, as we see
in the next subsection Thaler and Johnson (1990), using the concept of ”mental
accounting” as used by Thaler (1999), that is, the process of coding, categorising
and evaluating events, find in their experiments that following a gain, losses
(smaller than the original gain) can be integrated with that, moderating the
influence of loss aversion and facilitating risk-seeking. That implies that people
will tend to risk more when making decisions with windfall endowments (as the
perceive these as a gain and they tend to integrate smaller subsequent losses)
rather than with earned endowments, which are not perceived as a prior gain.
The other interpretation of the house money effect ascribes it to fairness or
‘just desert’ concerns. More precisely, other scholarly studies suggest that peo-
ple treat windfall endowments differently than earned endowments, as the later
involve entitlements earned by exerting effort and for that fairness and deserv-
ingness concerns arise. In this case differences in behaviour with windfall and
earned endowments will be driven by how people perceive entitlements over their
endowments and -as we have already seen in the previous section- also over the
endowments of others in the context of games.
These two interpretations of the house money effect are not necessarily com-
peting. In some cases they complement each other on explaining changes in
25Posted-offer trading institutions, market supply and demand that increases considerably
earnings’ inequality between sellers and buyers, public information, etc. (for further details see
Cason et al. (2011), p.2 3).
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behaviour when earned assets are used rather than windfall endowed. In fact, in
Chapter 2 we suggest an experimental design that aspires to disentangle these
two factors driving the house money effect, namely changes in risk behaviour and
deservingness and fairness concerns.
Here, we first briefly present the concept of mental accounting and how that
relates to the house money effect and in the second part, we shortly discuss the
literature on other-regarding preferences that involve desert and fairness consid-
erations.
1.4.1 Mental Accounting
Mental accounting emerged as a concept as part of the broader discussion regard-
ing expected utility theory’s perceived failure as a descriptive model of decision
making. Thaler (1999) who first named mental accounting summarises all the
work related to that and concludes that “mental accounting matters”. He de-
fines it as a set of cognitive operations that individuals (and households) use to
organise, evaluate and track their financial activities. There are three important
components of mental accounting: (i) how outcomes are perceived and experi-
enced and how decisions are made and evaluated subsequently; (ii) the assignment
of financial activities to specific accounts; and (iii) the frequency with which these
accounts are evaluated; and each of them violates the economic principle of fungi-
bility, that is, money in one mental account is not a perfect substitute for money
in another mental account. For instance, the house money effect is interpreted in
this framework as following: windfall endowments belong in one mental account
and earned endowments in another one.
Regarding the first important component of mental accounting, Thaler (1980,
1985) assumes that people perceive outcomes in terms of the value function of
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) prospect theory, which has three important fea-
tures: (i) the value function is defined over gains and losses relative to a reference
point. The focus is on changes rather than in final states as in expected utility
theory; (ii) the gain function is concave and the loss function is convex suggesting
diminishing sensitivity; and (iii) losing hurts more, implying loss aversion. Kah-
neman and Tversky (1981) defined a mental account as a frame for evaluation,
“an outcome frame which specifies (i) the set of elementary outcomes that are
evaluated jointly and the manner in which they are combined and (ii) a reference
outcome that is considered neutral or normal”. Thaler (1999), when using the
term ‘mental accounting’, differs somewhat by referring to the entire process of
coding, categorising and evaluating events. Kahneman and Tversky (1984, p.
347), propose three ways that outcomes might be framed: in terms of a minimal
account, a topical account, or a comprehensive account. Considering two alterna-
tives, using the minimal account implies examining only the differences between
the two choices, disregarding all their common features. A topical account re-
lates the consequences of possible options to a reference level that is determined
by the context within which the decision arises. A comprehensive account takes
into account all other factors including current wealth, future earnings, possible
outcomes of other probabilistic holdings, and so on. Framing has an impact on
choices in the real world as people make decisions piecemeal, influenced by the
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context of the choice.
Thaler (1985) suggested an editing rule on how people combine financial out-
comes (within a single mental account). Assuming that people do so to make
themselves as happy as possible and given the shape of the value function, he
proposed the hedonic framing which entails the following principles:
i) Segregate gains (concave gain function).
ii) Integrate losses (convex loss function).
iii) Integrate smaller losses with larger gains (to offset loss aversion).
iv) Segregate small gains (silver linings) from larger losses (because the gain
function is steepest at the origin, the utility of a small gain can exceed the
utility of slightly reducing a large loss).
More formally, the hedonic editing hypothesis is summarised in the following
formula:
x&y = max[ν(x+ y), ν(x) + ν(y)]
where & denotes the cognitive combination of the two outcomes x and y.
As we have already seen when discussing the seminal paper of Thaler and
Johnson (1990) on the house money effect, the Hedonic editing hypothesis has
been contradicted by the findings in their experimental data. More precisely, the
Hedonic editing rule was supported by experimental evidence in the domain of
gains but in the case of losses evidence suggested that separation of losses was
preferred to integration. A modification of that rule named Quasi-Hedonic edit-
ing rule was then suggested as an alternative. The intuition behind the Quasi-
Hedonic editing hypothesis was that risk aversion can be observed after prior
losses because subsequent losses are not integrated with the prior ones, while in
the presence of prior gains, the opposite expected, that is, following a gain, losses
which are smaller than the original gain can be integrated with that, moderat-
ing the influence of loss aversion and facilitating risk-seeking. The second part
regarding prior gains was named house money effect.
1.4.2 Entitlements, Fairness and Desert
The other possible explanation suggested for the house money effect was that
of fairness and deservingness concerns. Experimental research has very early
underlined the relevance of ‘fairness’ or ‘justice’ for economic decisions. The
literature on other-regarding preferences is very extensive26 and it is not our
purpose here to present an exhaustive review of that literature. We would rather
focus on discussing studies that favour and support an interpretation of the house
26We advise the reader interested in these topics to refer to Konow (2003)’s exceptional review
on justice theories, including those that have been presented and tested experimentally not only
in economics but also in psychology, political science, sociology, philosophy and other related
fields.
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money effect as the result of fairness and deservingness concerns, which is related
to what is known as the ‘Lockean desert effect’.
Hoffman and Spitzer (1985) conducted an experiment regarding distributive
justice, that is, how participants perceive fairness, entitlements and rights. They
make the distinction between entitlements and rights, referring to the former
as legally enforceable claims while the latter as morally justifiable entitlements.
Their study involves bargains between two participants with opposing payoff
functions and full information regarding the other’s payoffs. Participants choose
between a non-cooperative (keep $12 and give nothing to the other) and a co-
operative outcome (get $14 from the experimenter and split it according to a
mutually agreed-on manner). The participant who makes the decision in each
bargain is determined by a coin flip. The results show that all of the subjects
choose the efficient outcome of joint-profit maximisation; but the striking result is
that all of them divided the $14 equally. Hoffman and Spitzer (1985) rationalise
these results by suggesting that participants behaved ‘as if’ they chose a payoff
distribution according to their own perception of fairness.
In this particular case, distributive preferences imply that participants seem
to find luck (the flipping of a coin) not a ‘just’ way of allocating unequal property
entitlements. By varying the experimental institutions they test three major fam-
ilies of theories of justice: utilitarian, egalitarian and natural law or desert. The
evidence they collected supports the Lockean theory of earned desert. Despite
maximising joint profits across all treatments, participants seemed to acknowl-
edge ‘earned’ entitlements and for that reason the frequency of self-regarding
versus equal payoff divisions varied depending on the methods used for assigning
entitlements.
Kahneman et al. (1986) discuss entitlements in the market and ‘fairness as a
constraint on profit seeking’ in what Konow (2003) describes as ‘the most widely
cited descriptive study of justice in economics’. They use a household survey of
telephone interviews in Canada to identify standards of fairness regarding prices,
rents and wages and to consider the possible implications of those standards to
market outcomes. They consider three determinants of fairness: the reference
transaction which is “ a relevant precedent that is characterized by a reference
price or wage, and by a positive reference profit to the firm”(p.729); the outcomes
for the firm and the transactors; and the occasion for the action of the firm. Their
results are summarised in the principle of dual entitlement that they propose,
which states that:“ Transactors have an entitlement to the terms of the reference
transaction and firms are entitled to their reference profit. A firm is not allowed to
increase its profits by arbitrarily violating the entitlement of its transactors to the
reference price, rent or wage. When the reference profit of a firm is threatened,
however, it may set new terms that protect its profit at transactors’ expense”(pp.
729–730).
Burrows and Loomes (1994) also argue in favour of the ‘Lockean desert’ in the
two-person trading environment that they examine. They consider their results
as an updated version of Lockean desert theory since it refers to a ‘two-part
desert’, that is desert that derives not only from the effort that produces the
initial entitlements but also from the effort exerted in the bargaining process
itself.
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Apart from the experimental also the theoretical literature has responded
and tried to incorporate fairness in the analysis of economic decisions. Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) assume that people care about
‘fairness’ and they define this ‘fairness’ concern as inequity-aversion, that is, the
dislike for unequal payoff distributions.
Besides these outcome-based models of other-regarding behaviour, other ap-
proaches that focus on intentions of economic agents have been developed. The
most influential paper in this regard is by Rabin (1993) which incorporates the
concept of reciprocity and conditional other-regarding behaviour. Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger (2004) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006) have extended Rabin’s
work to extensive form games. Charness and Rabin (2002), motivated by the
confoundedness in explanations that models of other-regarding preferences had
suggested, present a model that embeds difference aversion, social-welfare prefer-
ences and other preferences (such as reciprocity).
Frohlich et al. (2004) extend the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model to incorporate
‘the just deserts’ for those cases where individuals were involved in production or
work. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) in their original work focus on explaining equity
concerns in a public good setting but Frohlich et al. (2004) focus on dictator
games. Let d represent the dictator and r the recipient, and let the total money
received by the dictator for distribution be x. Then in any distribution, x =
xd + xr: the sum of the amount kept and the amount redistributed. In the
experiments where production takes place, the amount produced p(in monetary
terms) is the amount to be distributed, being the summed production of the
paired individuals: p = pd + pr.Hence, pd + pr = xd + xr. In a typical dictator
game without production, the Fehr-Schmidt model characterizes the dictator’s
utility of allocating xd to herself as follows:
U(xd) = xd − αmax(xr − xd, 0)− βmax(xd − xr, 0)
Given that this environment involves a unilateral decision by the dictator and
that β < α, either β is sufficiently large to motivate a 5050 split, or it doesn’t
affect behaviour at all.
The critical value is β > 0.5.Introducing ‘just deserts’ and continuing to as-
sume linearity the dictator’s utility will now look like:
U(xd) = xd−αmax(xr−xd, 0)−βmax(xd−xr, 0)−γmax(pd−xd, 0)−ψmax(pr−xr, 0)
where the two additional terms represent the cost to the dictator of not taking
his/her own ‘just deserts’ and the cost to the dictator of not giving to the recipient
his/her ‘just deserts’. The coefficients for the ‘just dessert’ arguments, γ and ψ,
differ to those of equity in the sense that they do not involve the element of
reciprocity that leads to the 2 for 1 multiplier found in β. In the cases with
production, the other-regarding behaviour will emerge when both β and ψ are
below 0.5. Similarly with equity concerns, they assume that the individual is more
concerned about fairness to self than to others. Thus, apart from α > β they
also assume γψ > 0. Figure 1.1 summarises the relationship between decisions
and norms.
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Figure 1.1: The Relationship between Behaviours and Norms
Moreno Garrido and Rodrguez Lara (2012) extend the work of Frohlich et al.
(2004) to capture the accountability principle, which claims that subjects should
only be rewarded for factors under their control. This fairness concept does not
hold subjects responsible for factors beyond their control in the production of the
surplus.
The studies discussed in this section relate to the house money effect in two
ways: first experimental literature has documented considerations for property
rights and entitlements while theoretical literature has suggested ways to model
these preferences of fairness and desert. In that way, the house money effect can
be explained as a result of this kind of preferences. The intuition behind this
explanation would be that the “social reference point” that people may assume
as a benchmark for evaluating the degree of fairness in their decisions might be
different depending on how entitlements on endowments were induced (earned
endowments vs. windfall endowments).
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1.5 Conclusion
This chapter organises and provides a survey on the literature on the house money
effect. Apart from the profound two questions of whether people treat money
differently depending on its origin and the implications of the house money effect
for the experimental methodology in economics, this review tackles two more
research questions: first, what drives the house money effect and second, what
its context-dependency can say regarding this first question.
Bearing these questions in mind, the literature on the house money effect has
been divided into two main categories: papers that examine the house money
effect in the context of individual decisions, and those that do the same but
within the environment of a game, where social preferences may emerge. This
is our first step towards our two goals: to document how contextual differences
can amplify (or weaken) the house money effect and how different contexts might
favour different interpretations of the house money effect.
Regarding the first goal, we hope that our work has contributed not only to
present an extensive review of related studies on the house money effect but also
with the help of our organisation criterion to highlight important features related
to the house money effect across experimental settings. We believe that our
second goal regarding contextual differences and how these can favour different
interpretations of the house money effect has also been achieved. Although we
aspire to give a more complete answer to the question of what drives the house
money effect in the following chapter we believe that it is already obvious from our
earlier discussion here that the house money effect seems to be explained better as
the result of a different mental accounting over windfall gains in situations where
people face individual decisions27 whereas in situations where social preference
may emerge the house money effect seems to appear as a result of fairness or ‘just
desert’ preferences.
27That also involves competitive market environment.
33
Chapter 2
Re-examining the House Money
Effect
2.1 Introduction
A cursory glance at the literature on the house money effect typically leaves a
somewhat muddled impression of conflicting findings. This seemingly convoluted
state of affairs in the literature is what motivated the idea for this study. In Chap-
ter 1 we have already pinned down two important features of the house money
effect: its context-dependency and the different interpretations it has received.
This in turn has enabled us to systematically document the differences across
contexts, thus providing a useful a first step towards uncovering what drives the
house money effect.
This question of what drives the house money effect is at the core of our
analysis in this chapter. We employ a novel experimental design to examine this
research question that employs a within-subject approach, in tandem with the
use of three different contexts of economic decisions. Both the within-subject
experimental design and the three contexts of economic decisions allows to better
test the two most prevailing interpretations of the house money effect; namely
that it is the result of different mental accounting over windfall gains, and the
idea that it is a result of fairness or ‘just desert’ preferences. To our knowledge,
this is the first study on the house money effect using a within-subject design,
and although many scholars have argued in favour of the idea that the house
money effect is context-dependent, there is only one study, that of Rosenboim and
Shavit (2012), which examines and compares the findings on the house money
effect across different contexts1.
Regarding the different contexts we employ in our experiment, we opt for
based on our analysis in chapter 1- an individual decision setting and two group
decision-like games. Our individual decision setting involves choices between a
certain amount and a series of all-or-nothing lotteries, while the group decision-
like games consist of a trust game and a public good game. The choice of these
three contexts, apart from the apparent purpose to examine context-dependency
of the house money effect, also facilitates the examination of more specific ques-
1We refer to their experiments and findings and compare them with ours later in this chapter.
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tions.
Firstly, our individual decision setting allows us to measure the degree of risk
aversion of our participants using a Holt and Laury (2002)-like scale and test
directly the hypothesis that different sources of endowments (house money vs.
earned money2, thereon HM vs. EM) change the risk behaviour of participants,
as this stems from the definition3 of the house money effect by Thaler and Johnson
(1990). We also do the same, namely testing for the presence of the house money
effect, within the trust game and the public good game environments.
This risk aversion measure has also a second role as the way it was designed
allows us to directly compare the individual decision over lotteries with the de-
cision of the first mover in the trust game. We are able to do so show as we
have designed the choices in the individual decision to map exactly the decision
that the first mover in the trust game faces. The only difference between the two
decisions lies in the fact that in the decision over lotteries participants face state
uncertainty as nature (luck) determines the outcome and their payoff while in
the trust game first movers face strategic uncertainty as their outcome and payoff
will be determined by the decision of the respective second mover.
The public good game enters the discussion - and facilitates our analysis - as
a game where although social preferences may emerge as in the trust game, the
crucial difference lies in the existence of a dominant strategy, namely free-riding,
which renders risk preferences irrelevant to the decision4. In this way, we have
three different types of decision: one of them (decision over lotteries) involves
only risk; the other one (decision in the public good game) involves only social
preferences; and the last one (the first mover’s decision in the trust game) involves
both risk and social preferences. By examining the presence (or not) of the house
money effect across these three contexts, we try to disentangle the two factors
that might be driving the house money effect, namely changes in risk behaviour
and deservingness or fairness concerns.
Our experimental data confirm the presence of the house money effect both
in the decision to trust (but not in the decision of trustworthiness5 )in the trust
2As we have already seen in Chapter 1 terms are used interchangeably throughout the
literature. For instance, ‘house’ money, found money or ‘windfall’ endowments and respectively,
earned money or endowments.
3See Chapter 1 for the exact definition.
4In a workshop presentation at the School of Economics of the University of Edinburgh,
colleagues, among other useful comments, suggested that instead of the public good game we
could have used a simpler game that involves only social preferences like the dictator game.
We consider this a useful suggestion that might be considered for future research on the topic.
In defence of our choice of the public good game, first the experiment discussed here is in this
chapter is part of a larger experiment. The other part of the experiment is the central topic of
Chapter 3 and for the analysis there the public good game was indispensable. Secondly, given
that the trust game is considered as a sequential prisoner’s dilemma while the public good
game as a generalization of the prisoner’s dilemma, similar incentives are in action and social
preference that may emerge can be driven in both games by fairness or reciprocity. Note that
also preferences for efficiency in these two games as Nash equilibrium is not Pareto efficient in
both cases. Finally, we admit that the public good game was in the centre of our experimental
design from the very beginning as the motivation for this study was the confoundedness in the
experimental findings for the house money effect in the public good games.
5The literature usually refers to the decision of the second mover in the trust game as
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game and in the decision to contribute in the public account within the public
good game. However, our findings do not support the hypothesis of changes in
risk behaviour of participants due to different sources of money, suggesting that
risk attitudes are robust to different types of money used along the experiment.
This result, apart from providing further support for the argument of context-
dependency of the house money effect, sheds new light on the relative applicability
of the two competing explanations of the house money effect. In fact, our Holt
and Laury (2002)-like risk measure only serves to assist in explaining the decision
of trust in the trust game (TG, thereon) and the positive contributions in the
public good game (PGG)6. Therefore, our findings seem to favour interpretations
of the house money effect as a result of ‘just desert’ or fairness preferences rather
than a consequence of different mental accounting over windfall gains7 .
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: we skip any discussion of the
related literature given that those most relevant to our work have already been
presented in the first chapter8; rather, we begin with presenting our experimental
design, and in the following section we present and discuss our results while the
last section concludes.
2.2 Experimental Design
2.2.1 Experimental Tasks & Games
Each session of the experiment consisted of six economic decisions tasks and one
quiz task; all of them referred as ‘situations’ in the instructions9. A trust game,
a set of lotteries and a public good game were played twice and a real effort task
was played once. The within subjects design required two kinds of sessions in
ordered to control for order effects. In the one kind of sessions participants were
first asked to make decisions in 3 tasks using money endowed by the experimenter
(‘house money’, thereon HM), they then participated in the real effort task to earn
the money they would use when making decisions in the other 3 tasks (‘earned
money’, EM; HMEM session). In the other kind of sessions, they first had to
earn the money in the real effort task, which they used in the decisions in the
3 first tasks and for the rest of the tasks they were endowed with HM by the
experimental team (EMHM session). The following figure describes the timeline
of games and tasks that participants attended in each kind of session respectively.
Participants were informed that they would participate in more than one sit-
uation. They only received instructions for each situation by the experiment just
‘trustworthiness’ while ‘trust’ refers to the decision of the first mover.
6This result though is consistent with results in existing literature where no predictive re-
lationship found between risk attitudes and decisions in trust. (see Houser et al. (2010) and
discussion in Section 5)
7See the discussion of Thaler and Johnson (1990)’s Quasi-Hedonic editing rule in Chapter
1.
8We do discuss though some additional relevant studies in our discussion section.
9More precisely, the six games were referred to as Situation 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 respectively,
whereas the real effort task as Situation *. The reason for this distinction will be made clearer
later on in the description of the experiment.
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Figure 2.1: Experimental Sessions
before the beginning of the relevant stage. Information about their performance
in each stage was only presented to them by the end of the experiment in a
summary screen. The matching protocol was strangers and the participants were
informed about that. More specifically, participants were paired and grouped
with other participants in the room in some of the situations but the composition
of groups and pairs was never the same along each session and that was explic-
itly stated in the instructions. We chose the strangers’ matching protocol in an
attempt to reduce any reputation, history and implicit punishment spill overs.
We also tried to avoid any income/hedging effects by informing participants
about the outcome of their decisions in each situation at the end of the session
and by paying them only one of the situations (not the Situation *) they made
decisions in. The computer randomly chose one of the situations for each partic-
ipant. The outcome of that particular situation determined the final payment of
each person10.
2.2.2 Procedure
Participants arrived in the lab, confirmed their registration number, picked a
card with a number assigning them to the respective computer and signed a
consent form11 . They were also asked to answer a short questionnaire -mainly
with demographic related questions12 - in pen and paper. The experiment was
fully computerised. It was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree
(Fischbacher (2007)).
The general instructions and the instructions13 for each of the tasks were
distributed to participants in paper and were also read out loud. The reading
10Note that the final payment included also the show up and the participation fee.
11This was a general consent form where they were agreeing to be members of the subjects’
pool of the BLUE and accepting the general rules of participating in any experiments in the
laboratory.
12Most of the information collected by this short questionnaire is reported in the following
section.
13Experimental instructions are included in the Appendix A.1.
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of the instructions was accompanied by a power point presentation14. Some
additional instructions were added in each of the screens along the experiment.
Participants were welcomed to ask questions for any confusion regarding the
instructions.
The experiment lasted approximately one and a half hour and no commu-
nication was allowed during the session. When the session finished participants
were asked to remain seated up to be called -by the number of their respective
computer- to get paid in the next door’s room. The participants signed a receipt,
which has been kept in records by the lab administration and left the laboratory
with their payment in an envelope. Only the lab administrator knew participants’
names and exact payment and only for administrative purposes. The experimen-
tal team remained in the laboratory while the payment was taking place for each
participant, only to invigilate the process of one participant per time going for
payment next door according to the number on their computer.
The laboratory has 18 computers separated by partitions that ensure privacy
to participants when they make decisions. We could only use up to 16 due to
limitations imposed by the experimental design. As it is described below, one of
the decisions15 required groups of 4 participants.
2.2.3 The Origin of the Money - The Real Effort Task
The general idea of the real effort task is to assign stronger property right entitle-
ments on money by requiring participants to meet a performance quota to earn
their endowments16. The real effort task consisted of 25 puzzles (see the appendix
for examples of these puzzles) that were taken by an online IQ test17. Participants
were told that they had to solve correctly at least 10 of these puzzles in order to
receive £10 that they would be using in subsequent situations. The puzzles were
relatively easy (although not trivial) and the quota of 10 out of 25 was purposely
set low to ensure that everyone would succeed and earn the £10 of EM. In that
way we avoided any sample selection and attrition. We also avoided to award
them proportionally for each puzzle solved correctly in order to eliminate hetero-
geneity in endowments that would complicate our analysis further. None of our
participants failed to achieve the quota required in the task. It was very explicit
to the participants that the money earned in this task it would not be directly
payable to them but rather it would be used in subsequent situations. For that
reason, the real effort task was called ‘Situation *’ throughout the experiment to
distinguish it from other situations which were numbered chronologically.
To summarize the process, the three decision tasks were played twice in each
session. In each situation, participants were using either £10 that they were
credit in their account by the experimental team (HM) or £10 that they had
earned by performing the real effort task (EM). In each situation it was made
14The power point presentation is also available in the Appendix A.2.
15Recall that decisions were called ‘situations’ throughout the experiment to avoid any prim-
ing
16Other ways that have been used in the literature to induce ‘own’ money are discussed in
the later discussion section.
17IQ Test Questions source: http://www.iqtest-center.com
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explicit to the participants which kind of money they would be using.
2.2.4 The Trust Game18(Following Berg et al. (1995))
The game in this situation is the well-known trust or investment game. We mod-
erate the original game by Berg et al. (1995) by allowing only for binary choices
both for the trustor (‘first mover’) and the trustee (‘second mover’). The trustor
has to decide between trusting (‘transfer £10’) and not trusting (‘keep £10’) and
the trustee between reciprocating19 (‘transfer back £15’) and not reciprocating
(‘keep £30’)20.
More precisely in the experiment, participants were paired with other partici-
pants in the room without knowing who they are matched with but knowing that
they have not been and/or will not be paired with that person before/again. Each
pair consisted of a First Mover (FM) and a Second Mover (SM). The allocation
of roles was determined randomly by computer tossing a coin but only after the
participants had made their decisions both as a FM and as a SM. We are aware
of potential problems with using the strategy method but we believe they are
likely irrelevant in our context21 . Participants were informed about the actual
allocation of roles and the outcome of their decisions in this situation only by the
end of the session.
The FM was either endowed by £10 or had earned £10 and had to decide
between keeping the money for him/herself or transfer them to the SM. If the
FM kept the £10, the SM earned nothing. If the FM had transferred the £10 to
the SM, then experimenters tripled this money before it was passed to the SM.
Then, as a SM participants had to decide whether to keep the £30 and do not
transfer anything back to the FM or transfer £15 back to the FM paired with.










Figure 2.2: Trust Game
Participants were explicitly informed whether their partner -when acting as
a FM- had been endowed the £10 or had gained them in the real effort task.
18The use of a trust game in order to facilitate my analysis was a very useful suggestion by
my supervisor Prof. Michele Belot.
19As we discuss later on in this chapter the literature also refers to the second mover’s decision
as a choice between to show trustworthiness or not.
20See Experimental Instructions in Appendix A.1. for the terminology used during the ex-
periment.
21Strategy method is discussed further in a later section.
39
We kept homogeneity here as well, that is, we only considered pairs where both
members had been endowed or had earned the £10 when deciding as FM.
We also tried to elicit beliefs of participants by incentivizing their predictions.
They were asked to predict how many of the rest of the participants in the room
they think they will transfer the£10 as a FM and how many they will transfer£15
back as a SM. Precision in predictions was rewarded with additional payments22.
2.2.5 The Set of Lotteries (Following Holt and Laury (2002))
The set of lotteries was designed in such a way to mimic the typical Holt and
Laury (2002)’s menu of choices that permits measurement of the degree of risk
aversion. Rather than choices between two lotteries with different variability of
the potential payoffs we used a menu of nine choices between a lottery and a
certain amount. The idea behind this was to map the decision of the FM in
the trust game described above onto a risky decision, in order to facilitate direct
comparisons between choices in the trust game and the lottery scheme. In that
way, the set of lotteries works not only as a measurement of risk aversion but we
also have the ability to consider whether decisions with HM and EM differ when
framed in a trust environment rather than in a risky environment. Results from
the related literature on strategic uncertainty vs. state uncertainty are presented




1 (15, 0.1); (0 ,0.9) 10
2 (15, 0.2); (0 ,0.8) 10
3 (15, 0.3); (0 ,0.7) 10
4 (15, 0.4); (0 ,0.6) 10
5 (15, 0.5); (0 ,0.5) 10
6 (15, 0.6); (0 ,0.4) 10
7 (15, 0.7); (0 ,0.3) 10
8 (15, 0.8); (0 ,0.2) 10
9 (15, 0.9); (0 ,0.1) 10
Table 2.1: Set of Lottery Choices
A table like Table 2.1 was given to the participants who were asked to make
a decision for each of the cases. In each case they had to choose between the
certain amount of £10 or an all-or-nothing lottery that would pay them either
£0 or £15 according to the rule stated in the lottery and the result of the roll
of a ten-sided die. Participants had to make a choice for all the nine cases but
only one of them would be selected randomly by the computer to determine their
earnings in this situation. Participants were informed about the outcome of their
decisions in this situation only by the end of the session on a summary screen.
22Strategy method is discussed further in a later section. This is typical practice for elici-
tation of beliefs in the related literature (see Fischbacher et al. (2001)) and see Experimental
Instructions on how precision was rewarded.
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2.2.6 The Public Good Game (Following Fischbacher et al.
(2001))
In this situation, participants were divided into groups of four. We used random
matching and we kept a strangers’ protocol across the different situations that
participants had to take part23. The only information the participants received
was the number of the group they belong to and their individual number in
the group. This information was given to facilitate the understanding of the
instructions and both numbers were selected randomly by the computer24.
This situation consisted of two types of decisions: an unconditional contri-
bution and a conditional one. The unconditional decision is similar to the one
made in a typical linear public good game. Participants were asked to decide
how much25 of the £10 would be willing to keep in a private account and how
much to transfer -if any- in a project26. The earnings for each participant would
be determined by the following equation27 :




The second conditional decision28 required from participants to fill in a ‘trans-
fer table’. This ‘transfer table’ looked like table 2.2 and participants had to in-
dicate how much they would be willing to transfer to the project if the average
transfer of the others in their group was the respective number.
Your Transfer Table












Table 2.2: Transfer Table
23See discussion earlier on this section.
24The usefulness of the individual numbers will be shown in the next paragraphs.
25They were only allowed to transfer increments of £1.
26We did not use the term ‘public account’ in order to avoid any priming.
27This equation was not presented to participants. Instructions included in the Appendix A.1
demonstrate how the potential earnings were explained to participants during the experimental
session.
28Though data from this second decision are not relevant to our analysis in this chapter we
present exactly all the decisions participants faced during the whole experiment.
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Following Fischbacher et al. (2001) we made the conditional decision incen-
tive compatible by employing the following rule to determine the earnings in this
situation. Participants were told that, after they have all made both types of de-
cisions, a random mechanism would determine which of the two decisions would
be relevant for the determination of their actual earnings in this situation. In
each group, for one randomly chosen participant the ‘transfer table’ became this
participant’s relevant decision. For the other three group members their uncondi-
tional ‘transfer’ was their relevant contribution decision. For each member of the
group, the probability that the ‘transfer table’ will be the payoff-relevant decision
was 1/429.
We slightly deviate from Fischbacher et al. (2001)’s design by using terms like
‘transfer’ and ‘transfer table’ rather than unconditional and conditional contri-
bution as to avoid any priming towards conditioning decisions since conditional
cooperation and reciprocity are central concepts of our analysis -especially in the
next chapter.
We also elicited beliefs about average transfers of others. Precision on beliefs
was rewarded in this part of the experiment, too. Details on how precision was
rewarded follows in the Appendix A.1 with the Experimental Instructions.
29More discussion on this part of the experiment follows in the next chapter where the choice
of the particular experimental design is more relevant to the research questions discussed there




The experiment included a total of 64 subjects and was conducted in the Be-
havioural Laboratory at University of Edinburgh (BLUE)30 in the spring of 2013.
Five sessions were conducted in total: 3 HMEM (official trial 15/03/2013, session
1 and session 2 18/03/2013) and 2 EMHM (session 3 and session 4 25/03/2013).
In each session we needed a number of participants multiple of 4 due to restric-
tions imposed by our experimental design as described in the previous section.
Although we invited more than 16 participants31 in each session, there were still
sessions where less than 16 participants showed up. Therefore, in some sessions
we had 16 participants (official trial & session 1), in some 12 participants (sessions
2 & 4) and in one session 8 participants (session 8).
Participants were recruited using email lists of students of the University of
Edinburgh, since the experiment was the first to be run in BLUE and the subjects’
pool was not yet organised using ORSEE. We carefully excluded students that
were students of the School of Economics to try to eliminate familiarity with
game theory among participants. They were all students either on undergraduate
(Honours and Non-Honours years) or postgraduate (Masters and PhD) degrees.
According to the degrees’ classification of the University of Edinburgh there were
18 participants from Humanities, 23 from Social Sciences, 4 from Engineering, 10
from Science, 4 from Medicine and 5 from Art degrees.
The average age of participants was 22 years and varied from 18 to 42 years
old. There were 40 female participants and 18 male. Six of them did not report
their gender on the Short Questionnaire they were asked to complete. In the
same questionnaire they were asked to report their nationality and the country
they have spent most years of their life living in. By combining the answers to
these to questions we classified the participants as following: 28 were coming from
the United Kingdom, 15 from the European Union, 13 from the United States of
America and 8 from Asia.
The total cost of the experiment was £1017.4 and it was funded by the School
of Economics of the University of Edinburgh. The average earnings were £15.90
and varied from £5 to £36.50. All the participants that arrived in the laboratory
were paid a £3 show up fee and those who actually participated in the experiment
were paid an additional participation fee of £2 according to the policy of the
laboratory32. The payments to participants were only made at the end of the
experiment.
30This experiment was the first to be run in the BLUE and at that time the provisional name
of the laboratory was CEREP (see Experimental Instructions in the Appendix A.1).
31The maximum number of vacancies we could use in the laboratory subject to our experi-
mental design.
32Sessions were overbooked to ensure enough participation.
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2.3.2 Risk
We shall begin our analysis by considering first the individual decisions that
participants had to make. In the two lottery situations -as we explain in an earlier
subsection- participants face the decision choosing between a certain amount
(£10) and an all-or-nothing lottery (£15 or £0). They face this decision for nine
times (see 9 cases). The potential payoffs in the lotteries remain the same along
the nine cases but we vary the probabilities of low and high payoffs in each lottery.
As we go down in the table the probability of winning £15 when choosing the
lottery increases by 0.1 and the probability of getting £0 decreases in the same
pattern (see Table 2.1). Expected payoffs of the first six lotteries are lower than
the certain amount of £10 suggesting that a risk-neutral person would choose the
certain amount for 6 times before switching to the risky choice (the all-or-nothing
lottery).
Figure 2.3: Proportion of Safe Choices in Each Decision
Our data as presented in Figure 2.3 suggest a tendency towards risk-averse
behaviour among subjects participating. This result is commonly documented in
the related literature33. Figure 2.3 presents the proportion of safe choices made
by participants in each of the nine decisions they were asked to make during the
experiment. The green line indicates the predictions under the assumption of
risk-neutrality, i.e., the probability that the safe option is chosen is 1 for the first
six decisions and then the probability drops to 0 for all remaining decisions. The
blue line shows the observed frequency of safe choices when participants using
HM while the red line indicates the respective one when using EM. The graph
itself is pretty indicative that there is no statistical difference between HM and
EM. Actually, a sign test34 on number of safe choices with HM vs. EM does not
33See for instance Holt and Laury (2002)’s results.
34We use here the sign test as it is applicable to the case of two related samples when the
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Figure 2.4: Risky Behaviour
allows to reject the null hypotheses of equality of medians as well as a Wilcoxon
signed-rank test35 according to which we could not reject the null hypothesis
that both distributions are the same. The results of both tests suggest no change
in behaviour across the different sources of money (two-sided sign test p-value=
1.0000 and Wilcoxon signed-rank test p-value= 0.8842 respectively). Participants
seem not to behave differently when using HM and EM in this individual decision
lottery setting. In Figure 2.4 below means of safe choices show that with both
HM and EM participants switched to the risky choice later than risk neutrality
predicts.
We also examine any potential differences in behaviour between subjects, con-
sidering only decisions in the first set of lotteries that each participant faces in
each experimental session. That is, for the trial session and sessions 1 and 2 the
experimenter wishes to establish that two conditions are different. Following Siegel (1956) the
null hypothesis H0 tested by the sign test is that P (XA > XB) = P (XA < XB) = 1/2 where
XA and XB are the two scores for a matched pair. Another way of stating the null is that
the median difference is zero. When we apply the sigh test, we focus on the direction of the
differences between every XAi and XBi , noting whether the sign of the difference is plus or
minus. Under the H0, we would expect the number of pairs which have XA > XB to equal the
number of pairs which have XA < XB. That is, if the null hypothesis were true we would expect
about half of the differences to be negative and half to be positive. H0 is rejected if too few
differences of one sign occur.Since the test statistic is expected to follow a binomial distribution,
the standard binomial test is used to calculate significance. The normal approximation to the
binomial distribution can be used for large sample sizes.
35Following Siegel (1956) again, the sign test that we discuss in earlier footnote utilises
information simply about the direction of the differences within pairs. If we can also consider
the relative magnitude we can use a more powerful test, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test which
gives more weight to a pair which shows a larger difference between the two conditions than to a
pair which shows small difference. The null hypothesis H0 states that the difference between the
pairs follows a symmetric distribution around zero while the alternative H1 that the difference
between the pairs does not follow a symmetric distribution around zero.
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Figure 2.5: Order Effects in Risky Behaviour
choices in lotteries are made using HM and for sessions 3 and 4 using EM. A
Mann-Whitney U test36 shows again no statistical difference (p-value= 0.7902)
between HM and EM in this setting.
Our findings are similar from hypothesis testing between subjects regarding
the second set of lotteries participants face in each experimental session (Mann-
Whitney U test p-value= 0.8130; see Figure 2.5). Therefore, our original hypoth-
esis:
36The Mann-Whitney U test (also called Wilcoxon rank-sum test) is not the same as the
Wilcoxon signed-rank test, although both are nonparametric and involve summation of ranks.
The Wilcoxon rank-sum test is applied to independent (unmatched) samples while the Wilcoxon
signed-rank test is applied to matched or dependent samples. Following Siegel (1956), the
MannWhitney U test is one of the most useful alternative to the parametric t test when the
research -like in our case- wishes to avoid the t tests assumptions, or when the measurement
in the research is weaker than interval scaling. Assuming two populations A and B, the null
hypothesis H0 is that A and B have the same distribution and the alternative H1 is that A is
stochastically larger than B. We may accept H1 if the probability that a score from A is larger
than a score from B is greater than one half. That is, if a is one observation of population A
and b from population B then H1 is that p(a > b) > 1/2. Of course, we might also consider H1
p(a > b) < 1/2 or for the two-tailed test H1 p(a > b) ̸= 1/2. The test involves the calculation of
a statistic, usually called U, whose distribution under the null hypothesis is known. In the case
of small samples, the distribution is tabulated, but for sample sizes above ∼ 20 approximation
using the normal distribution is fairly good. The method for computing U is the following: We
first assign numeric ranks to all the observations, beginning with 1 for the smallest value. Where
there are groups of tied values, assign a rank equal to the midpoint of unadjusted rankings. We
then add up the ranks for the observations which came from sample 1. The sum of ranks in
sample 2 is now determinate, since the sum of all the ranks equals N(N + 1)/2 where N is the
total number of observations. U is then given by: U1 = R1 − n1(n1+1)2 where n1 is the sample
size for sample 1, and R1 is the sum of the ranks in sample 1. It doesn’t matter which of the
two samples is considered sample 1. An equally valid formula for U is U2 = R2− n2(n2+1)2 . The
smaller value of U1 and U2 is the one used when consulting significance tables.
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Figure 2.6: Risk Attitude Classification
Hypothesis 2.1. More safe choices will be made when using EM rather than
when using HM.
is not supported by the experimental evidence presented above. This result is not
far from what Cardenas et al. (2014) have documented, who although used a cash
in advance method to induce the sense of playing with ‘own’ money, they still
find only a small and indirect house money effect in decisions under uncertainty.
Finally in this subsection, we present a risk attitude types’ classification ac-
cording to the number of safe decisions made by each participant. Classification
seems to remain robust across different sources of money as seen in Figure 2.6.
2.3.3 Trust Game
The trust game as it has already been presented earlier is a sequential game with a
unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium37 . By backward induction the trustor
prefers to keep the £10 as the trustee, if he/she takes the turn, will prefer to
keep the £30. Results in related literature38 suggest positive transfers by both
the first mover and the second mover. Here, we will examine how both the two
decisions in the trust game are affected (or not) by using EM rather than HM.
2.3.3.1 First Movers’ Behavior
We begin by conjecturing that if the house money effect is present in the decision
to trust the following hypothesis should hold:
37Similar to a sequential prisoner’s dilemma situation as the equilibrium is not an efficient
outcome
38See for instance seminal paper by Berg et al. (1995).
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Figure 2.7: Trust
Hypothesis 2.2. When participants using EM is less probable to trust than when
using HM.
This hypothesis is supported by our experimental data. Both parametric
and non-parametric tests suggested significant differences between trust with HM
and trust with EM (Wilcoxon signed rank test p-value= 0.0011). As the Figure
2.7 suggests approximately 64% of participants decided to trust when they were
endowed with HM while only 39% did the same when earned endowments were
at stake. The hypothesis is also supported by results in probit models that are
discussed a bit later in this section.
We also consider differences in trust with HM and EM between subjects.
We compare across sessions trust with HM and trust with EM when the trust
decision is made for the 1st time in the experimental session and also when the
trust decision is made for the 2nd time in the session. As Figure 2.8 shows, our
results suggest that when decision for trust is made for the 1st time, although the
difference between trust with HM and trust with EM is of the same direction like
in within-subjects comparisons, it is not statistically significant (Mann Whitney
U test p-value= 0.8031). When decision for trust is made for the 2nd time our
experimental data show a statistically significant difference, suggesting that trust
is more probable when with HM rather than with EM (Mann Whitney U test
p-value= 0.0335). We discuss further these particular results when we comment
on the advantages and disadvantages of the within-subject experimental design.
Our findings seem to be in the same vein with the related literature as this
presented in Chapter 1, supporting the argument that assigning stronger property
right entitlements by requiring participants to meet a performance quota in a real
effort task in order to earn their endowment has an effect on cooperation in trust
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Figure 2.8: Order Effects in Trust
games.
2.3.3.2 Second Movers’ Behavior
We treat experimental data on second mover’s behaviour in a similar fashion.
Given that the money on bargain is entitled to the first mover we expect the
behaviour of the second mover in the trust game to be independent of the origin
of the money. We test the following conjecture:
Hypothesis 2.3. Participants’ decision to reciprocate (show trustworthiness) is
independent of the source of money.
Our results from non-parametric tests confirm the above hypothesis (Wilcoxon
signed rank test p-value= 1.000) while it is also confirmed comparing between
subjects both when decision was made for 1st time and when for 2nd time (Mann
Whitney U test p-value > 0.01 in both cases).
Our results are not exactly in line with earlier work, for instance by Fahr
and Irlenbusch (2000) who observe that trustees return significantly more money
the stronger the property rights of the trustors; but they do not contradict our
argument for fairness and deservingness concerns, since they seem to respect
property rights as the percentage of trustworthiness is always greater than the
percentage of trust when earned money is used rather than when ‘house’ money
is used where the opposite holds (compare Figures 2.8 and 2.10).
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Figure 2.9: Trustworthiness
Figure 2.10: Order Effects in Trustworthiness
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2.3.4 The Public Good Game
In our public good setting, given the existence of the dominant strategy, theoret-
ical predictions suggest that participants should free ride and keep the £10 for
themselves. Following the findings of the long existing literature on positive con-
tributions in public good games39 , we expect at least some positive contribution
and in regards with the house money effect’s examination we conjecture that:
Hypothesis 2.4. Contributions to the public account will be lower when using
EM rather than HM.
Our hypothesis is supported by our experimental data which show that partici-
pants contributed on average less with EM than with HM. Although the difference
on average contributions (see also Figure 2.11) seems small both parametric and
nonparametric tests suggest that it is statistically significant (Wilcoxon signed
rank test p-value= 0.0375).
Figure 2.11: Unconditional Contribution
We also look at differences in contribution behaviour between subjects and
our findings confirm Hypothesis 2.4 in that case, too. Particularly, we find that
contributions to the public account were on average lower when using EM rather
than HM when the public good game decision was made for the 1st time in the
experiment40.
39See Ledyard (1995) for a review on cooperation in social dilemmas.
40We discuss the findings from when the decision to contribute to the public account was made
for a 2nd time in a later section when we discuss the order effects due to the within-subject
design.
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Figure 2.12: Order Effects in Unconditional Contribution
Our results are in accordance with those of Muehlbacher and Kirchler (2009)
where participants who earn their endowments by exerting a high level of effort
and without information about the asymmetry of the origin of the endowments
within their groups seem to contribute less to the public good than those who
receive their endowments more easily in the low effort condition; but as we discuss
later on we do not think that our findings contradict previous work on the house
money effect in public good games but they rather contribute to the discussion on
the context dependency of the house money effect and argue for the necessity of
considering context and its respective features when inference from experimental
data is made41.
2.3.5 Context - Dependency of the House Money Effect
Our results above already make the case for the context-dependency argument
for the house money effect but to further support our argument we make -as our
experimental design allows us to- direct comparisons between the decision to trust
and the decision to take a risky bet. As we discuss earlier on our experimental
design’s section the set of lotteries that participants are asked to decide upon
is designed such that it maps the decision of the first mover in the trust game
onto the decision on a risky bet. The two decisions seem equivalent from the
point of view of theory as the participant in both cases faces a choice between
keeping the £10 or risk them to potentially get £15 (or £0). The difference in
the two decisions consists in the type of uncertainty that the participant faces in
41See discussion on “context matters and is not completely controlled by the experimenter”
by Levitt and List (2007).
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each case: in the lottery setting the participant faces state uncertainty while in
the trust game the first mover faces strategic uncertainty. Our hypothesis tests
the equivalence of the two decisions by comparing the switching probability in
lotteries, that is, the probability that participants switch from the safe choice to
the risky one in the set of lotteries, with the elicited beliefs on trustworthiness.
More specifically, we ask participants how many among the other participants in
the room they think they will transfer back £15 ; we translate this in a percentage
and we interpret it as the perceived probability of receiving £15 back by the
second mover. We form our hypothesis as following:
Hypothesis 2.5. The behaviour in the trust game as a first mover with HM (or
EM) is similar to the behaviour in the risky individual decision with HM (or EM).
Our findings suggest that behaviour differs across the two contexts both with
HM and EM (Wilcoxon signed rank test p-value < 0.01, for both). Particularly,
we find that the perceived probability of trustworthiness, namely of receiving
£15 back by the second mover, that made participants to trust is significantly
lower than the probability that made them switching to the risky bet in the set of
lotteries. These findings are consistent with earlier work on the relation of trust
and risk. Indicatively, we report results by Eckel and Wilson (2004) who similarly
to us they use a Holt and Laury (2002) like risk measure which as their other
two risk measures is not significantly correlated with trust. In the same vein,
Houser et al. (2010) using a trust environment and a risk environment similar
to ours42 and a Holt and Laury risk measure, conclude as well that investments
distributions differ significantly between trust and risk environments and although
risk attitudes predict investment decisions in risk games they do not in trust
games.
Regarding this last result, we also consider some probit specifications to fur-
ther explore the decision to trust. Our results indicate that the origin of money
is always statistical significant across all specifications and earned money ap-
pears to reduce the probability of trusting but our risk measurement (‘number
of safe choices made’), on the other hand, seems to do poorly in explaining the
probability to trust across different specifications. The opposite holds for the
trustworthiness (‘reciprocate’) and the contribution to the public account (‘PGG
contribution’) which are always statistically significant positively related to the
probability of trusting. Finally, regarding these probit specifications gender seems
to be irrelevant for the decision to trust while order effects also appear to be in-
significant. We do discuss though further on order effects in the next session.
42They use the Berg et al. (1995) investment game and participants face as a second mover
either another person or a computer, respectively.
53
Table 2.3: Risk, Trust & PGG Contribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Risk Trust Contribution Trust Trust
Earned money 0.0172 -0.589∗∗ -0.432∗ -0.649∗∗ -0.575∗∗
(0.17) (-2.93) (-2.20) (-3.22) (-2.90)
Session EMHM -0.339 0.397 -0.997
(-0.87) (1.24) (-1.24)
Sex -0.495 0.464 1.356
(-1.32) (1.48) (1.41)






Constant 7.188∗∗∗ 0.0999 2.719 0.236 -0.580
(24.07) (0.12) (1.24) (0.31) (-1.75)
Observations 116 116 116 128 128
Pseudo R2 0.073 0.135 0.116
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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2.3.6 Order Effects & the within Subject Design
Charness et al. (2012) argue that within-subjects designs are more naturally
aligned with most theoretical mindsets, for instance, it is more likely for a theorist
to imagine an agent in a market reacting to a price change rather than two agents
in separate markets with different prices. Likewise for us, our interest focuses on
how a person reacts into holding and spending earned money rather than house
money. Apart from boosting the internal validity, since this does not depend
anymore on random assignment, the within-subject design was also chosen on
the grounds of economizing on the number of participants we employed and of
course, moderating the total cost of the experiment.
Given that in within analyses participants are exposed to multiple treatments,
one has to worry about the order of exposure affecting the reference and framing
of treatments. For that we consider whether order matters. As we see earlier in
the probit specifications for the decision to trust the dummy for order effects ap-
pears statistically insignificant43. We do take a closer look though by considering
decisions with HM and EM in each kind of session.
Observing Figures 2.8 2.10 and 2.12 we can easily spot the decline in per-
centage of trust or trustworthiness and in the level of contributions in the public
good game suggesting learning across the two plays of the games44 but as we ear-
lier discuss our results within subjects are robust between subjects as well both
when decisions were faced for 1st and 2nd time; with only exceptions when trust
decision is made for the first time where difference although of the same sign
is not statistically significant and when decision for contributions in the public
account was made for a 2nd time where we observe that contributions with HM
are lower (but not statistically significantly lower) than contributions with EM.
We attribute the first inconsistency to the fact that the 1st decision to trust was
the very first decision to be made in all our sessions while regarding the sec-
ond inconsistency we claim that given that in sessions where decisions with EM
were made first and those with HM followed (EMHM sessions) contributions in
the public account with EM were very low and coupled with as we described it
above, contributions with HM were even lower. However this ‘learning’ bias we
observe is independent of the order of decision our participants were exposed to.
Finally, a last argument in favour of our within-subject design is the following:
in a between-subject design there might exist a potential difficulty of participants
to perceive any difference between ‘house’ money and earned money given the
way entitlements over earned money are induced, given the small size of stakes,
and given that the money is credited on account rather than given in hand45
(payments were only made at the end of the experiment) while in the within
subject design they observe both scenarios at once and can make a decision not
in vacuum46.
43Results were similar when we considered order effects dummy in OLS regressions for con-
tributions in public good games and for risk variable.
44Similarly we observe a consistent increase in the mean of safe choices in the risky decision
that participants face (see Figure 2.5).
45Reinstein and Riener (2009) find a strong tangibility effect on total donations in a charitable
giving experiment.
46See Charness et al. (2012).
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2.3.7 Limitations of the Experimental Design
At the last part of this section where we discuss our results, we would also like to
acknowledge the limitations of our experimental design. These limitations have
been mentioned throughout this chapter but we choose to also list them here in
attempt to motivate further research on the related topics.
We shall start by discussing the real effort task to induce ‘own’ money or -as
we refer to it throughout the thesis- earned money. The puzzles were relatively
easy and the quota of 10 correct answers out of 25 quizzes was quite low as we
tried to avoid heterogeneity of endowments in pairs and groups for the trust game
and the public good game respectively. Considering our results, these aspects of
our experimental design have not deterred us from observing evidence of entitle-
ments’ emergence but we believe that higher stakes and/or great ‘difficulty’ on
the process of earning the endowments might have resulted in an amplified house
money effect observed in the trust game and the public good game or even in
the case of the decision over lotteries. Clark (2002) uses an interesting approach:
instead of using a real effort task he asks participants to bring their own $8 and he
ensured an identical final wealth distribution between treatments of house money
and own money by adding an unannounced $8 participation fee to subjects accu-
mulated earnings in the treatment with own money before they received payment
at the end of their sessions. Another example is that of the work of Cardenas
et al. (2014) who gave the participants cash in advance but they find only a small
and indirect house money effect in decisions under uncertainty.
We consider talking explicitly here about the within-subject element of our
experimental design redundant as we believe that the subsection above covers
all the relevant issues but -following comments of one of the external examiners-
we believe that we could have consider randomising the order of decision and
most importantly, the order of belief and decision tasks.47 Another interesting
-and useful for future research- comment48 of a colleague from the University of
Edinburgh was the addition of a simpler game that involves only social preferences
like the dictator game in the experimental design. Along the same lines, future
research should take under consideration some scepticism regarding the Holt and
Laury (2002)’s measure of risk aversion.49
47The importance of the latter becomes more apparent mainly in our discussion about antic-
ipatory reciprocity at the next chapter.
48See also footnote 4 of this chapter for further discussion on this.




This chapter picks up where the first chapter concludes: there is a general con-
sensus in the related literature regarding the context-dependency of the house
money effect, but no agreement regarding the question of what drives the latter.
In this chapter, we tackle both of these research questions. We used a within-
subject experimental design which allows us to examine the house money effect
and to compare findings across three different contexts: an individual decision
involving risk (a set of lotteries); a group decision involving social preferences
(a public good game); and lastly a group decision involving both risk and social
preferences (a trust game). These key aspects of our experimental design help
us, first, to pin down the contextual features which may amplify (or nullify) the
house money effect and secondly, to test directly and disentangle the two factors
that may drive it, namely increased risk seeking in the presence of a prior gain
or ‘just desert’ and fairness considerations.
Our experimental findings confirm the arguments that contextual differences
matter and may affect the emergence of the house money effect and more specif-
ically, we find the house money effect present both in the decision to trust (but
not in the decision to show trustworthiness) in the trust game and in the decision
to contribute in the public good game, but (crucially) not in the risky individual
decision. Risk attitudes and risky behaviour seem to be robust across the differ-
ent origins of money and also our Holt and Laury (2002)-like risk measure seems
to perform poorly in terms of explaining the trust decision in the trust game
(and the decision to contribute in the public good game). Therefore, our results
appear to favour interpretations of the house money effect as a result of social
preferences of fairness and deservingness rather than a consequence of increased
risk-seeking due to different mental accounting over windfall gains.
We believe that our work adds to the oft-discussed debate in economics over
whether ‘windfall money’ is treated differently than earned (regular) income. Per-
haps most importantly, our work also contributes to the discussion on the way
forward for the experimental methodology in terms of both the design of exper-
iments and the interpretation and generalisation of experimental findings. The
context-dependency issue opens the path for further research on contexts not con-
sidered here. In particular, given that we have argued in favour of interpretations
of the house money effect as a result of fairness and desert preferences, it would
be worthwhile to assess the house money effect within the context of individual




The House Money Effect and
Individual Differences in Social
Preferences
3.1 Introduction
In the previous two chapters we argued in favour of interpretations of the house
money effect as a result of fairness and ‘desert’ considerations. Given these con-
clusions, we consider it worthwhile to assess the house money effect within the
context of individual differences in social preferences. Both the house money effect
and individual differences in social preferences have mainly been used to explain
cooperation in social dilemmas. This chapter combines these two branches of the
experimental literature by testing the implications of house money on coopera-
tion in social dilemmas. To this end, we employ a linear public good game and
more specifically, the innovative experimental design of Fischbacher et al. (2001),
which allows us to observe contributions both with the direct response method
(‘unconditional contributions’) and the strategy method (‘conditional contribu-
tions’). The former, along with elicited beliefs, helps us discuss ‘anticipatory
reciprocity’ while the latter allows us to classify participants according to their
behaviour in the public good game. By adding the within-subject element in
our experimental design we can test the robustness of this classification across
the different origins of endowments. To our knowledge, this is the first study to
examine the implications of the house money effect in reciprocal behaviour (or
conditional cooperation, as it is named throughout this chapter).
Our results indicate that the house money effect is present in the public good
game, but the types’ classification is robust across the origin of money. Contrary
to Harrison (2007)’ results, we find that participants’ decision to free ride or not
(contribute or not) is independent of the origin of money. However, given that the
decision to contribute has been made, contribution levels may vary -actually be
lower- when money is earned rather than windfall-endowed. Beliefs also appear
to be affected by the origin of the money, and when compared with unconditional
contributions this provides evidence of anticipatory reciprocity. Our last findings
relate to the discussion of the behavioural validity of the strategy method, and
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suggest that although it seems to do well in identifying conditional co-operators,
positive conditional contributions may appear deflated when compared to positive
unconditional ones (both with house money and earned money).
The rest of the chapter continues as follows. We first present the related
literature with a main focus on individual differences in social preferences. We
then present the linear public good game with its prediction of the reciprocity
hypothesis as well as our experimental design. Next, we present and discuss our
results while the last section concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
Over the last decades experimental research has provided ample evidence that
the classical paradigm of “homo economicus”- the rational and selfish economic
man - might not be able to explain behaviour in the real world. People seem
to make donations in dictator games (Kahneman et al. (1986); Forsythe et al.
(1994); Camerer (2003)), reject even high shares in the ultimatum game (Guth
et al. (1982); Camerer (2003)) and last but not least cooperate in situations of
social dilemmas (Ledyard (1995)). Evidence suggests that people may not only
care about their own material payoffs, but they might also consider other things
like others’ payoffs. A large literature, both theoretical and experimental, has
emerged on other-regarding preferences suggesting that people’s decisions might
be affected by altruism, fairness, reciprocity and, efficiency motives which shape
their social preferences.
Most of these theories still assume rationality but they relax the assumption
of selfishness by assuming that people have other-regarding or social preferences.
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) assume that people
care about ‘fairness’ and they define this ‘fairness’ concern as inequity-aversion,
that is, the dislike for unequal payoff distributions. Besides these outcome-based
models of other-regarding behaviour, other approaches that focus on intentions of
economic agents have been developed. The most influential paper in this regard
is by Rabin (1993), while Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and Falk and
Fischbacher (2006) extend Rabin’s work to extensive form games. Charness and
Rabin (2002), motivated by the confoundedness in explanations that models of
other-regarding preferences had suggested, present a model that embeds difference
aversion, social-welfare preferences and other preferences (such as reciprocity). A
common property of these models of social preferences is that economic agents are
heterogeneous in their preferences. This implies that theoretical predictions about
individual behaviour may differ between agents even if they face the same decision
problem. This implication has triggered a whole new and closely related branch
of literature that discusses heterogeneity (individual differences) in preferences
among economic agents.
Individual differences in other-regarding preferences have been suggested as
one of the main explanations of the observed behaviour in social dilemmas situa-
tions. Andreoni (1995) in his novel paper makes the first systematic attempt to
separate the hypothesis that cooperation is due to kindness, altruism or warm-
glow from the hypothesis that cooperation is simply the result of errors or confu-
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sion. He concludes that apart from the need for the experimental methodology to
improve in order to eliminate confusion in economics experiments, experimental
and behavioural research should also shift to include studies of preferences for
cooperation.
Theories of altruism, commitment, fairness, competition, social efficiency and
reciprocity have been suggested to explain and describe behaviour in public and
social dilemmas situations. Croson (2007) presents a direct comparison of com-
peting theories of social preferences by using evidence from linear public good
games. Her work has provided strong support for reciprocity theories over either
theories of commitment or altruism.
Reciprocity theories find their origins in Sugden (1984)’s paper where he ar-
gues in favour of reciprocity as a means to explain other-regarding behaviour due
to the wide range of testable predictions it entails. Charness and Rabin (2002)
also argue in favour of developing models that incorporate reciprocity as it is a
prevalent phenomenon that has been ignored.
Fischbacher et al. (2001)) investigate whether people are conditionally cooper-
ative in a public goods game environment. Participants in their experiment play
a one-shot public good game with a variant of the strategy method that directly
elicits participants’ willingness for conditional cooperation. They classify their
participants into three groups: 50% of them are conditional cooperators, 30%
free-riders and 14% percent made ‘hump-shaped’ contributions.
At approximately the same time, Houser and Kurzban (2001) suggest another
experimental design, what they call a circular public good game, to capture the
heterogeneity of behaviour in public good games and classify participants ac-
cordingly. They classify participants into three groups: strong free-riders (28%),
conditional cooperators or reciprocators (29%) and strong cooperators (25%). In
a later paper, Kurzban and Houser (2005) run a similar experiment and find that
their subjects fall into three types (cooperators, reciprocators and free-riders) as
well, that an individuals type is stable and that a group’s cooperative outcomes
can be remarkably well predicted if one knows its type composition.
According to Fischbacher et al. (2001) conditional cooperation can be con-
sidered as a motivation on it is own or it can be a consequence of altruism,
warm-glow, inequity aversion or reciprocity1 .
Keser and Winden (2000), whose work is among the first to examine condi-
tional cooperation, distinguish between two aspects of conditional cooperation:
future-oriented behaviour and simple reactive behaviour2. Regarding these sec-
ond aspect of reactive behaviour, their findings confirm what Keser (1997) had
earlier found: behaviour in public good games is oriented towards the average
behaviour of the other group members in the previous period. This behaviour is
also in the same vein as the principle of reciprocity which according to Axelrod
(1984) is observed in prisoner’s dilemma situations, where people appear to reply
1Although Fischbacher et al. (2001) discuss ‘conditional cooperation’ as a more general
concept that might be driven by different kinds of social preferences, we do argue in the next
section that is mostly and mainly refer to reciprocal behaviour. (see Section 3.3)
2The first aspect of conditional cooperation is irrelevant to our analysis since our experimen-
tal design abstracts away from both the dynamic element of repeated games and the ‘partners’
matching protocol .
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to cooperation with cooperation and to defection with defection.
We have so far presented a summary of the literature on other-regarding
preferences and individual differences. Given that the first chapter of this thesis
is an extensive literature review on the house money effect, it would be repetitive
to provide a survey on the house money effect here too. It is however very
important to clarify the obvious question arising by our introduction and our
claim that this chapter combines these two branches of the experimental research:
how do individual differences come into the discussion of the house money effect
that we have examined so far in this thesis?
Looking back to the literature presented in Chapter 1, already in Harrison
(2007) work we observe a rough classification between free riders and those mak-
ing positive contributions. Cherry et al. (2005) in their work on the impact of
endowment origin and heterogeneity on public good contributions introduce the
concept of an ‘anticipatory reciprocity’ effect in order to interpret the patterns of
contributions with high and low endowments in heterogeneous groups. Anticipa-
tory reciprocity implies -as observed in their results- that participants contribute
more when others are also able to contribute more. Cherry et al. (2005) con-
clude that rather than being generous with their earned wealth, people seem to
anticipate a reciprocation of their contributions. They relate this to conditional
cooperation introduced by Fischbacher et al. (2001) and underline the difference
between the two experimental designs, since in their design as opposed to that
of Fischbacher et al. (2001) - participants with high endowment could do very
little since those with low endowment are limited in terms of their ability to
reciprocate.
In their later work Kroll et al. (2007) argue that the anticipatory reciprocity
effect might overshadow the house money effect, and they examine these phenom-
ena in a new context of a best-shot public good game, where behavioural motive
for anticipatory reciprocity should be eliminated as only the highest contribution
sets the level of public good provision and all other lower contributions are un-
necessary. Their findings suggest that participants seem to be concerned about
efficiency and fairness. With windfall endowments efficient outcomes appear to
be the salient distributive preference while with earned endowments efficiency
might not be considered as a fair outcome. Kroll et al. (2007) relate their results
with the developing at that time literature on social preferences as summarised
earlier on in this section and they conclude that future research should try to
understand how contextual cues can affect social preferences.
Lastly, Oxoby and Spraggon (2009) find evidence which supports the concept
of anticipatory reciprocity as discussed by both Cherry et al. (2005) and Kroll
et al. (2007). Using an experimental design of a two-person public good game
with strategy method3 , they observe an ‘inverse found money effect’ according to
which participants who earned their endowments and were matched with some-
one who did not were more unconditionally and conditionally cooperative. They
attribute this ‘inverse found money effect’ to anticipatory reciprocity. Partici-
3Their design follows that of Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Keser and Winden (2000) and of
course is similar to our experimental design. Differences between the experimental designs are
discussed in the following section regarding our experimental design.
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pants expect those with windfall endowment to contribute (more) and they do so
themselves.
To our knowledge, there are only few studies that actually examine the house
money effect in combination with other-regarding preferences. Danneberg et al.
(2012) analyse if individual inequality aversion as measured by simple experimen-
tal games depends on the origin of monetary endowments in those experiments,
that is, ‘house money’ versus earned money. Their results suggest that individual
inequality aversion as measured by the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) is not
generally robust to the way endowments emerge and that inequality aversion has
only low predictive power for individual behaviour as it seems to perform best
when the endowment is windfall and small.
Danková and Servátka (2013) present a study on the house money effect and
negative reciprocity. Similar to us they explore the implications of windfall en-
dowments on observed reciprocal behaviour but, in contrast to this paper they
focus on negative reciprocity. For that reason they employ a two-player Taking
Game in which the First Mover (FM) decides whether or not to take an amount
of money from the Second Mover’s (SM) endowment, who can retaliate in return.
They implement three treatments where in the first treatment SM’s endowment
is entirely ‘house money’; in the second and third it consists of both ‘house’
and earned money. In one case the FM can take the ‘house money’ part of the
endowment and the SM can retaliate using his/her earned money part. In the
other case, the FM takes the earned part and the SM can retaliate using ‘house
money’. They conjecture two reasons why the origin of endowment might matter
for negative reciprocity: first, using earned money as opposed to house money
might increase the costs of negative reciprocity due to this money being in a
different mental account and thus lead to less retaliation and second, decreasing
an endowment consisting of earned money might be considered a stronger viola-
tion of property rights and lead to more retaliation. Their results suggest that
participants retaliate more in both cases4.
4Closely to this literature there is an extensive literature on retaliation and punishment
mainly suggesting that an increase in the perceived cost of reciprocation/retaliation may di-
minish its frequency and/or extend. Although relevant to our discussion we want to avoid
to tire the reader interest and focus and for that reason we just cite here some of the most
important paper of that literature: Ostrom et al. (1992), Fehr and Gchter (2000), Anderson
and Putterman (2006), Carpenter (2007), Nikiforakis and Normann (2008), Nikiforakis (2008),
Herrmann et al. (2008), Nikiforakis and Engelmann (2011).
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3.3 The Linear Public Good Game
In a typical linear public good game5, the individual decision to be made is
to allocate an initial endowment between a private and a public account.Each
player’s payoffs are given by the following expression:






< m < 1
where ei is the initial endowment, ci the contribution to the public account, m the
public account multiplier and n the number of members of the group that might
or might not contribute to the public account. When m < 1, contributing to the
public account is never optimal for the self-interested individual. Contributing
one unit to the public account earns him/her only m, and costs him/her 1. When
1/n < m, contributing to the public account is always socially optimal for the
group as a whole as contributing one unit to the public account costs an individual
1, but earns n×m for the group.
The traditional hypothesis of pure self-interest assumes a utility function in
which individuals are concerned only about their own payoffs. Following the
notation above we have:




When individuals care only about their own material payoffs, a pure public
goods problem like the one our participants face generates a unique equilibrium in
which each of n symmetric individuals, acting individually rational and choosing
the dominant strategy, will contribute zero, that is, c⋆i = 0 independently of
what others will do. This last bit implies that there will not be any correlation
between what an individual contributes and what others in the group contribute;
thus δc⋆i /δcj = 0.
Assuming reciprocity6 (individuals reciprocate or match contributions of oth-
ers) and using notation from above, the problem for each individual appears as
follows:




s.t. ci ≥ min(cci , cj).
where cci is the optimal level of contribution under commitment hypothesis which
implies than an individual contributes to the public account the level of contri-
bution he/she would most prefer that every member of the group make. Under
reciprocity hypothesis we expect positive contributions c⋆i > 0 and also in equi-
librium there can be a positive correlation between one’s own contribution and
others contribution δc⋆i /δcj > 0.




This experiment is part of a larger study on the house money effect. We present
here the part of the experiment that is relevant to our research questions in this
chapter7.
Participants were asked to make decisions on a linear public good game similar
to that of Fischbacher et al. (2001). They were divided into groups of four. We
used random matching and we kept a strangers’ protocol across the experiment.
Participants were informed about their performance and their payoff only at the
end of the experimental session. The only information the participants received
was the number of the group they belong to and their individual number in
the group. This information was given to facilitate the understanding of the
instructions and both numbers were selected randomly by the computer8.
This situation consisted of two types of decisions: an unconditional contri-
bution and a conditional one. The unconditional decision is similar to the one
made in a typical linear public good game (as the one described in the previous
section). Participants were asked to decide how much9 of the £10 would they
be willing to keep in a private account and how much to transfer -if any- in a
project. The earnings for each participant would be determined by the following
equation10 :




The second conditional decision11 required participants to fill in a ‘transfer
table’. This ‘transfer table’ looked like Table 3.1 and participants had to indi-
cate how much they would be willing to transfer to the project if the average
contribution of the others in their group was the respective number.
Following Fischbacher et al. (2001) we made the conditional decision incen-
tive compatible by employing the following rule to determine the earnings in
this situation. Participants were told that, after they had all made both types
of decisions, a random mechanism would determine which of the two decisions
would be relevant for the determination of their actual earnings in this situation.
In each group, for one randomly chosen participant the ‘transfer table’ became
this participant’s relevant decision. For the other three group members their
unconditional ‘transfer’ was their relevant contribution decision. For each mem-
ber of the group, the probability that the ‘transfer table’ would have been the
payoff-relevant decision was 1/4.
7For the full experiment the reader can refer back to Chapter 2 where the experimental
design is discussed.
8The usefulness of the individual numbers will be shown in the next paragraphs.
9They were only allowed to transfer increments of £1.
10This equation was not presented to participants. Instructions included in the Appendix A.1
demonstrate how the potential earnings were explained to participants during the experimental
session.
11Although the data from this second decision are not relevant to our analysis in this chapter
















Table 3.1: Transfer Table
We deviate from Fischbacher et al. (2001)’s design by using terms like ‘trans-
fer’ and ‘transfer table’ rather than unconditional and conditional contribution
as in order to avoid any priming towards conditioning decisions since reciprocity
is a central concept of our analysis.
This was a within-subject experiment. Participants had to decide twice on
their unconditional and conditional transfers once using £10 that was credited
to their account by the experimental team (HM) or £10 that they had earned by
performing the real effort task (EM)12.
We also elicited beliefs on average contributions of others. Precision on beliefs
was rewarded in an attempt to elicit true beliefs. Details on how precision was
rewarded is available in the Appendix A.1 with the experimental instructions.
Acknowledging the complexity of the game, the reading of the instructions was
accompanied by a power point presentation13 in order help them to understand
the rules of the tasks. Some additional instructions were added in each of the
screens along the experiment and participants were welcomed to ask questions to
clarify any confusion regarding the instructions.
Given that our main focus is the house money effect and how this affects
conditional cooperation in public goods games we consider Fischbacher et al.
(2001)’s simplest and easiest experimental design that allows us to directly test
for correlation or no correlation between one’s contribution and others’ in the
group average contribution, therefore testing directly for evidence of conditional
cooperation and, most importantly, facilitating the classification of participants
according to their conditional contribution patterns.
12See Chapter 2 for more details on the real effort task.
13The power point presentation is also available in the Appendix A.2.
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3.5 Results
In this section we present and discuss our experimental results. We skip the
discussion on participants as this experiment is part of a larger experiment dis-
cussed in Chapter 2. The reader can refer to Section 2.3.1 for more information
regarding the participants.
3.5.1 The HME in the Public Good Game
We start our analysis here first by discussing our preliminary findings in the public
good game. In the linear public good game setting presented in Section 3.3, the-
oretical predictions, given the existence of the dominant strategy, imply that the
participants should keep the £10 and contribute nothing to the public account,
that is, they should free ride. The existing experimental literature though sug-
gests that at least some positive contributions should be expected and in regards
with the house money effect’s implications we expect differences in contributions
to the public account made by different kind of money (house money vs. earned
money). In particular we conjecture that:
Hypothesis 3.1. (Unconditional) contributions to the public account will be
lower when using EM rather than HM.
The above hypothesis is confirmed by the data as both parametric and non-
parametric tests show significant difference between mean and median values of
contributions in house money vs. earned money (Two-sample t test p-value=
0.0451; Wilcoxon signed rank test p-value= 0.0375). The house money effect
seems to be present in the public good game setting14, that is, the origin of
money seems to matter and this is also indicated in Figure 3.1.
Following the empirical analysis of Harrison (2007) on the experimental data
of Clark (2002), we particularly focus on the positive contributions in the public
account. We construct a binary variable that takes a value equal to one when the
unconditional contribution is positive and zero in any other case, that is, when
the unconditional contribution is zero. Our conjecture, if the house money effect
is present and affects the decision to contribute or not, is the following:
Hypothesis 3.2. Positive contributions will be less probable when using EM
rather than HM.
We can also read this as ‘free-riding behaviour will be more common with
EM rather than with HM at stake’. Our results15 - as also presented in Figure
3.2 - indicate that the decision to contribute or not (free-ride or not) is indepen-
dent from the origin of money (Two-sided sign test p-value= 1.0000; Wilcoxon
signed-rank test p-value= 0.5637) as we observe no significant difference on the
percentage of positive contributions across the two types of money in stake. From
this latter result in conjunction with our very first result presented here in this
14This preliminary result has also be presented in Chapter 2 as Hypothesis 2.4.
15A probit for positive contribution suggested a non-significant (negative) coefficient for
earned money.
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Figure 3.1: Unconditional Contribution in PGG
section, which suggests that house money is related with more -on average- gen-
erous contributions compared to earned money, we infer that these differences
are driven by differences in levels of positive contributions rather than by having
more people free-riding when using earned money.
Figure 3.2: Percent of Positive Contributions in PGG
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Our results seem to contradict those of Harrison (2007) who reports that house
money has a major effect on the fraction of free riders, but no clear impact on the
levels of positive contributions. By contrast, in our case we find that the house
money seems not to affect the decision to contribute or not while it does affect
the level of contributions and particularly in such a way that contributions are
more generous with house money. We believe that differences between Harrison’s
and our results arise from two different features in our experimental designs. We
employ a one-shot public good game while Clark (2002)16’s experimental design
collects data from a (10-times) repeated public good game. This repeated game
feature of Harrison’s data may involve more learning than our one-shot design in-
ducing more equilibrium behaviour. A second feature of our experimental design
that may suggest a reason for these striking differences in our results is the within-
subject approach we use as opposed to the between-subject design of Clark. The
latter in combination with the fact that Clark recruited participants with the
requirement that you must bring $8 to the experiment may make the case for
differences in our subject pools. In support of these two arguments made here,
as we see in our later discussion, we do observe a low percentage of free-riders in
our experimental data both with house money and earned money.
3.5.2 Individual Differences in Contributions and the Role
of the Origin of Money
To examine further the conjecture that the observed house money effect seems to
be driven by higher contributions when using house money rather than by fewer
free riders, we shall focus now on the conditional contributions of participants.
Conditional contributions help us to form an impression of individual contribu-
tion patterns. As we discussed in the previous section, our experimental design
facilitates elicitation of any reciprocal behaviour. In Figure 3.3 we present the
contribution pattern of each participant both with HM and EM. This figure is
already a good indicator of the discussion to follow. At first glance it is apparent
that the contribution patterns seem relatively similar across both types of money
and we are even able to observe that any differences are mainly in terms of levels
of contributions rather than contribution patterns.


















































Using Fischbacher et al. (2001)’s innovative experimental design and technique
of classification we have classified participants in three main categories: free
riders, conditional co-operators and humped-shaped contributors. We begin, first,
with the classification in the case where participants used HM:
• Free Riding: Seven17 participants, that is, 10.9% of participants, exhibited
purely selfish behaviour by contributing zero in all entries of the contribu-
tion table.
• Conditional cooperation: We have classified 33 participants (51.56%) as
conditional co-operators. We first identify those who we call perfect condi-
tional co-operators: nine18 subjects exhibit this behaviour by contribut-
ing exactly as much as their group’s average (Spearman correlation ρ = 1).
We then consider a group of conditional co-operators with small devia-
tions from perfect conditional cooperation. This is based on the shape of
the graph of their contributions relative to others’, which in more formal
terms translates a Spearman correlation coefficient that lies in the range
0.99 < ρ < 1. In this subcluster, we have assigned nine19 participants.
Finally, we classified as imperfect conditional co-operators those that
seemed to condition their contribution on others’ average contribution, but
they either contributed less (or in a few cases more) than what others did
(below or above the 45-degree line). Alternatively, these participants may
have employed a strategy whereby they contributed a fixed amount for some
levels of others’ contribution and a larger fixed amount for higher contri-
butions by others, so that their graph would look more like a positively -
sloped step function. In terms of the Spearman correlation coefficient we
focused here on the range 0.94 < ρ < 0.99, and given those criteria we have
managed to classify as imperfect conditional co-operators 15 participants20
when using HM. There are some participants with lower Spearman corre-
lation coefficients than those used above that still exhibited a conditional
cooperation - like pattern of contribution but we discuss those in the ‘Other’
category.
• ‘Hump-shaped’ contributions: Fourteen21 of the participants (21.9%) dis-
played this contribution behaviour. More precisely, in this cluster we have
included participants that were close to conditional cooperation up to ap-
proximately £5 average contribution of others but thereafter either starting
decreasing their contributions or contributed a fixed amount.
• Other: In this subcategory we include those who, despite not strictly falling
into anyone of the above mentioned categories still manifest patterns of con-
tribution that may relate to conditional cooperation. For instance, we either
17See participants 3, 11, 26, 38, 53, 57, 62.
186, 16, 17, 19, 27, 44, 47, 48, 59.
19See participants 2, 4, 18, 20, 29, 41, 43, 61, 63.
20See participants 13, 14, 21, 23, 25, 31, 32, 33, 37, 39, 42, 49, 55, 60, 64.
21See participants 1, 7*, 22, 24, 28*, 30, 35, 36, 40*, 45, 46, 50, 51, 54.
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observe participants contributing very small amounts compared to the oth-
ers’ contribution but even in this case their (small) contribution is increasing
in the average contribution of others22. Others tended to contribute 0 for
average contribution of others below (approximately) £5 and then displayed
a conditional cooperation pattern afterwards23 . For that reason, we actu-
ally choose to call this cluster ‘quasi-conditional co-operators’ and 10
participants have been classified as such, that is 15.6%.
We now proceed to present the corresponding classification when EM was
used by the participants while making decisions about their contributions in the
public good game. We have followed exactly the same classification criteria as
above.
• Free riders: Eight24 participants (12.5%) displayed free-riding behaviour by
making 0 contributions at any level of others’ average contribution. They
consist of exactly the same participants who free rode with HM, as well
as participant 12 who displayed quasi-conditionally cooperative behaviour
when using HM.
• Conditional co-operators: 53.1% of participants, that is 34 out of 64, have
been classified as conditional co-operators. We observed eleven participants
exhibiting perfect conditional cooperation consisting of the same co-
hort observed in the HM case plus two additional participants (participant
51 and participant 61). In the subcategory of those with small devia-
tions from perfect conditional cooperation we find once again the same
participants as before, with only exception being participant 61 who now
behaves as mentioned above- as a perfect conditional co-operator. Last
but not least, the consistency of the group of imperfect conditional co-
operators remained unchanged across the different sources of money.
• ‘Hump-shaped’ contributors: When using EM, only eight participants (12.5%)
displayed this pattern of behaviour, who incidentally also exhibited such
behaviour when using HM. Six participants made ‘hump-shaped’ contribu-
tions with HM, but now with EM they either behaved as quasi-conditional
co-operators25 or (in the case of participant 51)as perfect co-operators.
• Other: Fourteen participants (21.9%) using EM behaved as quasi-conditional
co-operators. To those with (small) contributions, but still increasing in
the average contribution of others, participants 24, 45 and 54 were added.
Those three participants had displayed a ‘hump-shaped’ contribution pat-
tern when using HM. Participants 7 and 30 -previously classified as ‘hump-
shaped’ contributors with HM - joined the other subgroup of those who
tended to contribute 0 for average contribution of others below (approxi-
mately) £5 and conditional cooperation pattern thereafter, while partici-
pant 12 switched to free-riding with EM.
22See participants 5, 9*, 15, 58.
23See participants 8, 10, 12, 34, 52, 56.
24See participants 3, 11, 12, 26, 38, 53, 57, 62.
25See participants 7, 24, 30, 45, 54.
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It is already evident by the figures presented for each participant and by our
discussion above that classification appears to be independent of the origin of the
money used when deciding on the contributions in this particular linear public
good game. We observed that only eight26 participants (12.5%) changed their
pattern of conditional contributions across the different sources of money. In
reality for some of them (like participant 61) this was only a slight ‘change’ but
we have decided to classify him/her differently to maintain consistency with the
criteria we have used throughout. Our classification both with HM and EM seems
to be consistent with those of Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Houser and Kurzban
(2001) and Kurzban and Houser (2005) with the only difference being that we
document a lower percentage of both free-riders27 and perfect co-operators. The
above evidence seems to support our hypothesis that:
Hypothesis 3.3. The types’ classification remains robust across treatments and
is independent of the way endowments have emerged.
To test this hypothesis more rigorously, we computed the Spearman correla-
tion coefficient for each participant both with HM and EM and we found that
there is no statistically significant difference across the different sources of money
(Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test p-value= 0.4907).
3.5.3 The HME and the Anticipatory Reciprocity
We now turn the focus of our analysis to the beliefs about others in order to discuss
within our experiment the concept of ‘anticipatory reciprocity’. As it has been
discussed extensively in Section 2 of this chapter ‘anticipatory reciprocity’ refers
to the situation where people anticipate a reciprocation of their contributions,
and for that they tend to contribute more when others are also able to contribute
more. We shall start our analysis in this subsection by discussing the beliefs about
others’ contributions in the public account. We first test whether participants
change their beliefs about others when they know that earned money is at stake
rather than house money. We expect that beliefs about others’ behaviour are
also subject to the house money effect and for that we set our testing hypothesis
as following:
Hypothesis 3.4. Beliefs about others’ average contributions in the public account
differ across different sources of money.
The experimental data seem to confirm the above hypothesis, as participants
were expecting other participants to contribute on average less when earned
money was used rather than when house money was at stake (Wilcoxon signed
rank test p-value= 0.0000). We do recognise that this statement of beliefs could
26See the discussion on classification earlier and also the corresponding figures or participants
7, 12, 24, 30, 45, 51, 54, 61.
27Regarding the low percentage of free riders we suggest two possible impromptu explanations
the high percentage of female participants (a probit specification and a Spearman correlation
test suggest positive relation between the probability to make a positive contribution and being
a female) and the fact that we intentionally excluded students of economics and other related
degrees from our subjects’ pool in order to avoid any previous knowledge of game theory.
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work as a kind of self-justification mechanism for participants, that is, partici-
pants use this question about expressing their beliefs as a way of justifying their
contribution decision. We have two arguments against this claim. First, as it is
apparent in our experimental design, stating ‘true’ beliefs is incentivised by pay-
ing participants on ‘successful guesses’. Given the anonymity that is maintained
throughout our experiment and the possibility of earning up to £2 more28, we
believe that participants were strongly incentivised to truly revealed their beliefs
about others. Our second argument comes from the comparison of unconditional
contributions and beliefs about others. We have tested the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3.5. Participants (unconditionally) contribute in the public account
as much as they believe that other participants will contribute on average.
Comparing unconditional contributions and beliefs about others’ average con-
tribution, we report that when house money was at stake participants contributed
less that what was stated as their belief of others’ contribution on average (One-
sided sign test p-value= 0.0066; Wilcoxon test p-value= 0.0148), while with
earned money they appeared to match their contributions with their beliefs (Two-
sided sign test p-value= 0.2529; Wilcoxon test p-value= 0.2194). These results
suggest that participants do not always seem to care about matching their contri-
bution to others’ contributions something that is also suggested by our discussion
above on types’ classification. At this point and relating our results here to the
discussion in chapters 1 and 2, we would interpret this change in behaviour be-
tween house money and earned money as a possible recognition of others’ entitle-
ment over their earned money. People in general seem to expect a lower average
contribution with earned money as discussed earlier, but at the same time they
also acknowledge the fact that others have expended the same level of effort as
themselves to earn this £10, meaning that they ultimately match their contri-
butions to their beliefs. We consider this result a manifestation of ‘anticipatory
reciprocity’ as that was discussed by Cherry et al. (2005), Kroll et al. (2007) and
Oxoby and Spraggon (2009) who used it to explain evidence of the house money
effect that they only find in asymmetric cases with heterogeneous endowments or
best-shot production technologies. Our findings seem to diverge from theirs at
the point that we find evidence of the house money effect even in homogeneous
and symmetric cases. In the same vein with our results Muehlbacher and Kirch-
ler (2009) conduct an experiment where participants are not informed about the
asymmetry of the origin of the endowments within their groups and find that par-
ticipants who earn their endowments by exerting a high level of effort contribute
less to the public good than those participants who receive their endowments
more easily in the low effort condition.
28We kept this maximum reward small to avoid any hedging confounds as according to Blanco
et al. (2010) hedging confounds by rewarding accuracy for belief elicitation might not be com-
pletely eliminated but are not a major problem unless the experimental setting offers very
prominent hedging opportunities.
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3.5.4 Conditional Contributions and the Behavioural Va-
lidity of Strategy Method
To further examine the points raised above, we have created the variable ’con-
ditional contribution’ c, which is the entry in the contribution table that corre-
sponds to the beliefs of that particular participant. That is, we check the belief
of a participant and track down the corresponding ’conditional contribution’ in
the contribution table. We then first test whether:
Hypothesis 3.6. ‘Conditional contributions’ are higher when HM is at stake
rather than EM.
Parametric and non-parametric tests (Two-sample t test p-value= 0.0165;
Wilcoxon signed rank test p-value= 0.0086) confirm this hypothesis which is in
accordance with Hypothesis 3.1 on unconditional contributions. Given that we
have already demonstrated the robustness of types’ classification, this result also
supports our argument that any house money effect observed is due to differences
in the levels of contributions rather than changes in the decision to free ride or
not. We also test whether unconditional contributions differ from conditional
ones. Our intention here is to examine whether the strategy method setting we
use has any effect on contributions. We set up our testing hypothesis as following:
Hypothesis 3.7. ‘Conditional contributions’ should not be significantly different
from ‘unconditional contributions’.
However, our data reject this hypothesis showing that unconditional contri-
butions both with house money and earned money are statistically significantly
greater than conditional contributions respectively (Wilcoxon signed rank test
p-value < 0.05 for both cases). Participants seemed to be affected by the strat-
egy method framing and contribute less than when they do not condition their
contributions. This result does not disprove the behavioural validity of strategy
method since, as opposed to Fischbacher and Gachter (2009) who have argued
in favour of strategy method by finding that people identified by the strategy
method as conditional co-operators also behave as conditional co-operators un-
der the direct response method; our experimental design of one-shot public good
game does not allow us to classify participants under their direct response. Our
finding just suggests that positive unconditional contribution were greater than
positive conditional ones (both with house money and earned money) rather that
contributions patterns change when strategy method rather than direct response
is used.
Considering this ‘conditional contribution’ variable again, we last compare
conditional contributions with the corresponding average others’ contribution.
Particularly, we conjecture that:
Hypothesis 3.8. ‘Conditional contributions’ are lower than the corresponding
average contributions of others.
This hypothesis is in line with the results from Hypothesis 3.5 although
there is a difference in the case of earned money where participants seem to be-
have differently than before. Our data here show that both with HM and EM
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conditional contributions are below the corresponding average contributions of
others (Wilcoxon signed rank test p-value= 0.0000 for both cases). This finding
is in line with Fischbacher and Gachter (2010) who show that the decline of coop-
eration can be driven by the fact that most people have a preference to contribute
less than others (rather than by their changing beliefs of others’ contributions).
The last two Hypotheses 3.7 and 3.8 combined imply that removing uncertainty
about others’ contributions by using the strategy method lowers average contribu-
tions. We believe that this result could be attributed to anticipatory reciprocity
as well. As participants are called on to state how much to contribute in the
public account given others’ average contribution, they anticipate with certainty
the maximum contribution by others and thus contribute accordingly whereas




This chapter combines two branches of the experimental literature, that of the
house money effect which has extensively been discussed in the previous two
chapters and that of individual differences in social preferences. Both these have
been used to explain cooperation in social dilemmas but also social preferences
have been suggested as a possible explanation for the house money effect. This
earlier research motivates our work here where we test the implications of house
money on cooperation in social dilemmas. Using the innovative experimental
design of Fischbacher et al. (2001), we observe both ‘unconditional contribu-
tions’ (with the direct response method) and ‘conditional contributions’ (with
the strategy method). The strategy method approach allows us to classify par-
ticipants according to their behaviour in the public good game while by adding
the within-subject element in our experimental design we can test the robustness
of this classification across the different origins of endowments. Unconditional
contributions along with elicited beliefs help us reconsider the discussion around
anticipatory reciprocity as an explanation of the house money effect.
Our findings first confirm the presence of the house money effect in the public
good game and second, contrary to Harrison (2007) they support that the decision
to free ride or not as well as the types’ classification is independent of the origin of
money. Our experimental evidence seems consistent both with anticipatory reci-
procity and fairness or deservingness concerns. Participants both unconditionally
and conditionally contributed lower with earned money rather than with house
money and they anticipated contribution of others in a similar fashion; but in the
case of earned money they matched their (unconditional) contributions to their
beliefs. We consider the latter consistent with our earlier discussion on the inter-
pretation of the house money effect as ‘Lockean desert effect’. Our last findings
report differences between conditional and unconditional contribution suggesting
that the strategy method approach may deflate contributions.
We believe that our findings here add on the discussion on the house money
effect and the treatment that it should receive within the experimental method-
ology; but more importantly, we believe we contribute to the ongoing debate
regarding cooperation in social dilemmas. Our findings suggest that further re-





This appendix includes the experimental instructions for the two kinds of ses-
sions, namely HMEM and EMHM; an example of the power point presentation
that accompanied the instructions; the short questionnaire; and examples of the





Welcome	  and	  thank	  you	  for	  participating	  in	  the	  experiment.	  The	  experiment	  will	  last	  about	  1	  1/2	  hours.	  Please	  
switch	  off	  your	  mobile	  phones	  and	  remain	  silent	  from	  now	  on	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment.	  You	  will	  have	  
the	  opportunity	  to	  ask	  questions	   in	  a	  few	  minutes.	  No	  discussions	  between	  the	  participants	  are	  allowed	  and	  
you	  should	  always	  face	  your	  screen	  unless	  a	  member	  of	  the	  experimental	  team	  reads	  instructions.	  Do	  not	  try	  
to	  check	  the	  screens	  of	  other	  participants	  around	  you.	  
The	   experiment	   consists	   of	   a	   number	   of	   different	   situations.	   In	   each	   situation	   you	  will	   be	   asked	   to	  make	   a	  
choice.	  We	  will	  describe	  each	  situation	  successively	  and	  explain	  precisely	  what	  you	  have	  to	  do.	  You	  will	  also	  
receive	  instructions	  on	  the	  computer	  screen	  and	  be	  guided	  throughout	  each	  stage.	  
Each	  of	  these	  situations	  is	  independent	  and	  should	  be	  treated	  as	  such	  (i.e.	  your	  choice	  in	  one	  situation	  has	  no	  
implications	  for	  another).	  	  
In	  each	  situation,	  your	  earnings	  will	  depend	  on	  your	  choices,	  possibly	  the	  choices	  of	  others	  and	  chance.	  You	  
will	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  ask	  any	  questions	  related	  to	  the	  instructions	  before	  you	  take	  the	  actual	  decision.	  
This	   is	  only	   to	  make	  sure	  you	  understood	  the	   instructions.	  When	  each	  situation	   is	  over,	   there	  will	  be	  a	  very	  
short	  pause	  and	  then	  we	  will	  introduce	  the	  next	  situation.	  To	  be	  more	  precise	  before	  the	  decision	  to	  be	  taken	  
in	  situation	  there	  is	  a	  screen	  with	  the	  title	  “Instructions”.	  When	  you	  have	  this	  screen	  in	  front	  of	  we	  will	  have	  a	  
pause	  while	  the	  member	  of	  the	  experimental	  team	  explains	  the	  instructions	  for	  this	  particular	  situation.	  You	  
will	  only	  be	  informed	  about	  the	  outcomes	  of	  all	  situations	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  session.	  We	  will	  show	  you	  a	  screen	  
with	  the	  outcomes	  corresponding	  to	  each	  situation	  and	  another	  one	  with	  your	  final	  payment.	  
At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  session,	  the	  computer	  will	  choose	  one	  of	  the	  situations	  randomly	  for	  each	  of	  you	  and	  this	  
situation	  shall	  be	  used	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  determining	  your	  payment.	  That	  is,	  your	  actual	  earnings	  will	  depend	  on	  
the	  choices	  you	  made	  in	  one	  of	  the	  situations	  only.	  On	  your	  desk	  there	  is	  a	  Short	  Questionnaire	  about	  some	  
background	  characteristics,	  which	  we	  kindly	  ask	  you	  to	  answer	  before	  you	   leave	  the	  room	  at	  the	  end	  of	   the	  
session.	  All	  this	  information	  will	  be	  kept	  confidential	  and	  anonymous.	  
As	  we	  have	  already	  mentioned	  before	  we	  ask	  you	  to	  remain	  silent	  during	  the	  whole	  experiment.	  Those	  who	  do	  
not	   respect	   the	   silence	   requirement	  will	   be	   asked	   to	   leave	   the	   experimental	   room.	  Once	   the	   experiment	   is	  
finished,	  please	  remain	  seated.	  You	  will	  be	  called	  up	  successively	  by	  the	  number	  on	  your	  table;	  you	  will	  then	  
receive	  an	  envelope	  with	  your	  earnings	  and	  you	  will	  be	  asked	  to	  sign	  a	  receipt.	  
Important	  note:	  The	  CEREP	   lab	  has	  a	  strict	  “no	  deception”	  policy.	  That	  means	  that	  under	  no	  circumstances	  
will	  participants	  to	  experiments	  be	  deceived.	  All	  the	  information	  you	  will	  receive	  from	  us	  is	  true.	  For	  example,	  
if	  we	  tell	  you	  that	  you	  have	  been	  paired	  to	  another	  participant	  in	  the	  room,	  this	  is	  indeed	  the	  case.	  
Finally,	  note	  that	  your	  participation	  is	  considered	  voluntary	  and	  you	  are	  free	  to	  leave	  the	  room	  at	  any	  point	  if	  
you	  wish	  to	  do	  so.	  In	  that	  case,	  we	  will	  only	  pay	  you	  the	  show	  up	  payment	  of	  £3.	  
Please,	  leave	  all	  the	  instructions	  &	  the	  Short	  Questionnaire	  on	  your	  table	  when	  you	  leave	  the	  room.	  You	  can	  
take	  notes	  on	  the	  pages	  of	  the	  instructions	  if	  you	  wish	  to	  do	  so.	  
If	  you	  have	  any	  questions	  so	  far,	  please	  raise	  your	  hand	  now.	   	  
Situation	  1	  
We	  have	  formed	  pairs	  of	  participants	  at	  random	  in	  the	  room.	  Each	  pair	  consists	  of	  a	  First	  Mover	  (FM)	  
and	  a	  Second	  Mover	  (SM).	  The	  allocation	  of	  roles	  will	  be	  determined	  randomly	  by	  flipping	  a	  coin	  by	  
the	  computer	  only	  after	  you	  have	  made	  your	  choices	  both	  as	  a	  FM	  and	  as	  a	  SM.	  	  
We	  –the	  experimental	   team-­‐	  will	   credit	   the	  account	  of	  each	  FM	  with	  £10.	  As	  FM,	  you	  will	   choose	  
whether	  to	  keep	  this	  £10	  or	  transfer	  it	  to	  the	  SM	  you	  are	  paired	  with.	  
• If	  the	  FM	  decides	  to	  keep	  the	  £10,	  the	  SM	  earns	  nothing.	  
• If	  the	  FM	  decides	  to	  transfer	  the	  £10	  to	  the	  SM,	  the	  money	  will	  be	  tripled	  by	  us	  before	  it	  is	  
passed	  on	  to	  SM.	  That	  is,	  SM	  will	  receive	  £30.	  
As	  SM,	  you	  will	  be	  able	  to	  choose	  whether	  to	  keep	  the	  £30	  or	  transfer	  £15	  back	  to	  the	  FM	  you	  are	  
paired	  with.	  
• If	  SM	  keeps	  the	  £30	  and	  does	  not	  transfer	  anything	  to	  the	  FM,	  SM’s	  account	  will	  be	  credited	  
with	  £30	  and	  FM	  earns	  nothing	  (£0	  credited	  to	  FM’s	  account).	  
• If	  SM	  transfers	  £15	  back	  to	  the	  FM	  of	  the	  pair,	  both	  FM	  and	  SM	  will	  earn	  £15	  (both	  accounts	  
will	  be	  credited	  with	  £15).	  
	  
Predictions	  about	  Others’	  Choices	  
In	  this	  situation,	  you	  will	  also	  be	  asked	  to	  predict	  the	  choices	  of	  other	  participants	  (both	  as	  FM	  and	  
as	  SM).	  Specifically,	  we	  will	  ask	  you	  to	  state	  how	  many	  of	  the	  other	  15	  participants	  in	  the	  room	  do	  
you	  expect	  will	  transfer	  £10	  as	  FM	  /	  transfer	  £15	  back	  as	  SM.	  
You	  will	  be	  rewarded	  for	  correct	  guesses	  with	  additional	  payment.	  	  
That	   is,	   if	   you	   predict	  exactly	   how	  many	   of	   the	   15	   other	   participants	   in	   the	   room	   they	   said	   they	  
would	  transfer	  £10	  as	  FM	  /	  transfer	  £15	  back	  as	  SM	  you	  will	  gain	  £2	  for	  each	  prediction,	  respectively.	  
If	   your	   prediction	  deviates	   by	   -­‐1	   or	   +1	   of	   the	   actual	   number	   you	  will	   gain	   £1	   for	   each	   prediction,	  
respectively.	   If	   your	   prediction	   deviates	   by	   -­‐2	   or	   +2	   you	   will	   gain	   £0.50	   for	   each	   prediction,	  
respectively.	  If	  your	  prediction	  deviates	  by	  -­‐3	  or	  +3	  or	  more	  you	  will	  gain	  nothing	  (£0),	  respectively.	  
If	   you	   have	   any	   questions	   about	   the	   set-­‐up,	   please	   raise	   your	   hand	   now	   and	   wait	   for	   the	  
experimenter	  to	  come	  to	  you.	  	  
Please	  return	  to	  your	  computer	  and	  follow	  the	  next	  instructions	  on	  screen.	   	  
	  
Situation	  2	  
We	  will	  now	  propose	  to	  you	  nine	  different	  choices	  between	  a	  fixed	  amount	  of	  money	  (£10)	  that	  we	  
have	  credited	  to	  your	  account	  and	  an	  all-­‐or-­‐nothing	  lottery.	  
The	  lottery	  will	  work	  as	  follows:	  The	  computer	  will	  roll	  a	  ten-­‐sided	  die.	  According	  to	  the	  rule	  stated	  
in	  the	  lottery,	  you	  will	  earn	  nothing	  (£0)	   if	  the	  die	   indicates	  some	  of	  the	  numbers	  or	  £15	  if	  the	  die	  
indicates	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  numbers.	  
For	  example,	  if	  you	  choose	  the	  lottery	  that	  states	  {	  £0	  if	  the	  die	  shows	  1	  or	  2;	  £15	  if	  the	  die	  show	  3,	  
4,	  5,	  6,	  7,	  8,	  9,	  10}	  you	  will	  earn	  nothing	  if	  the	  die	  indicates	  1	  or	  2	  and	  earn	  £15	  if	  the	  die	  indicates	  3,	  
4,	  5,	  6,	  7,	  8,	  9	  or	  10.	  If	  you	  choose	  to	  keep	  the	  £10	  rather	  than	  picking	  the	  all-­‐or-­‐nothing	  lottery,	  you	  
will	  earn	  £10.	  
You	  will	  be	  asked	  to	  indicate	  your	  preferred	  option	  in	  each	  of	  the	  cases.	  
Finally,	   the	  computer	  will	  pick	  at	   random	  a	  number	  between	  1	  and	  9	  to	  determine	  which	  of	   the	  9	  
cases	  will	  be	  relevant	  to	  determine	  your	  earnings	  in	  this	  situation.	  
If	   you	   have	   any	   questions	   about	   the	   set-­‐up,	   please	   raise	   your	   hand	   now	   and	   wait	   for	   the	  
experimenter	  to	  come	  to	  you.	  	  
Please	  return	  to	  your	  computer	  and	  follow	  the	  next	  instructions	  on	  screen.	  
	   	  
Situation	  3	  
We	  have	  formed	  groups	  of	  four	  participants	  at	  random	  in	  the	  room.	  You	  have	  been	  assigned	  to	  one	  of	  these	  
groups.	  None	  of	  you	  will	  know	  who	  is	  in	  his/her	  group.	  The	  experimenter	  is	  the	  only	  one	  who	  knows	  who	  is	  in	  
which	  group.	  You	  will	  only	  know	  the	  number	  of	   the	  group	  you	  belong	   to	  and	  your	   individual	  number	   in	   the	  
group.	  
For	   example,	   if	   you	   are	   told	   that	   your	   group	  number	   is	   5	   and	   your	  number	   in	   the	   group	   is	   3,	   then	   you	   are	  
member	  number	  3	  in	  group	  5.	  
Each	  member	  of	  the	  group	  has	  to	  decide	  on	  the	  division	  of	  £10	  that	  has	  been	  allocated	  to	  each	  of	  you	  by	  us,	  
the	  experimental	  team.	  You	  can	  put	  this	  £10	  in	  your	  private	  account	  or	  you	  can	  transfer	  it	  fully	  or	  partially	  into	  
a	  project.	  Each	  pound	  you	  do	  not	  transfer	  to	  the	  project	  will	  automatically	  be	  credited	  to	  your	  private	  account.	  
Your	  income	  from	  the	  private	  account:	  
For	  each	  £1	  you	  put	  in	  your	  private	  account,	  you	  will	  receive	  exactly	  £1.	  Nobody	  except	  you	  earns	  something	  
from	  your	  private	  account.	  
Your	  income	  from	  the	  project:	  
We	  will	  add	  up	  the	  transfers	  made	  by	  the	  four	  members	  of	  your	  group	  to	  the	  project.	  Each	  member	  will	  then	  
receive	  an	  income	  from	  the	  project	  calculated	  as	  follows:	  
Income	  from	  the	  project	  =	  Sum	  of	  all	  transfers	  of	  the	  members	  of	  the	  group	  x	  0.4	  
Your	  total	  income:	  
Your	  total	  income	  is	  the	  sum	  of	  your	  income	  from	  your	  private	  account	  and	  your	  income	  from	  the	  project.	  
We	  will	  ask	  you	  to	  make	  two	  types	  of	  decisions	  in	  this	  situation,	  which	  we	  will	  refer	  to	  below	  as	  the	  “transfer”	  
and	  “transfer	  table”.	  
• You	  first	  decide	  how	  much	  of	  the	  £10	  you	  want	  to	  transfer	  to	  the	  project	  without	  knowing	  what	  the	  
other	  three	  members	  of	  your	  group	  intend	  to	  transfer	  to	  the	  project.	  We	  will	  call	  this	  your	  “transfer”.	  
• Your	  second	  task	  is	  to	  fill	  in	  a	  “transfer	  table”.	  The	  table	  contains	  all	  possible	  average	  transfers	  by	  the	  
other	   three	  group	  members	   (rounded	  up	  to	  the	  closest	   integer).	  For	  each	  number	   in	   the	  table,	  you	  
simply	  have	  to	  insert	  in	  the	  input	  box	  how	  much	  of	  the	  £10	  you	  want	  to	  transfer	  to	  the	  project	  if	  that	  
number	  was	  the	  average	  transfer	  by	  the	  other	  three	  members.	  For	  example,	  you	  will	  have	  to	  indicate	  
how	  much	  you	  would	  transfer	  to	  the	  project	  if	  the	  others	  transfer	  £0	  on	  average	  to	  the	  project,	  how	  
much	  you	  would	  transfer	  if	  the	  others	  transfer	  £1,	  £2	  or	  £3	  etc.	  You	  can	  insert	  any	  integer	  numbers	  
from	  0	  to	  10	  in	  each	  input	  box.	  All	  input	  boxes	  must	  be	  filled	  in.	  
After	  all	  the	  members	  of	  your	  group	  have	  made	  a	  “transfer”	  and	  filled	  their	  “transfer	  table”,	  a	  group	  member	  
number	  will	  be	  chosen	  at	  random.	  For	  example,	  if	  number	  2	  is	  selected,	  this	  means	  that	  every	  participant	  with	  
number	  2	  in	  each	  group	  will	  have	  been	  selected.	  For	  this	  participant,	  his/her	  “transfer	  table”	  choices	  will	  be	  
relevant,	  while	  for	  the	  other	  members	  of	  the	  group	  their	  “transfers”	  will	  be	  the	  relevant	  ones.	  By	  ‘relevant’	  we	  
mean	  that	  the	  sum	  of	  all	  transfers	  of	  the	  members	  of	  the	  group	  will	  be	  the	  “transfers”	  of	  member	  numbers	  1,	  
3	  and	  4	  and	  the	  respective	  choice	  in	  the	  “transfer	  table”	  for	  the	  member	  number	  2.	  The	  respective	  choice	  in	  
the	  “transfer	  table”	  for	  the	  member	  number	  2	  is	  the	  transfer	  on	  the	  table	  that	  corresponds	  to	  the	  average	  of	  
the	  “transfers”	  of	  the	  other	  3	  members.	  
	   	  
Two	  examples	  should	  make	  this	  clear.	  
Example	   1:	   Assume	   that	   your	   number	   in	   the	   group	   is	   selected	   randomly.	   This	   implies	   that	   your	   relevant	  
decision	   will	   be	   your	   “transfer	   table”.	   The	   “transfer”	   is	   the	   relevant	   decision	   for	   the	   other	   three	   group	  
members.	  Assume	  they	  made	  “transfers”	  of	  £0,	  £2	  and	  £4.	  The	  average	  transfer	  of	  these	  three	  group	  members	  
is,	  therefore,	  £2.	  If	  you	  indicated	  in	  your	  “transfer	  table”	  that	  you	  will	  transfer	  £1	  if	  the	  others	  transfer	  £2	  on	  
average,	  then	  the	  total	  transfer	  of	  the	  group	  to	  the	  project	  is	  given	  by	  £0+£2+£4+£1=£7.	  All	  group	  members,	  
therefore,	  earn	  0.4x£7=2.8	  from	  the	  project	  plus	  their	  respective	  income	  from	  their	  private	  account	  (e.g.	  your	  
earnings	  would	   be	   £9+£2.8=	   £11.8).	   If,	   instead,	   you	   have	   indicated	   in	   your	   “transfer	   table”	   that	   you	  would	  
transfer	  £9	  if	  the	  others	  transfer	  £2	  on	  average,	  then	  the	  total	  transfer	  of	  the	  group	  to	  the	  project	  is	  given	  by	  
£0+£2+£4+£9=£15.	   All	   group	   members	   therefore	   earn	   0.4x£15=£6	   from	   the	   project	   plus	   their	   respective	  
income	  from	  the	  private	  account	  (e.g.	  your	  earnings	  in	  this	  case	  would	  be	  £1+£6=£7).	  
Example	  2:	  Assume	  that	  the	  random	  mechanism	  did	  not	  select	  your	  number	  in	  the	  group,	  implying	  that	  the	  
“transfer”	   is	   taken	   as	   the	   payoff-­‐relevant	   decision	   for	   you	   and	   two	   other	   group	   members.	   Assume	   your	  
“transfer”	   is	   £6	   and	   those	   of	   the	   other	   two	   group	  members	   are	   £8	   and	   £10.	   The	   average	   transfer	   of	   your	  
“transfer”	  and	  those	  of	  the	  two	  other	  group	  members,	  therefore,	  is	  £8.	  If	  the	  group	  member	  whose	  number	  in	  
group	  has	   been	   selected	   indicates	   in	   his/her	   “transfer	   table”	   that	   he/she	  will	   transfer	   £1	   if	   the	   other	   three	  
group	   members	   transfer	   on	   average	   £8,	   then	   the	   total	   transfer	   of	   the	   group	   to	   the	   project	   is	   given	   by	  
£6+£8+£10+£1=£25.	  All	  group	  members	  will	  therefore	  earn	  0.4×£25=£10	  from	  the	  project	  plus	  their	  respective	  
income	   from	   the	   private	   account	   (e.g.	   your	   earnings	   would	   be	   £4+£10=£14).	   	   	   If,	   instead,	   the	   randomly	  
selected	  group	  member	  indicates	  in	  his/her	  “transfer	  table”	  that	  he/she	  transfers	  £9	  if	  the	  others	  transfer	  on	  
average	  £8,	  then	  the	  total	  transfer	  of	  that	  group	  to	  the	  project	  is	  £6+£8+£10+£9=£33.	  All	  group	  members	  will	  
therefore	   earn	   0.4×£33=£13.2	   from	   the	   project	   plus	   their	   respective	   income	   from	   the	   private	   account	   (e.g.	  
your	  earnings	  would	  be	  £4+£13.2=£17.2)	  
Estimate	  of	  Others’	  Decision	  
In	   addition,	   in	   this	   situation,	   you	   will	   be	   asked	   to	   estimate	   the	   decision	   of	   other	   members	   of	   your	   group.	  
Specifically,	  we	  will	  ask	  you	  to	  state	  how	  much	  of	  the	  £10	  you	  think	  each	  of	  the	  other	  three	  members	  of	  your	  
group	  will	  transfer	  to	  the	  project	  on	  average.	  
You	  will	  be	  rewarded	  for	  correct	  guesses	  with	  additional	  payment.	  	  
That	  is,	  if	  you	  estimate	  exactly	  how	  much	  is	  the	  average	  “transfer”	  of	  the	  other	  three	  group	  members	  you	  will	  
gain	  £2.	  If	  your	  estimate	  deviates	  by	  -­‐1	  or	  +1	  of	  the	  actual	  average	  “transfer”	  you	  will	  gain	  £1.	  If	  your	  estimate	  
deviates	  by	  -­‐2	  or	  +2	  you	  will	  gain	  £0.50.	  If	  your	  prediction	  deviates	  by	  -­‐3	  or	  +3	  or	  more	  you	  will	  gain	  nothing	  
(£0).	  
If	  you	  have	  any	  questions	  about	  the	  set-­‐up,	  please	  raise	  your	  hand	  now	  and	  wait	  for	  the	  experimenter	  to	  come	  
to	  you.	  	  
Please	  return	  to	  your	  computer	  and	  follow	  the	  next	  instructions	  on	  screen.	  
	   	  
Situation	  4	  
This	  situation	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  described	  in	  Situation	  1.	  
Once	  more,	  we	  have	  formed	  pairs	  of	  participants	  at	  random	  in	  the	  room.	  Each	  pair	  consists	  of	  a	  First	  
Mover	  (FM)	  and	  a	  Second	  Mover	  (SM).	  None	  of	  you	  will	  know	  whom	  you	  have	  been	  paired	  with	  and	  
it	   is	  definitely	  not	   the	  person	  you	  were	  matched	  with	   in	  Situation	  1.	  The	  allocation	  of	  roles	  will	  be	  
determined	   randomly	   by	   flipping	   a	   coin	   by	   the	   computer	   only	   after	   you	   have	  made	   your	   choices	  
both	  as	  a	  FM	  and	  as	  a	  SM.	  
In	  this	  situation	  you	  are	  now	  asked	  to	  use	  the	  £10	  you	  earned	  by	  solving	  the	  puzzle	   in	  Situation	  *.	  
That	  is,	  if	  you	  are	  chosen	  as	  FM	  you	  are	  now	  using	  the	  £10	  you	  earned	  in	  Situation	  *.	  As	  FM,	  you	  will	  
choose	  whether	  to	  keep	  this	  £10	  or	  transfer	  it	  to	  the	  SM	  you	  are	  paired	  with.	  
• If	  the	  FM	  decides	  to	  keep	  the	  £10,	  the	  SM	  earns	  nothing.	  
• If	  the	  FM	  decides	  to	  transfer	  the	  £10	  to	  the	  SM,	  the	  money	  will	  be	  tripled	  by	  us	  before	  it	  is	  
passed	  on	  to	  SM.	  That	  is,	  SM	  will	  receive	  £30.	  
As	  SM,	  you	  will	  be	  able	  to	  choose	  whether	  to	  keep	  the	  £30	  or	  transfer	  £15	  back	  to	  the	  FM	  you	  are	  
paired	  with.	  
• If	  SM	  keeps	  the	  £30	  and	  do	  not	  transfer	  anything	  to	  the	  FM,	  SM’s	  account	  will	  be	  credited	  
with	  £30	  and	  FM	  earns	  nothing	  (£0	  credited	  to	  FM’s	  account).	  
• If	  SM	  transfers	  £15	  back	  to	  the	  FM	  of	  the	  pair,	  both	  FM	  and	  SM	  will	  earn	  £15	  (both	  accounts	  
will	  be	  credited	  with	  £15).	  
Note	   that	   your	  partner	   in	   your	  pair	   has	   also	   gained	   the	  £10	   that	   he/she	  will	   be	  using	   if	   he/she	   is	  
selected	  as	  a	  FM	  by	  solving	  the	  same	  “puzzle”	  in	  Situation*.	  (If	  not,	  that	  will	  be	  explicitly	  stated	  to	  
you.)	  
Predictions	  about	  Others’	  Choices	  
In	  this	  situation,	  you	  will	  also	  be	  asked	  to	  predict	  the	  choices	  of	  other	  participants	  (both	  as	  FM	  and	  
as	  SM).	  Specifically,	  we	  will	  ask	  you	  to	  state	  how	  many	  of	  the	  other	  15	  participants	  in	  the	  room	  do	  
you	  expect	  will	  transfer	  £10	  as	  FM	  /	  transfer	  £15	  back	  as	  SM.	  
You	  will	  be	  rewarded	  for	  correct	  guesses	  with	  additional	  payment.	  	  
That	  is,	  if	  you	  predict	  exactly	  how	  many	  of	  the	  15	  other	  participants	  in	  the	  room	  transferred	  £10	  as	  
FM	  /	  transferred	  £15	  back	  as	  SM	  you	  will	  gain	  £2	  for	  each	  prediction,	  respectively.	  If	  your	  prediction	  
deviates	  by	  -­‐1	  or	  +1	  of	  the	  actual	  number	  you	  will	  gain	  £1	  for	  each	  prediction,	  respectively.	  If	  your	  
prediction	  deviates	  by	  -­‐2	  or	  +2	  you	  will	  gain	  £0.50	  for	  each	  prediction,	  respectively.	  If	  your	  prediction	  
deviates	  by	  -­‐3	  or	  +3	  or	  more	  you	  will	  gain	  nothing	  (£0),	  respectively.	  
If	   you	   have	   any	   questions	   about	   the	   set-­‐up,	   please	   raise	   your	   hand	   now	   and	   wait	   for	   the	  
experimenter	  to	  come	  to	  you.	  	  
Please	  return	  to	  your	  computer	  and	  follow	  the	  next	  instructions	  on	  screen.	   	  
Situation	  5	  
In	  this	  situation	  you	  are	  again	  asked	  to	  participate	  by	  using	  the	  £10	  earned	  at	  Situation	  *.	  
Recall	  that	  the	  result	  of	  Situation	  4	  -­‐like	  the	  results	  of	  all	  the	  previous	  situations-­‐	  is	  irrelevant	  for	  the	  
purposes	  of	  this	  situation	  because	  only	  one	  of	  the	  situations	  will	  be	  payable	  to	  you.	  
This	   situation	   is	   similar	   to	   the	   one	   described	   in	   Situation	   2.	   We	   will	   again	   propose	   to	   you	   nine	  
different	  choices	  between	  a	  fixed	  amount	  of	  money	  (the	  £10	  from	  Situation	  *)	  and	  an	  all-­‐or-­‐nothing	  
lottery.	  
The	  lottery	  will	  work	  as	  follows:	  The	  computer	  will	  roll	  a	  ten-­‐sided	  die.	  According	  to	  the	  rule	  stated	  
at	  the	  lottery,	  you	  will	  earn	  nothing	  (£0)	   if	  the	  die	  indicates	  some	  of	  the	  numbers	  or	  £15	  if	  the	  die	  
indicates	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  numbers.	  
For	  example,	  if	  you	  choose	  that	  lottery	  that	  states	  {	  £0	  if	  the	  die	  shows	  1	  or	  2;	  £15	  if	  the	  die	  show	  3,	  
4,	  5,	  6,	  7,	  8,	  9,	  10}	  	  you	  will	  earn	  nothing	  if	  the	  die	  indicates	  1	  or	  2	  and	  earn	  £15	  if	  the	  die	  indicates	  3,	  
4,	  5,	  6,	  7,	  8,	  9	  or	  10.	  If	  you	  choose	  to	  keep	  the	  £10	  rather	  than	  picking	  the	  all-­‐or-­‐nothing	  lottery,	  you	  
will	  earn	  £10.	  
You	  will	  be	  asked	  to	  indicate	  your	  preferred	  option	  in	  each	  of	  the	  cases.	  
Finally,	   the	  computer	  will	  pick	  at	   random	  a	  number	  between	  1	  and	  9	  to	  determine	  which	  of	   the	  9	  
cases	  will	  be	  relevant	  to	  determine	  your	  earnings	  in	  this	  situation.	  
If	   you	   have	   any	   questions	   about	   the	   set-­‐up,	   please	   raise	   your	   hand	   now	   and	   wait	   for	   the	  
experimenter	  to	  come	  to	  you.	  	  
Please	  return	  to	  your	  computer	  and	  follow	  the	  next	  instructions	  on	  screen.	  
	   	  
Situation	  6	  
In	  this	  situation	  you	  are	  asked	  to	  participate	  by	  using	  the	  £10	  earned	  in	  Situation	  *.	  
This	   situation	   is	   similar	   to	   the	  one	  described	   in	  Situation	  3.	  We	  have	  again	   formed	  groups	  of	   four	  
participants	  at	  random	  in	  the	  room.	  You	  have	  been	  assigned	  to	  one	  of	  these	  groups.	  None	  of	  you	  will	  
know	  who	  is	  in	  his/her	  group.	  The	  experimenter	  is	  the	  only	  one	  who	  knows	  who	  is	  in	  which	  group.	  
You	  will	  only	  know	  the	  number	  of	  the	  group	  you	  belong	  to	  and	  your	  individual	  number	  in	  the	  group.	  
For	  example,	  if	  you	  are	  told	  that	  your	  group	  number	  is	  5	  and	  your	  number	  in	  the	  group	  is	  3,	  then	  you	  
are	  member	  number	  3	  in	  group	  5.	  The	  composition	  of	  your	  group	  will	  not	  be	  the	  same	  as	  the	  one	  in	  
Situation	  3.	  You	  will	  be	  matched	  with	  other	  participants	  in	  the	  room	  but	  not	  the	  same	  as	  before.	  
Each	  member	  of	   the	  group	  has	  to	  decide	  on	  the	  division	  of	  £10	  that	  he/she	  earned	  by	  solving	  the	  
“puzzle”	  in	  Situation	  *.	  (If	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case,	  it	  will	  be	  explicitly	  stated	  to	  you).	  	  You	  can	  put	  this	  £10	  
in	  your	  private	  account	  or	  you	  can	  transfer	  it	  fully	  or	  partially	  into	  a	  project.	  Each	  pound	  you	  do	  not	  
transfer	  will	  automatically	  be	  credited	  to	  your	  private	  account.	  
Your	  income	  from	  the	  private	  account:	  
For	  each	  £1	  you	  put	   in	  your	  private	  account,	  you	  will	   receive	  exactly	  £1.	  Nobody	  except	  you	  earns	  
something	  from	  your	  private	  account.	  
Your	  income	  from	  the	  project:	  
We	  will	  add	  up	  the	  transfers	  made	  by	  the	  four	  members	  of	  your	  group	  to	  the	  project.	  Each	  member	  
will	  then	  receive	  an	  income	  from	  the	  project	  calculated	  as	  follows:	  
Income	  from	  the	  project	  =	  Sum	  of	  all	  transfers	  of	  the	  members	  of	  the	  group	  x	  0.4	  
Your	  total	  income:	  
Your	  total	   income	  is	  the	  sum	  of	  your	   income	  from	  your	  private	  account	  and	  your	   income	  from	  the	  
project.	  
We	  will	  ask	  you	  to	  make	  two	  types	  of	  decisions	  in	  this	  situation,	  which	  we	  will	  refer	  to	  below	  as	  the	  
“transfer”	  and	  “transfer	  table”.	  
• You	  first	  decide	  how	  much	  of	  the	  £10	  you	  want	  to	  transfer	  to	  the	  project	  without	  knowing	  
what	  the	  other	  three	  members	  of	  your	  group	  intend	  to	  transfer	  to	  the	  project.	  We	  will	  call	  
this	  your	  “transfer”.	  
• Your	   second	   task	   is	   to	   fill	   in	   a	   “transfer	   table”.	   The	   table	   contains	   all	   possible	   average	  
transfers	  by	   the	  other	   three	  group	  members	   (rounded	  up	   to	   the	  closest	   integer).	  For	  each	  
number	   in	   the	   table,	  you	  simply	  have	   to	   insert	   in	   the	   input	  box	  how	  much	  of	   the	  £10	  you	  
want	  to	  transfer	  to	  the	  project	   if	  that	  number	  was	  the	  average	  transfer	  by	  the	  other	  three	  
members.	   For	   example,	   you	   will	   have	   to	   indicate	   how	   much	   you	   would	   transfer	   to	   the	  
project	  if	  the	  others	  transfer	  £0	  on	  average	  to	  the	  project,	  how	  much	  you	  would	  transfer	  if	  
the	  others	  transfer	  £1,	  £2	  or	  £3	  etc.	  You	  can	  insert	  any	  integer	  numbers	  from	  0	  to	  10	  in	  each	  
input	  box.	  All	  input	  boxes	  must	  be	  filled	  in.	  
After	  all	  the	  members	  of	  your	  group	  have	  made	  a	  “transfer”	  and	  filled	  their	  “transfer	  table”,	  a	  group	  
member	  number	  will	  be	  chosen	  at	  random.	  For	  example,	  if	  number	  2	  is	  selected,	  this	  means	  that	  
every	  participant	  with	  number	  2	  in	  each	  group	  will	  have	  been	  selected.	  For	  this	  participant,	  his/her	  
“transfer	  table”	  choices	  will	  be	  relevant,	  while	  for	  the	  other	  members	  of	  the	  group	  their	  “transfers”	  
will	  be	  the	  relevant	  ones.	  By	  ‘relevant’	  we	  mean	  that	  the	  sum	  of	  all	  transfers	  of	  the	  members	  of	  the	  
group	  will	  be	  the	  “transfers”	  of	  member	  numbers	  1,	  3	  and	  4	  and	  the	  respective	  choice	  in	  the	  
“transfer	  table”	  for	  the	  member	  number	  2.	  The	  respective	  choice	  in	  the	  “transfer	  table”	  for	  the	  
member	  number	  2	  is	  the	  transfer	  on	  the	  table	  that	  corresponds	  to	  the	  average	  of	  the	  “transfers”	  of	  
the	  other	  3	  members.	  
Remember	  the	  examples	  given	  in	  Situation	  3.	  
	  
Estimate	  of	  Others’	  Decision	  
In	  addition,	   in	   this	   situation,	  you	  will	  be	  asked	   to	  estimate	   the	  decision	  of	  other	  members	  of	  your	  
group.	  Specifically,	  we	  will	  ask	  you	  to	  state	  how	  much	  of	  the	  £10	  you	  think	  each	  of	  the	  other	  three	  
members	  of	  your	  group	  will	  transfer	  to	  the	  project	  on	  average.	  
You	  will	  be	  rewarded	  for	  correct	  guesses	  with	  additional	  payment.	  	  
That	   is,	   if	   you	   estimate	   exactly	   how	   much	   is	   the	   average	   “transfer”	   of	   the	   other	   three	   group	  
members	  you	  will	  gain	  £2.	  If	  your	  estimate	  deviates	  by	  -­‐1	  or	  +1	  of	  the	  actual	  average	  “transfer”	  you	  
will	  gain	  £1.	  If	  your	  estimate	  deviates	  by	  -­‐2	  or	  +2	  you	  will	  gain	  £0.50.	  If	  your	  prediction	  deviates	  by	  -­‐3	  
or	  +3	  or	  more	  you	  will	  gain	  nothing	  (£0).	  
If	   you	   have	   any	   questions	   about	   the	   set-­‐up,	   please	   raise	   your	   hand	   now	   and	   wait	   for	   the	  
experimenter	  to	  come	  to	  you.	  	  





Welcome	  and	  thank	  you	  for	  participating	  in	  the	  experiment.	  The	  experiment	  will	  last	  about	  1	  1/2	  hours.	  Please	  
switch	  off	  your	  mobile	  phones	  and	  remain	  silent	  from	  now	  on	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment.	  You	  will	  have	  
the	  opportunity	  to	  ask	  questions	   in	  a	  few	  minutes.	  No	  discussions	  between	  the	  participants	  are	  allowed	  and	  
you	  should	  always	  face	  your	  screen	  unless	  a	  member	  of	  the	  experimental	  team	  reads	  instructions.	  Do	  not	  try	  
to	  check	  the	  screens	  of	  other	  participants	  around	  you.	  
The	   experiment	   consists	   of	   a	   number	   of	   different	   situations.	   In	   each	   situation	   you	  will	   be	   asked	   to	  make	   a	  
choice.	  We	  will	  describe	  each	  situation	  successively	  and	  explain	  precisely	  what	  you	  have	  to	  do.	  You	  will	  also	  
receive	  instructions	  on	  the	  computer	  screen	  and	  be	  guided	  throughout	  each	  stage.	  
Each	  of	  these	  situations	  is	  independent	  and	  should	  be	  treated	  as	  such	  (i.e.	  your	  choice	  in	  one	  situation	  has	  no	  
implications	  for	  another).	  	  
In	  each	  situation,	  your	  earnings	  will	  depend	  on	  your	  choices,	  possibly	  the	  choices	  of	  others	  and	  chance.	  You	  
will	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  ask	  any	  questions	  related	  to	  the	  instructions	  before	  you	  take	  the	  actual	  decision.	  
This	   is	  only	   to	  make	  sure	  you	  understood	  the	   instructions.	  When	  each	  situation	   is	  over,	   there	  will	  be	  a	  very	  
short	  pause	  and	  then	  we	  will	  introduce	  the	  next	  situation.	  To	  be	  more	  precise	  before	  the	  decision	  to	  be	  taken	  
in	  situation	  there	  is	  a	  screen	  with	  the	  title	  “Instructions”.	  When	  you	  have	  this	  screen	  in	  front	  of	  we	  will	  have	  a	  
pause	  while	  the	  member	  of	  the	  experimental	  team	  explains	  the	  instructions	  for	  this	  particular	  situation.	  You	  
will	  only	  be	  informed	  about	  the	  outcomes	  of	  all	  situations	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  session.	  We	  will	  show	  you	  a	  screen	  
with	  the	  outcomes	  corresponding	  to	  each	  situation	  and	  another	  one	  with	  your	  final	  payment.	  
At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  session,	  the	  computer	  will	  choose	  one	  of	  the	  situations	  randomly	  for	  each	  of	  you	  and	  this	  
situation	  shall	  be	  used	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  determining	  your	  payment.	  That	  is,	  your	  actual	  earnings	  will	  depend	  on	  
the	  choices	  you	  made	  in	  one	  of	  the	  situations	  only.	  On	  your	  desk	  there	  is	  a	  Short	  Questionnaire	  about	  some	  
background	  characteristics,	  which	  we	  kindly	  ask	  you	  to	  answer	  before	  you	   leave	  the	  room	  at	  the	  end	  of	   the	  
session.	  All	  this	  information	  will	  be	  kept	  confidential	  and	  anonymous.	  
As	  we	  have	  already	  mentioned	  before	  we	  ask	  you	  to	  remain	  silent	  during	  the	  whole	  experiment.	  Those	  who	  do	  
not	   respect	   the	   silence	   requirement	  will	   be	   asked	   to	   leave	   the	   experimental	   room.	  Once	   the	   experiment	   is	  
finished,	  please	  remain	  seated.	  You	  will	  be	  called	  up	  successively	  by	  the	  number	  on	  your	  table;	  you	  will	  then	  
receive	  an	  envelope	  with	  your	  earnings	  and	  you	  will	  be	  asked	  to	  sign	  a	  receipt.	  
Important	  note:	  The	  CEREP	   lab	  has	  a	  strict	  “no	  deception”	  policy.	  That	  means	  that	  under	  no	  circumstances	  
will	  participants	  to	  experiments	  be	  deceived.	  All	  the	  information	  you	  will	  receive	  from	  us	  is	  true.	  For	  example,	  
if	  we	  tell	  you	  that	  you	  have	  been	  paired	  to	  another	  participant	  in	  the	  room,	  this	  is	  indeed	  the	  case.	  
Finally,	  note	  that	  your	  participation	  is	  considered	  voluntary	  and	  you	  are	  free	  to	  leave	  the	  room	  at	  any	  point	  if	  
you	  wish	  to	  do	  so.	  In	  that	  case,	  we	  will	  only	  pay	  you	  the	  show	  up	  payment	  of	  £3.	  
Please,	  leave	  all	  the	  instructions	  &	  the	  Short	  Questionnaire	  on	  your	  table	  when	  you	  leave	  the	  room.	  You	  can	  
take	  notes	  on	  the	  pages	  of	  the	  instructions	  if	  you	  wish	  to	  do	  so.	  
If	  you	  have	  any	  questions	  so	  far,	  please	  raise	  your	  hand	  now.	   	  
Situation	  1	  
We	  have	  formed	  pairs	  of	  participants	  at	  random	  in	  the	  room.	  Each	  pair	  consists	  of	  a	  First	  Mover	  (FM)	  
and	  a	  Second	  Mover	  (SM).	  The	  allocation	  of	  roles	  will	  be	  determined	  randomly	  by	  flipping	  a	  coin	  by	  
the	  computer	  only	  after	  you	  have	  made	  your	  choices	  both	  as	  a	  FM	  and	  as	  a	  SM.	  	  
In	  this	  situation,	  you	  are	  asked	  to	  use	  the	  £10	  you	  earned	  by	  solving	  the	  “puzzles”	  in	  Situation	  *.	  That	  
is,	   if	  you	  are	  chosen	  as	  FM	   you	  are	  now	  using	   the	  £10	  you	  earned	   in	  Situation	  *.	  As	  FM,	  you	  will	  
choose	  whether	  to	  keep	  this	  £10	  or	  transfer	  it	  to	  the	  SM	  you	  are	  paired	  with.	  
• If	  the	  FM	  decides	  to	  keep	  the	  £10,	  the	  SM	  earns	  nothing.	  
• If	   the	   FM	  decides	   to	   transfer	   the	  £10	   to	   the	   SM,	   this	  money	  earned	   in	   Situation	  *	  will	   be	  
tripled	  by	  us	  before	  it	  is	  passed	  on	  to	  SM.	  That	  is,	  SM	  will	  receive	  £30.	  
As	  SM,	  you	  will	  be	  able	  to	  choose	  whether	  to	  keep	  the	  £30	  or	  transfer	  £15	  back	  to	  the	  FM	  you	  are	  
paired	  with.	  
• If	  SM	  keeps	  the	  £30	  and	  does	  not	  transfer	  anything	  to	  the	  FM,	  SM’s	  account	  will	  be	  credited	  
with	  £30	  and	  FM	  earns	  nothing	  (£0	  credited	  to	  FM’s	  account).	  
• If	  SM	  transfers	  £15	  back	  to	  the	  FM	  of	  the	  pair,	  both	  FM	  and	  SM	  will	  earn	  £15	  (both	  accounts	  
will	  be	  credited	  with	  £15).	  
Note	   that	   your	  partner	   in	   your	  pair	   has	   also	   gained	   the	  £10	   that	   he/she	  will	   be	  using	   if	   he/she	   is	  
selected	  as	  a	  FM	  by	  solving	  the	  same	  “puzzles”	  in	  Situation*.	  	  
Predictions	  about	  Others’	  Choices	  
In	  this	  situation,	  you	  will	  also	  be	  asked	  to	  predict	  the	  choices	  of	  other	  participants	  (both	  as	  FM	  and	  
as	  SM).	  Specifically,	  we	  will	  ask	  you	  to	  state	  how	  many	  of	  the	  other	  15	  participants	  in	  the	  room	  do	  
you	  expect	  will	  transfer	  £10	  as	  FM	  /	  transfer	  £15	  back	  as	  SM.	  
You	  will	  be	  rewarded	  for	  correct	  guesses	  with	  additional	  payment.	  	  
That	   is,	   if	   you	   predict	  exactly	   how	  many	   of	   the	   15	   other	   participants	   in	   the	   room	   they	   said	   they	  
would	  transfer	  £10	  as	  FM	  /	  transfer	  £15	  back	  as	  SM	  you	  will	  gain	  £2	  for	  each	  prediction,	  respectively.	  
If	   your	   prediction	   deviates	   by	   -­‐1	   or	   +1	   of	   the	   actual	   number	   you	  will	   gain	   £1	   for	   each	   prediction,	  
respectively.	   If	   your	   prediction	   deviates	   by	   -­‐2	   or	   +2	   you	   will	   gain	   £0.50	   for	   each	   prediction,	  
respectively.	  If	  your	  prediction	  deviates	  by	  -­‐3	  or	  +3	  or	  more	  you	  will	  gain	  nothing	  (£0),	  respectively.	  
If	   you	   have	   any	   questions	   about	   the	   set-­‐up,	   please	   raise	   your	   hand	   now	   and	   wait	   for	   the	  
experimenter	  to	  come	  to	  you.	  	  
Please	  return	  to	  your	  computer	  and	  follow	  the	  next	  instructions	  on	  screen.	   	  
Situation	  2	  
In	  this	  situation	  you	  are	  again	  asked	  to	  participate	  by	  using	  the	  £10	  earned	  at	  Situation	  *.	  
Recall	  that	  the	  result	  of	  Situation	  1	  is	  irrelevant	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  situation	  because	  only	  one	  
of	  the	  situations	  will	  be	  payable	  to	  you.	  
We	  will	   propose	   to	   you	   nine	   different	   choices	   between	   a	   fixed	   amount	   of	  money	   {the	   £10	   from	  
Situation	  *)	  and	  an	  all-­‐or-­‐nothing	  lottery.	  
The	  lottery	  will	  work	  as	  follows:	  The	  computer	  will	  roll	  a	  ten-­‐sided	  die.	  According	  to	  the	  rule	  stated	  
at	  the	  lottery,	  you	  will	  earn	  nothing	  (£0)	   if	  the	  die	  indicates	  some	  of	  the	  numbers	  or	  £15	  if	  the	  die	  
indicates	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  numbers.	  
For	  example,	  if	  you	  choose	  that	  lottery	  that	  states	  {	  £0	  if	  the	  die	  shows	  1	  or	  2;	  £15	  if	  the	  die	  show	  3,	  
4,	  5,	  6,	  7,	  8,	  9,	  10}	  	  you	  will	  earn	  nothing	  if	  the	  die	  indicates	  1	  or	  2	  and	  earn	  £15	  if	  the	  die	  indicates	  3,	  
4,	  5,	  6,	  7,	  8,	  9	  or	  10.	  If	  you	  choose	  to	  keep	  the	  £10	  rather	  than	  picking	  the	  all-­‐or-­‐nothing	  lottery,	  you	  
will	  earn	  £10.	  
You	  will	  be	  asked	  to	  indicate	  your	  preferred	  option	  in	  each	  of	  the	  cases.	  
Finally,	   the	  computer	  will	  pick	  at	   random	  a	  number	  between	  1	  and	  9	  to	  determine	  which	  of	   the	  9	  
cases	  will	  be	  relevant	  to	  determine	  your	  earnings	  in	  this	  situation.	  
If	   you	   have	   any	   questions	   about	   the	   set-­‐up,	   please	   raise	   your	   hand	   now	   and	   wait	   for	   the	  
experimenter	  to	  come	  to	  you.	  	  
Please	  return	  to	  your	  computer	  and	  follow	  the	  next	  instructions	  on	  screen.	  
	   	  
Situation	  3	  
In	  this	  situation	  you	  are	  asked	  to	  participate	  by	  using	  the	  £10	  earned	  in	  Situation	  *.	  
We	  have	  formed	  groups	  of	  four	  participants	  at	  random	  in	  the	  room.	  You	  have	  been	  assigned	  to	  one	  
of	   these	  groups.	  None	  of	  you	  will	  know	  who	   is	   in	  his/her	  group.	  The	  experimenter	   is	   the	  only	  one	  
who	  knows	  who	  is	   in	  which	  group.	  You	  will	  only	  know	  the	  number	  of	  the	  group	  you	  belong	  to	  and	  
your	  individual	  number	  in	  the	  group.	  
For	  example,	  if	  you	  are	  told	  that	  your	  group	  number	  is	  5	  and	  your	  number	  in	  the	  group	  is	  3,	  then	  you	  
are	  member	  number	  3	  in	  group	  5.	  
Each	  member	  of	   the	  group	  has	  to	  decide	  on	  the	  division	  of	  £10	   that	  he/she	  earned	  by	  solving	  the	  
“puzzle”	   in	  Situation	  *.	  You	  can	  put	   this	  £10	   in	  your	  private	  account	  or	  you	  can	  transfer	   it	   fully	  or	  
partially	  into	  a	  project.	  Each	  pound	  you	  do	  not	  transfer	  will	  automatically	  be	  credited	  to	  your	  private	  
account.	  
Your	  income	  from	  the	  private	  account:	  
For	  each	  £1	  you	  put	   in	  your	  private	  account,	  you	  will	   receive	  exactly	  £1.	  Nobody	  except	  you	  earns	  
something	  from	  your	  private	  account.	  
Your	  income	  from	  the	  project:	  
We	  will	  add	  up	  the	  transfers	  made	  by	  the	  four	  members	  of	  your	  group	  to	  the	  project.	  Each	  member	  
will	  then	  receive	  an	  income	  from	  the	  project	  calculated	  as	  follows:	  
Income	  from	  the	  project	  =	  Sum	  of	  all	  transfers	  of	  the	  members	  of	  the	  group	  x	  0.4	  
Your	  total	  income:	  
Your	  total	   income	  is	  the	  sum	  of	  your	   income	  from	  your	  private	  account	  and	  your	   income	  from	  the	  
project.	  
We	  will	  ask	  you	  to	  make	  two	  types	  of	  decisions	  in	  this	  situation,	  which	  we	  will	  refer	  to	  below	  as	  the	  
“transfer”	  and	  “transfer	  table”.	  
• You	  first	  decide	  how	  much	  of	  the	  £10	  you	  want	  to	  transfer	  to	  the	  project	  without	  knowing	  
what	  the	  other	  three	  members	  of	  your	  group	  intend	  to	  transfer	  to	  the	  project.	  We	  will	  call	  
this	  your	  “transfer”.	  
• Your	   second	   task	   is	   to	   fill	   in	   a	   “transfer	   table”.	   The	   table	   contains	   all	   possible	   average	  
transfers	  by	   the	  other	   three	  group	  members	   (rounded	  up	   to	   the	  closest	   integer).	  For	  each	  
number	   in	   the	   table,	  you	  simply	  have	   to	   insert	   in	   the	   input	  box	  how	  much	  of	   the	  £10	  you	  
want	  to	  transfer	  to	  the	  project	   if	  that	  number	  was	  the	  average	  transfer	  by	  the	  other	  three	  
members.	   For	   example,	   you	   will	   have	   to	   indicate	   how	   much	   you	   would	   transfer	   to	   the	  
project	  if	  the	  others	  transfer	  £0	  on	  average	  to	  the	  project,	  how	  much	  you	  would	  transfer	  if	  
the	  others	  transfer	  £1,	  £2	  or	  £3	  etc.	  You	  can	  insert	  any	  integer	  numbers	  from	  0	  to	  10	  in	  each	  
input	  box.	  All	  input	  boxes	  must	  be	  filled	  in.	  
	   	  
After	  all	  the	  members	  of	  your	  group	  have	  made	  a	  “transfer”	  and	  filled	  their	  “transfer	  table”,	  a	  group	  
member	  number	  will	  be	   chosen	  at	   random.	  For	  example,	   if	  number	  2	   is	   selected,	   this	  means	   that	  
every	  participant	  with	  number	  2	  in	  each	  group	  will	  have	  been	  selected.	  For	  this	  participant,	  his/her	  
“transfer	  table”	  choices	  will	  be	  relevant,	  while	  for	  the	  other	  members	  of	  the	  group	  their	  “transfers”	  
will	  be	  the	  relevant	  ones.	  By	  ‘relevant’	  we	  mean	  that	  the	  sum	  of	  all	  transfers	  of	  the	  members	  of	  the	  
group	   will	   be	   the	   “transfers”	   of	   member	   numbers	   1,	   3	   and	   4	   and	   the	   respective	   choice	   in	   the	  
“transfer	   table”	   for	   the	  member	   number	   2.	   The	   respective	   choice	   in	   the	   “transfer	   table”	   for	   the	  
member	  number	  2	  is	  the	  transfer	  on	  the	  table	  that	  corresponds	  to	  the	  average	  of	  the	  “transfers”	  of	  
the	  other	  3	  members.	  
Two	  examples	  should	  make	  this	  clear.	  
Example	   1:	   Assume	   that	   your	   number	   in	   the	   group	   is	   selected	   randomly.	   This	   implies	   that	   your	  
relevant	  decision	  will	  be	  your	  “transfer	  table”.	  The	  “transfer”	   is	  the	  relevant	  decision	  for	  the	  other	  
three	   group	  members.	   Assume	   they	   made	   “transfers”	   of	   £0,	   £2	   and	   £4.	   The	   average	   transfer	   of	  
these	  three	  group	  members	   is,	  therefore,	  £2.	   If	  you	  indicated	  in	  your	  “transfer	  table”	  that	  you	  will	  
transfer	  £1	  if	  the	  others	  transfer	  £2	  on	  average,	  then	  the	  total	  transfer	  of	  the	  group	  to	  the	  project	  is	  
given	   by	   £0+£2+£4+£1=£7.	   All	   group	  members,	   therefore,	   earn	   0.4x£7=2.8	   from	   the	   project	   plus	  
their	  respective	  income	  from	  their	  private	  account	  (e.g.	  your	  earnings	  would	  be	  £9+£2.8=	  £11.8).	  If,	  
instead,	  you	  have	  indicated	  in	  your	  “transfer	  table”	  that	  you	  would	  transfer	  £9	  if	  the	  others	  transfer	  
£2	  on	  average,	  then	  the	  total	  transfer	  of	  the	  group	  to	  the	  project	  is	  given	  by	  £0+£2+£4+£9=£15.	  All	  
group	  members	  therefore	  earn	  0.4x£15=£6	  from	  the	  project	  plus	  their	  respective	  income	  from	  the	  
private	  account	  (e.g.	  your	  earnings	  in	  this	  case	  would	  be	  £1+£6=£7).	  
Example	  2:	  Assume	  that	  the	  random	  mechanism	  did	  not	  select	  your	  number	  in	  the	  group,	  implying	  
that	  the	  “transfer”	  is	  taken	  as	  the	  payoff-­‐relevant	  decision	  for	  you	  and	  two	  other	  group	  members.	  
Assume	   your	   “transfer”	   is	   £6	   and	   those	   of	   the	   other	   two	   group	   members	   are	   £8	   and	   £10.	   The	  
average	  transfer	  of	  your	  “transfer”	  and	  those	  of	  the	  two	  other	  group	  members,	  therefore,	   is	  £8.	   If	  
the	  group	  member	  whose	  number	   in	  group	  has	  been	  selected	   indicates	   in	  his/her	  “transfer	   table”	  
that	  he/she	  will	  transfer	  £1	  if	  the	  other	  three	  group	  members	  transfer	  on	  average	  £8,	  then	  the	  total	  
transfer	  of	  the	  group	  to	  the	  project	  is	  given	  by	  £6+£8+£10+£1=£25.	  All	  group	  members	  will	  therefore	  
earn	  0.4×£25=£10	  from	  the	  project	  plus	  their	  respective	  income	  from	  the	  private	  account	  (e.g.	  your	  
earnings	   would	   be	   £4+£10=£14).	   	   	   If,	   instead,	   the	   randomly	   selected	   group	  member	   indicates	   in	  
his/her	  “transfer	  table”	  that	  he/she	  transfers	  £9	  if	  the	  others	  transfer	  on	  average	  £8,	  then	  the	  total	  
transfer	  of	  that	  group	  to	  the	  project	   is	  £6+£8+£10+£9=£33.	  All	  group	  members	  will	   therefore	  earn	  
0.4×£33=£13.2	   from	   the	   project	   plus	   their	   respective	   income	   from	   the	   private	   account	   (e.g.	   your	  
earnings	  would	  be	  £4+£13.2=£17.2)	  
	   	  
Estimate	  of	  Others’	  Decision	  
In	  addition,	   in	   this	   situation,	  you	  will	  be	  asked	   to	  estimate	   the	  decision	  of	  other	  members	  of	  your	  
group.	  Specifically,	  we	  will	  ask	  you	  to	  state	  how	  much	  of	  the	  £10	  you	  think	  each	  of	  the	  other	  three	  
members	  of	  your	  group	  will	  transfer	  to	  the	  project	  on	  average.	  
You	  will	  be	  rewarded	  for	  correct	  guesses	  with	  additional	  payment.	  	  
That	   is,	   if	   you	   estimate	   exactly	   how	   much	   is	   the	   average	   “transfer”	   of	   the	   other	   three	   group	  
members	  you	  will	  gain	  £2.	  If	  your	  estimate	  deviates	  by	  -­‐1	  or	  +1	  of	  the	  actual	  average	  “transfer”	  you	  
will	  gain	  £1.	  If	  your	  estimate	  deviates	  by	  -­‐2	  or	  +2	  you	  will	  gain	  £0.50.	  If	  your	  prediction	  deviates	  by	  -­‐3	  
or	  +3	  or	  more	  you	  will	  gain	  nothing	  (£0).	  
If	   you	   have	   any	   questions	   about	   the	   set-­‐up,	   please	   raise	   your	   hand	   now	   and	   wait	   for	   the	  
experimenter	  to	  come	  to	  you.	  	  
Please	  return	  to	  your	  computer	  and	  follow	  the	  next	  instructions	  on	  screen.	  
	   	  
Situation	  4	  
This	  situation	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  described	  in	  Situation	  1.	  
Once	  more,	  we	  have	  formed	  pairs	  of	  participants	  at	  random	  in	  the	  room.	  Each	  pair	  consists	  of	  a	  First	  
Mover	  (FM)	  and	  a	  Second	  Mover	  (SM).	  None	  of	  you	  will	  know	  whom	  you	  have	  been	  paired	  with	  and	  
it	   is	  definitely	  not	   the	  person	  you	  were	  matched	  with	   in	  Situation	  1.	  The	  allocation	  of	  roles	  will	  be	  
determined	   randomly	   by	   flipping	   a	   coin	   by	   the	   computer	   only	   after	   you	   have	  made	   your	   choices	  
both	  as	  a	  FM	  and	  as	  a	  SM.	  
In	  this	  situation,	  rather	  than	  using	  the	  £10	  earned	   in	  Situation	  *,	  we	  –the	  experimental	  team-­‐	  will	  
credit	  the	  account	  of	  each	  FM	  with	  £10.	  As	  FM,	  you	  will	  choose	  whether	  to	  keep	  this	  £10	  or	  transfer	  
it	  to	  the	  SM	  you	  are	  paired	  with.	  
• If	  the	  FM	  decides	  to	  keep	  the	  £10,	  the	  SM	  earns	  nothing.	  
• If	  the	  FM	  decides	  to	  transfer	  the	  £10	  to	  the	  SM,	  the	  money	  will	  be	  tripled	  by	  us	  before	  it	  is	  
passed	  on	  to	  SM.	  That	  is,	  SM	  will	  receive	  £30.	  
As	  SM,	  you	  will	  be	  able	  to	  choose	  whether	  to	  keep	  the	  £30	  or	  transfer	  £15	  back	  to	  the	  FM	  you	  are	  
paired	  with.	  
• If	  SM	  keeps	  the	  £30	  and	  do	  not	  transfer	  anything	  to	  the	  FM,	  SM’s	  account	  will	  be	  credited	  
with	  £30	  and	  FM	  earns	  nothing	  (£0	  credited	  to	  FM’s	  account).	  
• If	  SM	  transfers	  £15	  back	  to	  the	  FM	  of	  the	  pair,	  both	  FM	  and	  SM	  will	  earn	  £15	  (both	  accounts	  
will	  be	  credited	  with	  £15).	  
Predictions	  about	  Others’	  Choices	  
In	  this	  situation,	  you	  will	  also	  be	  asked	  to	  predict	  the	  choices	  of	  other	  participants	  (both	  as	  FM	  and	  
as	  SM).	  Specifically,	  we	  will	  ask	  you	  to	  state	  how	  many	  of	  the	  other	  15	  participants	  in	  the	  room	  do	  
you	  expect	  will	  transfer	  £10	  as	  FM	  /	  transfer	  £15	  back	  as	  SM.	  
You	  will	  be	  rewarded	  for	  correct	  guesses	  with	  additional	  payment.	  	  
That	  is,	  if	  you	  predict	  exactly	  how	  many	  of	  the	  15	  other	  participants	  in	  the	  room	  transferred	  £10	  as	  
FM	  /	  transferred	  £15	  back	  as	  SM	  you	  will	  gain	  £2	  for	  each	  prediction,	  respectively.	  If	  your	  prediction	  
deviates	  by	  -­‐1	  or	  +1	  of	  the	  actual	  number	  you	  will	  gain	  £1	  for	  each	  prediction,	  respectively.	  If	  your	  
prediction	  deviates	  by	  -­‐2	  or	  +2	  you	  will	  gain	  £0.50	  for	  each	  prediction,	  respectively.	  If	  your	  prediction	  
deviates	  by	  -­‐3	  or	  +3	  or	  more	  you	  will	  gain	  nothing	  (£0),	  respectively.	  
If	   you	   have	   any	   questions	   about	   the	   set-­‐up,	   please	   raise	   your	   hand	   now	   and	   wait	   for	   the	  
experimenter	  to	  come	  to	  you.	  	  
Please	  return	  to	  your	  computer	  and	  follow	  the	  next	  instructions	  on	  screen.	   	  
Situation	  5	  
This	  situation	  is	  similar	  to	  Situation	  2.	  
We	  will	  now	  propose	  to	  you	  nine	  different	  choices	  between	  a	  fixed	  amount	  of	  money	  (£10)	  that	  we	  -­‐
the	  experimental	  team-­‐	  have	  credited	  to	  your	  account	  and	  an	  all-­‐or-­‐nothing	  lottery.	  
Recall	   that	   the	   result	  of	  Situation	  4	   -­‐like	   the	   results	  of	  all	   the	  previous	  &	  subsequent	  situations-­‐	   is	  
irrelevant	   for	   the	  purposes	  of	   this	   situation	  because	  only	  one	  of	   the	  situations	  will	  be	  payable	   to	  
you.	  
The	  lottery	  will	  work	  as	  follows:	  The	  computer	  will	  roll	  a	  ten-­‐sided	  die.	  According	  to	  the	  rule	  stated	  
in	  the	  lottery,	  you	  will	  earn	  nothing	  (£0)	   if	  the	  die	   indicates	  some	  of	  the	  numbers	  or	  £15	  if	  the	  die	  
indicates	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  numbers.	  
For	  example,	  if	  you	  choose	  the	  lottery	  that	  states	  {	  £0	  if	  the	  die	  shows	  1	  or	  2;	  £15	  if	  the	  die	  show	  3,	  
4,	  5,	  6,	  7,	  8,	  9,	  10}	  you	  will	  earn	  nothing	  if	  the	  die	  indicates	  1	  or	  2	  and	  earn	  £15	  if	  the	  die	  indicates	  3,	  
4,	  5,	  6,	  7,	  8,	  9	  or	  10.	  If	  you	  choose	  to	  keep	  the	  £10	  rather	  than	  picking	  the	  all-­‐or-­‐nothing	  lottery,	  you	  
will	  earn	  £10.	  
You	  will	  be	  asked	  to	  indicate	  your	  preferred	  option	  in	  each	  of	  the	  cases.	  
Finally,	   the	  computer	  will	  pick	  at	   random	  a	  number	  between	  1	  and	  9	  to	  determine	  which	  of	   the	  9	  
cases	  will	  be	  relevant	  to	  determine	  your	  earnings	  in	  this	  situation.	  
If	   you	   have	   any	   questions	   about	   the	   set-­‐up,	   please	   raise	   your	   hand	   now	   and	   wait	   for	   the	  
experimenter	  to	  come	  to	  you.	  	  
Please	  return	  to	  your	  computer	  and	  follow	  the	  next	  instructions	  on	  screen.	  
	   	  
Situation	  6	  
This	   situation	   is	   similar	   to	   the	  one	  described	   in	  Situation	  3.	  We	  have	  again	   formed	  groups	  of	   four	  
participants	  at	  random	  in	  the	  room.	  You	  have	  been	  assigned	  to	  one	  of	  these	  groups.	  None	  of	  you	  will	  
know	  who	  is	  in	  his/her	  group.	  The	  experimenter	  is	  the	  only	  one	  who	  knows	  who	  is	  in	  which	  group.	  
You	  will	  only	  know	  the	  number	  of	  the	  group	  you	  belong	  to	  and	  your	  individual	  number	  in	  the	  group.	  
For	  example,	  if	  you	  are	  told	  that	  your	  group	  number	  is	  5	  and	  your	  number	  in	  the	  group	  is	  3,	  then	  you	  
are	  member	  number	  3	  in	  group	  5.	  The	  composition	  of	  your	  group	  will	  not	  be	  the	  same	  as	  the	  one	  in	  
Situation	  3.	  You	  will	  be	  matched	  with	  other	  participants	  in	  the	  room	  but	  not	  the	  same	  as	  before.	  
Each	  member	  of	  the	  group	  has	  to	  decide	  on	  the	  division	  of	  £10	  that	  has	  been	  allocated	  to	  each	  of	  
you	  by	  us,	  the	  experimental	  team.	  You	  can	  put	  this	  £10	  in	  your	  private	  account	  or	  you	  can	  transfer	  
it	  fully	  or	  partially	  into	  a	  project.	  Each	  pound	  you	  do	  not	  transfer	  to	  the	  project	  will	  automatically	  be	  
credited	  to	  your	  private	  account.	  
Your	  income	  from	  the	  private	  account:	  
For	  each	  £1	  you	  put	   in	  your	  private	  account,	  you	  will	   receive	  exactly	  £1.	  Nobody	  except	  you	  earns	  
something	  from	  your	  private	  account.	  
Your	  income	  from	  the	  project:	  
We	  will	  add	  up	  the	  transfers	  made	  by	  the	  four	  members	  of	  your	  group	  to	  the	  project.	  Each	  member	  
will	  then	  receive	  an	  income	  from	  the	  project	  calculated	  as	  follows:	  
Income	  from	  the	  project	  =	  Sum	  of	  all	  transfers	  of	  the	  members	  of	  the	  group	  x	  0.4	  
Your	  total	  income:	  
Your	  total	   income	  is	  the	  sum	  of	  your	   income	  from	  your	  private	  account	  and	  your	   income	  from	  the	  
project.	  
We	  will	  ask	  you	  to	  make	  two	  types	  of	  decisions	  in	  this	  situation,	  which	  we	  will	  refer	  to	  below	  as	  the	  
“transfer”	  and	  “transfer	  table”.	  
• You	  first	  decide	  how	  much	  of	  the	  £10	  you	  want	  to	  transfer	  to	  the	  project	  without	  knowing	  
what	  the	  other	  three	  members	  of	  your	  group	  intend	  to	  transfer	  to	  the	  project.	  We	  will	  call	  
this	  your	  “transfer”.	  
• Your	   second	   task	   is	   to	   fill	   in	   a	   “transfer	   table”.	   The	   table	   contains	   all	   possible	   average	  
transfers	  by	   the	  other	   three	  group	  members	   (rounded	  up	   to	   the	  closest	   integer).	  For	  each	  
number	   in	   the	   table,	  you	  simply	  have	   to	   insert	   in	   the	   input	  box	  how	  much	  of	   the	  £10	  you	  
want	  to	  transfer	  to	  the	  project	   if	  that	  number	  was	  the	  average	  transfer	  by	  the	  other	  three	  
members.	   For	   example,	   you	   will	   have	   to	   indicate	   how	   much	   you	   would	   transfer	   to	   the	  
project	  if	  the	  others	  transfer	  £0	  on	  average	  to	  the	  project,	  how	  much	  you	  would	  transfer	  if	  
the	  others	  transfer	  £1,	  £2	  or	  £3	  etc.	  You	  can	  insert	  any	  integer	  numbers	  from	  0	  to	  10	  in	  each	  
input	  box.	  All	  input	  boxes	  must	  be	  filled	  in.	  
After	  all	  the	  members	  of	  your	  group	  have	  made	  a	  “transfer”	  and	  filled	  their	  “transfer	  table”,	  a	  group	  
member	  number	  will	  be	  chosen	  at	  random.	  For	  example,	  if	  number	  2	  is	  selected,	  this	  means	  that	  
every	  participant	  with	  number	  2	  in	  each	  group	  will	  have	  been	  selected.	  For	  this	  participant,	  his/her	  
“transfer	  table”	  choices	  will	  be	  relevant,	  while	  for	  the	  other	  members	  of	  the	  group	  their	  “transfers”	  
will	  be	  the	  relevant	  ones.	  By	  ‘relevant’	  we	  mean	  that	  the	  sum	  of	  all	  transfers	  of	  the	  members	  of	  the	  
group	  will	  be	  the	  “transfers”	  of	  member	  numbers	  1,	  3	  and	  4	  and	  the	  respective	  choice	  in	  the	  
“transfer	  table”	  for	  the	  member	  number	  2.	  The	  respective	  choice	  in	  the	  “transfer	  table”	  for	  the	  
member	  number	  2	  is	  the	  transfer	  on	  the	  table	  that	  corresponds	  to	  the	  average	  of	  the	  “transfers”	  of	  
the	  other	  3	  members.	  
Remember	  the	  examples	  given	  in	  Situation	  3.	  
	  
Estimate	  of	  Others’	  Decision	  
In	  addition,	   in	   this	   situation,	  you	  will	  be	  asked	   to	  estimate	   the	  decision	  of	  other	  members	  of	  your	  
group.	  Specifically,	  we	  will	  ask	  you	  to	  state	  how	  much	  of	  the	  £10	  you	  think	  each	  of	  the	  other	  three	  
members	  of	  your	  group	  will	  transfer	  to	  the	  project	  on	  average.	  
You	  will	  be	  rewarded	  for	  correct	  guesses	  with	  additional	  payment.	  	  
That	   is,	   if	   you	   estimate	   exactly	   how	   much	   is	   the	   average	   “transfer”	   of	   the	   other	   three	   group	  
members	  you	  will	  gain	  £2.	  If	  your	  estimate	  deviates	  by	  -­‐1	  or	  +1	  of	  the	  actual	  average	  “transfer”	  you	  
will	  gain	  £1.	  If	  your	  estimate	  deviates	  by	  -­‐2	  or	  +2	  you	  will	  gain	  £0.50.	  If	  your	  prediction	  deviates	  by	  -­‐3	  
or	  +3	  or	  more	  you	  will	  gain	  nothing	  (£0).	  
If	   you	   have	   any	   questions	   about	   the	   set-­‐up,	   please	   raise	   your	   hand	   now	   and	   wait	   for	   the	  
experimenter	  to	  come	  to	  you.	  	  







Welcome	  to	  CEREP	  Lab	  
Monday	  18th	  March	  2013	  
The	  experiment	  
•  A	  number	  of	  different	  situaGons	  
•  In	  each	  situaGon	  you	  make	  a	  choice/decision	  
•  SituaGons	  are	  independent	  
•  Your	  earnings	  will	  depend	  on	  your	  choices,	  
possibly	  the	  choices	  of	  others	  &	  chance	  
	  
InstrucGons	  &	  QuesGons	  
•  Before	  the	  actual	  decision:	  
General	  InstrucGons	  
•  You	  will	  only	  be	  informed	  about	  outcomes	  of	  
all	  situaGons	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  session	  
•  Actual	  earnings	  depend	  on	  the	  choices	  you	  
made	  in	  one	  of	  the	  situaGons	  only	  
•  Please	  fill	  in	  the	  Short	  QuesGonnaire	  on	  your	  
desk	  before	  you	  leave	  the	  room.	  




General	  InstrucGons	  (cont.)	  
•  Please	  remain	  silent	  during	  the	  whole	  experiment	  
•  Those	  who	  do	  not	  respect	  the	  silence	  
requirement	  will	  be	  asked	  to	  leave	  the	  
experimental	  room	  
•  Once	  the	  experiment	  is	  finished	  please	  remain	  
seated	  
•  You	  will	  be	  called	  successively	  by	  the	  number	  on	  
your	  table	  to	  receive	  an	  envelope	  with	  your	  
earnings	  and	  sign	  a	  receipt	  
General	  InstrucGons	  (cont.)	  
•  CEREP’s	  “no	  decepGon”	  policy	  
•  Your	  parGcipaGon	  is	  voluntary	  
•  You	  are	  free	  to	  leave	  the	  room	  at	  any	  point	  
•  In	  that	  case,	  you	  will	  only	  receive	  the	  show	  up	  
payment	  of	  £3	  
•  At	  the	  end	  please	  leave	  the	  InstrucGons	  &	  the	  
Short	  QuesGonnaire	  on	  your	  table	  when	  you	  
leave	  the	  room	  
•  You	  can	  take	  notes	  on	  these	  pages	  
SituaGon	  1:	  Decision	  
	  
Second	  
Mover	  First	  Mover	  
£10	  
Transfer	  





SituaGon	  1:	  PredicGons	  about	  Others	  
•  How	  many	  of	  the	  other	  15	  parGcipants	  in	  this	  
room	  do	  you	  think	  said	  that	  they	  will	  transfer	  £10	  
if	  they	  are	  chosen	  as	  FM?	  
•  How	  many	  of	  the	  other	  15	  parGcipants	  in	  this	  
room	  do	  you	  think	  said	  that	  they	  will	  transfer	  £15	  
back	  if	  they	  are	  chosen	  as	  SM?	  
•  Precision	  awarded	  by	  extra	  £2	  per	  predicGon	  
±1	  gives	  £1	  per	  predicGon	  
±2	  gives	  £0.50	  per	  predicGon	  
±3	  or	  more	  gives	  £0	  per	  predicGon	  
SituaGon	  2:	  Decisions	  
•  9	  different	  choices	  between	  £10	  and	  an	  all-­‐or	  
nothing	  lohery	  	  
Example	  
A:	  {	  £0	  if	  the	  die	  shows	  1	  or	  2;	  £15	  if	  the	  die	  
shows	  3,	  4,	  5,	  6,	  7,	  8,	  9,	  10}	  	  
B:	  {£10}	  
•  Computer	  will	  randomly	  pick	  one	  of	  the	  cases	  
to	  determine	  your	  earnings	  in	  this	  SituaGon	  
SituaGon	  3:	  Decision	  
•  Your	  income	  from	  the	  private	  account:	  
For	  each	  £1	  you	  put	  in	  your	  private	  account,	  you	  will	  receive	  
exactly	  £1.	  Nobody	  except	  you	  earns	  something	  from	  your	  
private	  account.	  
•  Your	  income	  from	  the	  project:	  
Each	  member	  will	  receive	  an	  income	  from	  the	  project	  
calculated	  as	  follows:	  
Income	  from	  the	  project	  =	  Sum	  of	  all	  transfers	  of	  the	  
members	  of	  the	  group	  x	  0.4	  
•  Your	  total	  income:	  
Your	  total	  income	  is	  the	  sum	  of	  your	  income	  from	  your	  




SituaGon	  3:	  Two	  kinds	  of	  decisions	  	  
•  “transfer”:	  how	  much	  of	  £10	  you	  want	  to	  transfer	  to	  
the	  project	  
•  “transfer	  table”:	  
	  
SituaGon	  3:	  EsGmate	  of	  Others’	  Decision	  
•  What	  is	  your	  esGmate	  of	  the	  average	  transfer	  
to	  the	  project	  of	  the	  other	  three	  group	  
members	  (round	  it	  up	  to	  the	  nearest	  integer)?	  
•  Precision	  awarded	  by	  extra	  £2	  per	  predicGon	  
±1	  gives	  £1	  per	  predicGon	  
±2	  gives	  £0.50	  per	  predicGon	  
±3	  or	  more	  gives	  £0	  per	  predicGon	  
SituaGon	  *:	  Puzzles	  
•  25	  puzzles	  given	  to	  you	  
•  If	  you	  answer	  10	  or	  more	  puzzles	  correctly	  you	  
will	  receive	  £10	  
•  If	  you	  answer	  less	  than	  10	  puzzles	  correctly	  you	  
will	  receive	  £0	  
•  This	  £10	  will	  not	  be	  directly	  payable	  to	  you	  but	  
rather	  will	  be	  used	  in	  subsequent	  situaGons	  
•  You	  have	  10mins	  to	  solve	  (at	  least)	  10	  puzzles	  
•  Copy	  your	  answers	  in	  the	  computer	  
SituaGon	  4:	  Decision	  
	  
Second	  
Mover	  First	  Mover	  
£10	  
Transfer	  





SituaGon	  4:	  PredicGons	  about	  Others	  
•  How	  many	  of	  the	  other	  15	  parGcipants	  in	  this	  
room	  do	  you	  think	  said	  that	  they	  will	  transfer	  £10	  
if	  they	  are	  chosen	  as	  FM?	  
•  How	  many	  of	  the	  other	  15	  parGcipants	  in	  this	  
room	  do	  you	  think	  said	  that	  they	  will	  transfer	  £15	  
back	  if	  they	  are	  chosen	  as	  SM?	  
•  Precision	  awarded	  by	  extra	  £2	  per	  predicGon	  
±1	  gives	  £1	  per	  predicGon	  
±2	  gives	  £0.50	  per	  predicGon	  
±3	  or	  more	  gives	  £0	  per	  predicGon	  
SituaGon	  5:	  Decisions	  
•  9	  different	  choices	  between	  £10	  and	  an	  all-­‐or	  
nothing	  lohery	  	  
Example	  
A:	  {	  £0	  if	  the	  die	  shows	  1	  or	  2;	  £15	  if	  the	  die	  
shows	  3,	  4,	  5,	  6,	  7,	  8,	  9,	  10}	  	  
B:	  {£10}	  
•  Computer	  will	  randomly	  pick	  one	  of	  the	  cases	  
to	  determine	  your	  earnings	  in	  this	  SituaGon	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SituaGon	  6:	  Decision	  
•  Your	  income	  from	  the	  private	  account:	  
For	  each	  £1	  you	  put	  in	  your	  private	  account,	  you	  will	  receive	  
exactly	  £1.	  Nobody	  except	  you	  earns	  something	  from	  your	  
private	  account.	  
•  Your	  income	  from	  the	  project:	  
Each	  member	  will	  receive	  an	  income	  from	  the	  project	  
calculated	  as	  follows:	  
Income	  from	  the	  project	  =	  Sum	  of	  all	  transfers	  of	  the	  
members	  of	  the	  group	  x	  0.4	  
•  Your	  total	  income:	  
Your	  total	  income	  is	  the	  sum	  of	  your	  income	  from	  your	  
private	  account	  and	  your	  income	  from	  the	  project.	  
	  
SituaGon	  6:	  Two	  kinds	  of	  decisions	  	  
•  “transfer”:	  how	  much	  of	  £10	  you	  want	  to	  transfer	  to	  
the	  project	  
•  “transfer	  table”:	  
	  
SituaGon	  6:	  EsGmate	  of	  Others’	  Decision	  
•  What	  is	  your	  esGmate	  of	  the	  average	  transfer	  
to	  the	  project	  of	  the	  other	  three	  group	  
members	  (round	  it	  up	  to	  the	  nearest	  integer)?	  
•  Precision	  awarded	  by	  extra	  £2	  per	  predicGon	  
±1	  gives	  £1	  per	  predicGon	  
±2	  gives	  £0.50	  per	  predicGon	  
±3	  or	  more	  gives	  £0	  per	  predicGon	  
Thank	  you	  for	  your	  parGcipaGon	  
	  
Please	  remain	  seated	  	  
unGl	  you	  are	  called	  up	  to	  	  
receive	  the	  envelope	  with	  your	  payment	  	  
and	  sign	  a	  receipt	  
A.3 Short Questionnaire
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Table	  No:	  _____	  
Short	  Questionnaire	  
1.	  Gender:	  	  Male	  /	  Female	  
2.	  Age:	  ______	  
3.	  Area	  of	  studies:	  __________________________________________________________________	  
4.	  Year	  of	  studies:	  __________	  
5.	  Nationality:	  _______________________________________	  
6.	  Which	  country	  have	  you	  spent	  most	  years	  of	  your	  life	  living	  in?	  ____________________________	  
7.	  How	  much	  do	  you	  spend	  on	  average	  on	  weekend	  entertainment?	  __£_____	  
	  
PLEASE	  LEAVE	  THIS	  ON	  YOUR	  TABLE.	  
	  
THANK	  YOU	  FOR	  YOUR	  PARTICIPATION	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